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Parties to a contract base their consensus on the facts known to them at the time of 
contracting – should there be an unforeseen change in these circumstances, it may 
no longer be just for one party to enforce the agreement against the other.  Because 
the losses and gains consequent upon a change in circumstances occur by chance, 
it is not fair to place the resultant burden on one party alone. 
 
Already in Roman times, moral philosophers wrote of the circumstances under which 
a promise would no longer bind.  Over the centuries this was extended into the realm 
of legally binding contracts under the banner of the clausula rebus sic stantibus, but 
this doctrine was vague and lax and it did not survive past the nineteenth century.  
With the rise of considerations of fairness in contracting, however, solutions to the 
problem of changed circumstances were once again deemed necessary.  This 
occurred in the civil law world, in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands as 
well as in the common law world, through the export of the English doctrine of 
frustration.  Today most Western legal systems recognise some form of rules to deal 
with changed circumstances, although the availability of this defence and the types 
of redress available vary from country to country.  Perhaps the best available 
solutions are to be found in the supranational model rules, such as the Unidroit 
PICC, the PECL and the DCFR. 
 
South Africa allows discharge in situations of objective supervening impossibility, but 
not for supervening change of circumstances.  Comparatively, this leaves a gap in 
our contract law.  The latest developments in constitutional law suggest that fairness 
in contracting has become an important limitation on the value of contractual 
certainty.  With regard to comparative law, the argument can thus validly be made 
that fairness in contracting demands that the problem of changed circumstances be 
addressed.  This should best be done through the inclusion of a common law rule, 
based on the equivalent hardship provisions of the PICC, read with the PECL and 
the DCFR.  Renegotiation by the parties themselves would be the ideal outcome 
after a fundamental change of circumstances, alternatively a court should modify or 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
1.1 The nature of the problem 
 
It is a fundamental tenet of any system of contract law that agreements which have 
been validly concluded should be enforceable at the instance of the parties to those 
agreements.1  Hardship may result, however, if a change of circumstances 
intervenes in the factual matrix of the contract.  In some legal systems the legal 
response to such a calamity would be that agreements must be upheld and that non-
performance will result in an action for breach of contract.2  What this type of 
approach fails to take account of, however, is that a party’s offer or acceptance is 
usually based on certain motivating factors, which may or may not be disclosed.  
Should there be a change in circumstances following the conclusion of the contract, 
the new situation which prevails may be so different to that under which the contract 
was concluded that had the relevant party known the change would occur, he would 
never have contracted, or at least not on the terms he did.   
 
This raises the normative question of whether it is just for a party to still be held 
bound to the contract following such a change of circumstances.  To allow discharge 
of a promise too easily would attack the certainty of contracts, which is not in the 
commercial interests of a country’s legal system.  To enforce the promise regardless 
of the change would often, however, be too harsh, since this would place the burden 
of an unforeseen occurrence on one party alone.  Quite apart from this it may be that 
performance is objectively no longer possible. 
 
Clearly some sort of balance must be struck between these competing concerns, 
sometimes referred to by the Latin phrases pacta sunt servanda (agreements must 
be observed) and clausula rebus sic stantibus (an implied condition that 
circumstances remain unchanged).3  Individual bodies of rules which deal with this 
problem thus usually place certain limits on the circumstances under which 
discharge will be permitted, which will be investigated in the comparative studies 
                                               
1 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz Introduction to Comparative Law (1998) at 486 – 515. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Cf RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa (2006) at 473. 
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which follow in later chapters.  The rules which have resulted to deal with this issue 
vary from country to country and can be traced back through the ages into antiquity. 
 
Consider the following example:  Party A contracts with party B that A will hire B’s 
rooms overlooking a coronation procession in London.4  The rooms are to be used 
only during the day of the procession and the rental is suitably enhanced because of 
the occurrence of this event.  Two days before the envisaged date, the king falls ill 
and a decision is taken to operate on him.  As a result the procession is cancelled.  
Party A refuses to continue with the lease agreement and party B sues on the 
contract for the promised rental.  
 
The change of circumstances may also affect the supplier of goods or services, 
however.  Consider a further example:  Several months after the nationalisation of 
the Suez Canal, and during the crisis resulting from this political upheaval, party A 
contracts to carry a cargo of party B’s wheat from Texas in the United States to Iran 
in the Middle East for a flat rate.  The contract does not specify the route to be taken, 
but conventionally A would make the voyage via the Suez Canal, a journey of 16 000 
kilometres.  A month later and several days after the ship has sailed from Texas, the 
Suez Canal is closed.  The voyage must now follow the longer 21 000 kilometre 
route around the Cape of Good Hope.  A refuses to complete the voyage unless B 
pays an increased fee for its services.5  
 
Any contract law casebook will provide further examples of changes in 
circumstances which have had dire consequences for the affected agreement.  
Typically these examples represent the major upheavals or calamities of human life, 
such as war, hyper-inflation or change in political regime.  A country such as 
Germany, which has a highly developed set of laws to deal with changed 
circumstances, has experienced all three of the above in the last century, which 
demonstrates that a country’s legal development often mirrors its history.  Clearly 
this is a well-documented problem requiring some sort of response.  
                                               
4 This illustration is based on Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740.  See also Second Restatement of 
Contracts § 265, Illustration 1. 
5 Second Restatement of Contracts § 261, Illustration 9.  This illustration is based on Transatlantic 
Financing Corp v United States 363 F 2d 312 (DC Cir 1966).  
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1.2 The treatment of this problem in other legal systems 
 
Of course the balance struck between pacta sunt servanda and discharge for 
changed circumstances will vary from legal system to legal system.  Some systems 
come down firmly on the side of contractual certainty.  In South Africa, discharge is 
allowed only for objective impossibility of performance.  Any change which does not 
result in impossibility does not lead to discharge.6  Other systems are more 
permissive, however. 
 
In medieval times a doctrine was developed to deal with changed circumstances, 
which goes by the name alluded to above: clausula rebus sic stantibus.7  The origins 
of this doctrine lay largely in canon law and hence the concern was originally as to 
the morality of breaking a promise.8  The general idea was that a promise, later even 
a contractual undertaking, could be repudiated if circumstances had changed to the 
point where you would not have promised had you had the benefit of hindsight.9  Of 
course the constraints of daily life were different in medieval times, and the 
subsequent demise of this rule in the nineteenth century needs to be investigated.10  
Parallels between this antiquated law and the laws prevalent in many modern states 
bear inquiry, however.  This will be attempted in chapters four and five below. 
 
As stated above modern Germany has an advanced set of rules to deal with 
changed circumstances.  Although the framers of the German Civil Code (BGB) had 
rejected the concept of discharge for changed circumstances at the time of 
promulgation, the subsequent history of the country nevertheless required the 
development of such a doctrine.  The adoption of the theory of Wegfall der 
Geschäftsgrundlage relied on the good faith provision in the BGB11 and stands as an 
                                               
6 Hersman v Shapiro 1926 TPD 367 at 375 – 377; Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v Owner 
of MV Snow Crystal 2008 (4) SA 111 (SCA) at [28]. 
7 See generally on this doctrine Robert Feenstra “Impossibilitas and clausula rebus sic stantibus” in 
Alan Watson (ed) Daube Noster (1974) at 77. 
8 Ibid and see below at chapter 3. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Zweigert & Kötz op cit note 1 at 519; James Gordley The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract 
Doctrine (1991) at 185 – 186.  This will be attempted in chapter 3 below. 
11 § 242 of the BGB, which reads as follows: “An obligor has a duty to perform according to the 
requirements of good faith, taking customary practice into consideration.”  Translation found at the 
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example of a proactive approach to changed circumstances.  Other modern civil law 
countries, such as the Netherlands, likewise recognise a doctrine of changed 
circumstances.12 
 
In a largely parallel development, the English common law has also incorporated a 
doctrine of changed circumstances, which goes by the name of frustration (first 
formulated in 186313).  This doctrine has stood the test of time and has been 
exported to many leading common law countries around the world, including the 
United States and Australia. 
 
A further notable comparative development in this regard is the inclusion of doctrines 
dealing with changed circumstances, or “hardship”, in several leading systems of 
international model rules, namely Unidroit’s Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (PICC), the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).  Even the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), which is intended to pave the way for a future 
unified civil law in Europe (a Common Frame of Reference)14 contains rules on 
hardship.  While these supra-national laws are currently binding by agreement only, 
they have been developed through careful study of leading international legal 
systems and thus merit attention in an examination of the problem of changed 
circumstances. 
 
1.3 The problem in South Africa 
 
In South Africa, as noted above and as will be shown more fully in the next chapter, 
a change of circumstances will only discharge a contract if the change results in 
actual impossibility of performance.  Any change with lesser effect will not affect the 
enforceability of the contract.  There is no indication at present that South African 
courts are willing to recognise discharge on these grounds.  The picture is thus bleak 
for South African contract law: should a major calamity, such as war, strike our 
                                                                                                                                                  
website for the Bundesministerium der Justiz: www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb.  (Last 
accessed 12 January 2010.) 
12 Art 6:258 of the BW. 
13 Taylor v Caldwell (1863) B&S 826. 
14 Christian von Bar, Eric Clive & Hans Schulte-Nölke Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law - Draft Common Frame of Reference (2009) at Introduction 1. 
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economy, it will have no device to deal with it.  One need only look across our 
Northern border to Zimbabwe to see how hyper-inflation can negatively impact upon 
a country and upset contractual bargains.  Extreme pessimism aside, however, 
lesser calamities occur frequently and it is entirely foreseeable that a fundamental 
and unforeseen change of circumstances could strike a contract in this country.  The 
fact that we have no doctrine to deal with changed circumstances could thus be seen 
as a shortcoming in our law. 
 
If South Africa is to develop a doctrine of changed circumstances then the question 
is as to what form it would take.  Would the courts develop the common law to the 
point where there was a new doctrine, or a residual term in all contracts, which 
enabled discharge following a fundamental change of circumstances?  Or would this 
be a sufficiently drastic move to require legislative enactment to bring it about?  If the 
common law route is to be followed, what would be the doctrinal basis on which the 
new rule would be incorporated?  Some sort of peg on which to hang the doctrine 
would arguably be required by the South African courts, comparable to the good faith 
provision in the German BGB.  Furthermore what form would the new doctrine take?  
While an indigenous solution may be preferable, there are a myriad of foreign 
models on which to draw as exemplified by those mentioned in the previous section.   
 
1.4 The nature and methodology of this inquiry 
 
The aim of this thesis is to elucidate the problem of changed circumstances with 
reference to the lacuna in this regard in South African law.  A central goal is to 
propose a way forward in dealing with this problem in our country.  Thus from the 
outset there will be a focus on South African law.  The first substantive chapter of 
this work, chapter two, will consider the status of the defence of changed 
circumstances in South African law and it will continue to identify possible existing 
rules which could be used to develop an indigenous solution to the problem.  Before 
anything concrete can be put forward, however, it will be necessary to set the scene 
both historically and comparatively.  Chapter three will therefore address the 
historical doctrine of the clausula rebus sic stantibus.  This will provide the backdrop 
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against which the development of the modern doctrines of changed circumstances 
can play out.   
 
Given South Africa’s close legal ties historically with English law, it is apt that chapter 
four focuses on the doctrine of frustration and the legal developments which it has 
spawned, such as the doctrines of impracticability and frustration in US law.  This 
chapter will establish categories of cases into which instances of hardship can be 
divided.  There is evidence of the English doctrine of frustration in the South African 
case law – which will have been explored in chapter two.  This means that 
knowledge of the English system is vital to the analysis of our own law.  Given the 
importance of the English common law worldwide, it is also natural to investigate this 
doctrine in other common law countries, such as the USA. 
 
Chapter five will look at two examples of civil law systems, namely German law and 
Dutch law.  These are codified systems, but they retain ties with the old ius 
commune and hence the clausula doctrine.  These systems will also provide an 
interesting study on the role which good faith can play in this regard.  The final 
investigation will be into some of the leading examples of supranational model rules 
which deal with changed circumstances.  The PECL and PICC systems mentioned 
above will for example be examined in this light.  Since these systems are the 
culmination of legal developments in Europe and the rest of the world at large, they 
provide an interesting model, unconstrained by history or precedent, as to how to 
deal with the problem at hand.  These will be examined in chapter six. 
 
Chapter seven will consider good faith and issues of fairness in contracting – again 
with reference to leading international legal systems, but particularly within South 
Africa.  Since good faith has played such an important role with regard to change of 
circumstances in Germany and the Netherlands, it is necessary to examine this 
possibility in South Africa as well.  The introduction of the Constitution in South Africa 
has also infused our law with new values and ideals and this could provide a 




The final substantive chapter, chapter eight, will set out and evaluate the 
developments of the preceding chapters.  This will shed some light on ways in which 
South Africa can develop a doctrine of changed circumstances.  Thus the overall aim 
of this thesis is to undertake a historical and comparative analysis of the problem of 
changed circumstances in contract law and to suggest the best way forward for 
South Africa to address the lacuna in our own law in this regard.  
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The aim of this chapter is to set out the existing position in South African law on 
change of circumstances.  This investigation will necessitate an examination of all 
the existing rules in contract law which deal with this issue.  Reformist arguments 
that a change in circumstances can be dealt with by an equitable intervention, based 
on good faith, public policy or the Constitution will not be considered here.  These 
will be dealt with in chapter seven. 
 
A change in circumstances subsequent to the conclusion of a contract is primarily 
dealt with in South African law by the doctrine of supervening impossibility of 
performance.1  If the change results in objective impossibility, the contract will be 
discharged.2  A supposition, in the sense of a common assumption between the 
parties, may also terminate a contract, but only if the state of affairs assumed related 
to events past or present at the time of conclusion of the contract.3  For the purposes 
of this inquiry, it is the supposition in futuro which is most relevant, since this is 
where the parties to a contract make their agreement contingent upon the 
occurrence of a future state of affairs.  Should circumstances change, so that what 
was assumed does not eventuate, then should discharge be permitted under the 
supposition in futuro?  A further consideration is whether there may be a tacit term in 
a contract that it would cease to bind should circumstances change.  Supervening 
impossibility will be considered in section 2 of this chapter and suppositions and tacit 
terms, which to a certain extent overlap, in section 3.   
 
Section 2 will deal not only with our common law rules on impossibility, but also the 
pervasive influence of the English doctrine of frustration in this area.  Given the close 
                                               
1 Peters, Flamman and Co v Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 427 at 434; Transnet Ltd t/a National 
Ports Authority v Owner of MV Snow Crystal 2008 (4) SA 111 (SCA) at [28]; Schalk van der Merwe et 
al Contract – General Principles (2007) at 541; RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 
(2006) at 472. 
2 Hersman v Shapiro 1926 TPD 367 at 375 - 377; Snow Crystal supra note 1 at [28]; Van der Merwe 
et al op cit note 1 at 542; Christie op cit note 1 at 93, 472. 
3 Fourie v CDMO Homes (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 21 (A) at 26 – 27; Van der Merwe et al op cit note 1 at 
285; Christie op cit note 1 at 327. 
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connection between the English and South African legal systems due to our history 
as a British colony, as well as to the past tendency of many local judges to look to 
English law for guidance,4 it is not surprising that there is evidence of the doctrine of 
frustration in the South African case law.  It will be seen that there are dicta in favour 
of adopting the English doctrine, or at least drawing on its substance, which raises 
the question of the suitability of employing frustration in a South African context.  
Section 2 will attempt an analysis of past attempts to incorporate the doctrine of 
frustration into South African law, in order to facilitate a discussion of the deeper 
question of whether the English model of frustration is a good solution to the problem 
of changed circumstances in South Africa.  This will be attempted in chapter eight, 
after the English model has been discussed in detail in chapter four.   
 
The investigation of suppositions and tacit terms in section 3 will explore the overlap 
between these two concepts.  Finally the continuing relevance of the supposition in 
futuro will be considered.  This much maligned concept is analogous to the English 
notion of frustration of purpose, providing a possible indigenous means of dealing 
with the failure of a common foundation of a contract.  The evaluation in this section 
will thus focus on the role which the supposition in futuro, or an appropriately 
adapted concept of a tacit condition, could play to address the problem of changed 
circumstances. 
 
Change of circumstances is recognised in the limited context of specific performance 
in South African law, in that hardship to the defendant may influence a court to 
exercise its discretion to deny an award of specific performance as a remedy for 
breach of contract.5  For the sake of completeness, this notion needs to be 
discussed as well. 
 
A final development requiring consideration is the draft Bill on the Control of 
Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms, 
issued by the South African Law Commission (as it then was), as the outcome of the 
                                               
4 Compare the argument of Philip J Thomas “Bona fides, Roman values and legal science” (2004) 
Fundamina 188 at 189 – 190. 
5 Haynes v King William’s Town Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) at 381B-E; Barclays National Bank 
Ltd v Natal Fire Extinguishers Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 650 (D) at 654H – 655H; 
Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd v Erconovaal Ltd 1985 (4) SA 615 (T) at 627A – 628I. 
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1998 Report on Project 47.6  This Bill will be considered in section 5, since it 
contains specific rules on how courts should approach the problem of changed 
circumstances. 
 
The overall aim of this chapter is thus to evaluate existing South African law on 
changed circumstances and to lay a foundation for an inquiry into possible means of 
expansion to accommodate such a doctrine within our contract law. 
 
2.2 Supervening impossibility 
 
2.2.1 Requirements for the doctrine of supervening impossibility  
In a recent pronouncement on the requirements for supervening impossibility to 
operate as a defence to a claim for performance, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
stated as follows: 
“As a general rule impossibility of performance brought about by vis maior or casus fortuitus 
will excuse performance of a contract.  But it will not always do so.  In each case it is 
necessary to ‘look to the nature of the contract, the relation of the parties, the circumstances 
of the case, and the nature of the impossibility invoked by the defendant, to see whether the 
general rule ought, in the particular circumstances of the case, to be applied’.  The rule will 
not avail a defendant if the impossibility is self-created; nor will it avail the defendant if the 
impossibility is due to his or her fault.”7 
 
As authority for this synopsis, the SCA referred in particular to Hersman v Shapiro,8 
from which the quoted insert in the above passage is drawn.  The Hersman case is 
undoubtedly seminal in the South African law of impossibility of performance, and 
will be analysed presently.  The exceptions to this doctrine, namely self-created (or 
subjective) impossibility and impossibility due to the fault of the defendant (which is 
actually a form of breach and is also known as “prevention of performance”)9 are not 
central to the present inquiry and will not be considered here.  As stated in the 
introduction, the focus of this examination of supervening impossibility is on the 
definitional requirements of impossibility, since this will inform an inquiry into which 
                                               
6 Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts 
7 Snow Crystal supra note 1 at [28] (footnotes omitted). 
8 Supra note 2. 
9 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 1 at 366. 
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types of change of circumstances excuse performance.  In a contract struck by 
supervening impossibility the general rule is that the reciprocal obligations are 
discharged.10  The position is the same as if performance under the contract had 
been impossible from the beginning and hence the contract is retrospectively invalid 
(e tunc) and performance can only be reclaimed via the law of unjustified 
enrichment.11  In a continuous contract such as employment, where performance is 
due from month to month, however, upon discharge a party may not reclaim past 
performance.12  This type of contract is thus discharged prospectively (e nunc).13  
 
Although Peters, Flamman and Co v Kokstad Municipality14 is not mentioned in the 
extract from the Snow Crystal case above, a historical examination of impossibility in 
contract should really start with this case.  Peters, Flamman marks the turning point 
in this country with regard to the impossibility defence: before this case, South 
African courts had tended to follow the English approach of absolute contracts, as 
laid down in that country in Paradine v Jane.15  Solomon ACJ, however, began his 
discussion of the law on impossibility in Peters, Flamman with the simple 
pronouncement:  
“By the Civil Law a contract is void if at the time of its inception its performance is impossible: 
impossibilium nulla obligatio (D. 50.17.185).  So also where a contract has become 
impossible of performance after it had been entered into the general rule was that the position 
is then the same as if it had been impossible from the beginning…”16 
 
The Acting Chief Justice added: 
                                               
10 D. 50.17.185, cited in Peters, Flamman supra note 1 at 434. 
11 Daniel Visser Unjustified Enrichment (2008) at 481; Christie op cit note 1 at 472.  For a discussion 
of the enrichment aspects of supervening impossibility see chapter 8 at 8.6. 
12 Visser op cit note 11 at 481. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Supra note 1. 
15 1647 Aleyn 26.  The concept of “absolute contracts” is defined in chapter 4.  A contract is absolute 
if discharge will not be permitted for any reason, including impossibility of performance.  For  earlier 
South African decisions following this case see Hay v The Divisional Council of King William’s Town 
(1880) 1 EDC 97; Morgan & Ramsey v Cornelius & Hollis (1910) 31 NLR 447; Algoa Milling Co v 
Arkell & Douglas 1918 AD 145. 
16 Peters, Flamman supra note 1 at 434.  The quotation from the Digest means “impossibility gives 
rise to no obligation”. 
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“Unfortunately the rules of the Civil Law appear to have been ignored in several cases on this 
subject which have come before our Courts, which have been guided entirely by the decisions 
of the English Courts.”17 
 
In casu, the defendants had contracted to light the streets of Kokstad for a period of 
20 years from 1907.18  During the First World War the defendants (who were 
described in the judgment as “enemy subjects”) were imprisoned and were hence 
unable to perform their obligation.19  The plaintiff municipality sued for compensation, 
but the Appellate Division held in line with the above statements of law that 
performance by the defendants had been rendered impossible and that the contract 
was hence terminated.20  
 
This was a contract for personal services, however: the imprisonment of the 
defendants could not but render performance under such a contract impossible.  In 
Hersman v Shapiro, the contract called for the delivery of a certain quantity of white 
corn.21  Heavy rains during the growing season which continued through the 
harvesting period resulted in a failure of the corn crop, however: the corn which was 
produced was discoloured and of an inferior quality.22  As a result there was a 
shortage of the required type of corn in the Transvaal area and the defendant 
pleaded impossibility to the plaintiff’s claim for performance.23  The court, however, 
considered the nature of the impossibility requirement and concluded that 
performance in this case had not been rendered impossible, but merely more difficult 
and expensive.24  The defendant had not looked to surrounding provinces and 
countries and had not offered “fanciful” prices: evidence led had established that 
“white corn” was not unavailable, but merely scarce.25 
 
                                               
17 Ibid at 435. 
18 Ibid at 432. 
19 Ibid at 434. 
20 Ibid at 437. 
21 Hersman supra note 2 at 369. 
22 Ibid at 370. 
23 Ibid at 371. 




In the course of reaching his decision, Stratford J discussed the finding in Peters, 
Flamman as well as comparing English and South African law on impossibility.26  His 
conclusion was as follows: 
“Therefore, the rule that I propose to apply in the present case is the general rule that 
impossibility of performance does in general excuse the performance of a contract, but does 
not do so in all cases, and that we must look to the nature of the contract, the relation of the 
parties, the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the impossibility invoked by the 
defendant, to see whether that general rule ought, in the particular circumstances of the case, 
to be applied.”27 
 
This extract, part of which was repeated in the Snow Crystal case (as cited above), 
can now be seen in context.  The repetition of this passage indicates acceptance by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of the view that the impossibility in question must be 
absolute.  Of course what is impossible is a question of fact and depends on factors 
such as what the state of technology is at the time for performance.28  In 1962 the 
American textbook author, Corbin, wrote that it was absolutely impossible to go to 
the moon.29  Ramsden cites the example of a boat carrying a ring over the ocean to 
an exhibition in which it is to be the central attraction.30  If the ship sinks and the ring 
is thereby lost, it may be possible by modern means of salvage and at vast expense 
to recover it, but practical sense should dictate that this is impossible.     
 
In the Snow Crystal case the appellant, Transnet, had failed to make a dry dock 
available for a ship (called the MV Snow Crystal) despite this dock having been 
booked six months in advance.31  The respondent had instituted action for breach of 
contract, against which Transnet raised several defences, one of which was that 
performance had been impossible since another ship was in the dry dock at that 
                                               
26 Ibid at 371 – 373. 
27 Ibid at 373. 
28 Cf William Arthur Ramsden Supervening Impossibility of Performance in the South African Law of 
Contract (1985) at 64. 
29 Arthur Corbin Contracts (1962) at para 1325.  Cited in Guenter Treitel Frustration and Force 
Majeure (2004) at 262. 
30 Ramsden op cit note 28 at 64.  This example appears in the writing of other authors, such as JC De 
Wet and AH Van Wyk Kontraktereg (1992) at 85 – 86.  Treitel op cit note 29 at 265 cites the English 
case of Moss v Smith (1859) 9 CB 94 at 103 where a similar example is given and notes the inclusion 
of such an example in  Karl Larenz Schuldrecht 14th ed (1987) Vol I at 99. 
31 Snow Crystal supra note 1 at [29]. 
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time.32  The SCA held that since a further dry dock was available for the obstructing 
ship and the dock master could have been forced (by Transnet) to effect the 
necessary transfer under the relevant regulations, impossibility was not present.33 
 
In this brief excursus of supervening impossibility it remains only to deal with the 
nature of events which can give rise to impossibility and the resultant forms which 
the impossibility can take.  South Africa’s Roman-Dutch common law refers to vis 
maior (higher power) and casus fortuitus (an event occurring by chance) as being 
the necessary causes of impossibility.34  Innes CJ discussed the meaning of casus 
fortuitus in New Heriot Gold Mining Co Ltd v Union Government:35  
  “Casus fortuitus, which is a species of vis maior, is a term well understood and needing no 
formal definition.  It includes all direct acts of nature, the violence of which could not 
reasonably have been foreseen or guarded against.  The doctrine that the operation of such 
visitations excludes civil liability overlies the fields both of contract and of tort.”36   
 
Thus the impossibility must be caused by an unforeseen event.  This may result in 
physical impossibility if performance can in no way be carried out, such as (for 
instance) if the subject matter of the contract is destroyed.37  Alternatively the vis 
maior may take the form of a legislative enactment, making performance not 
physically but legally impossible.  In Bayley v Harwood,38 premises had been used 
as a health and pleasure resort by the respondent owner.39  The premises were then 
leased to the appellant who intended to use them for the same purpose.40  A licence 
was required for this purpose, however, and during the currency of the lease the 
licensing authority had refused to renew the licence unless structural alterations 
were made to the premises.41  The lessor refused to make such alterations.42  The 
lessee therefore vacated the premises, tendering payment of rent up until the date 
                                               
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid at [28] – [30]. 
34 See Ramsden op cit note 28 at 49n44 for a list of old authorities on the meaning of these terms. 
35 1916 AD 415. 
36 Ibid at 433. 
37 For a general discussion of physical, as well as legal impossibility see Ramsden op cit note 28 at 
59 – 61. 
38 1954 (3) SA 498 (A) 
39 Ibid at 508. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid at 504. 
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on which he had moved out.43  The Appellate Division held that this legislative 
prohibition on the lessee’s trade constituted vis maior44 and that in consequence he 
was entitled to a remission of rent from the date on which he had vacated the 
premises.45  
 
The brief sketch of the law on supervening impossibility outlined above will indicate 
that this doctrine is not really compatible with any concept of discharge for changed 
circumstances.  The threshold required for supervening impossibility to discharge 
performance is objective impossibility, which is construed strictly by the courts.46  No 
lesser tests such as increase in difficulty or expense will suffice, although some SA 
writers do suggest that the standard of impossibility is a pragmatic one (a 
“verkeersmaatstaf”) with the concomitant view that a measure of flexibility exists due 
to the circumstances of the case.47  Thus while a change in circumstances may be 
unforeseen, unless it actually renders performance impossible, there will be no 
discharge on the grounds of supervening impossibility in South African contract law.  
The further possibility does exist, however, that the parties may include an express 
hardship clause in their agreement, which would make provision for changes in 
circumstances falling short of impossibility, and thereby alleviate the harshness of 
South African law.   
 
2.2.2 The influence of the doctrine of frustration  
 
2.2.2.1 Frustration v supervening impossibility: essential differences  
The nature of the doctrine of frustration in English law will be dealt with below in 
chapter four.  The comparable doctrine of supervening impossibility in South African 
law was discussed under the previous heading.  The different titles given to these 
two doctrines belie the fact that both perform essentially the same function in their 
legal system of origin, namely governing the impact of change of circumstances on a 
                                               
43 Ibid at 509. 
44 Ibid at 503G. 
45 Ibid at 505A, 508B, 511A. 
46 Hersman supra note 2 at 375 – 377; Snow Crystal supra note 1 at [28]. 
47 De Wet & Van Wyk op cit note 30 at 85 – 86; Van der Merwe et al op cit note 1 at 188.  See section 
2.2.3 below for further discussion. 
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contract. As Howie JA stated in the recent case of Nuclear Fuels Corporation of SA 
(Pty) Ltd v Orda AG: 
“While the English law of frustration differs from the South African law of impossibility of 
performance in certain respects, there is also a strong degree of similarity....”48 
 
In South Africa, as we have seen, a change of circumstances must result in absolute 
impossibility of performance in order for discharge to occur.  This rule  originates in 
the civil law, dating back to Roman times.  The English legal theory is slightly 
different: frustration occurs where there has been a radical change in the nature of 
the contractual obligation due to a change in circumstances.49  Should such a 
change in circumstances supervene, the contract comes to an end forthwith.50  This 
doctrine developed gradually in the common law, although the seminal case on 
frustration cites civil law authority for its finding that impossibility terminated a 
contract.51  Although frustration initially covered only impossibility, the doctrine in its 
modern form has a wider sphere of application and encompasses in addition legal 
impossibility52 and the notion of frustration of purpose.53   
 
Legal impossibility is a recognised ground of discharge in South Africa just as in 
English law, illustrating once again the overlap between frustration and our local 
notion of impossibility, but the concept of frustration of purpose is alien to South 
Africa’s Roman-Dutch common law.  The essential idea behind frustration of purpose 
is that when the “foundation” of a contract falls away, the contract falls away with it.54  
This means that performance need not have become impossible, but merely that a 
common assumption of the contracting parties – on which the contract was based – 
has proved false.55  In order to bring this notion under the umbrella of South African 
law, there have been attempts in the past to apply the English doctrine of frustration 
of purpose as a legal transplant.  This is evidenced by discussions of frustration of 
purpose in the South African case law, to which we shall turn presently.   
                                               
48 1996 (4) SA 1190 (A) at 1214C. 
49 Compare Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696 at 729, discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
50 J Lauritzen AS v Wijsmuller BV (“The Super Servant Two”) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 at [8]. 
51 Taylor v Caldwell 3 B&S 826 at 833 – 834. 
52 Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd v Fraser (James B) & Co Ltd [1944] AC 265. 
53 Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740. 
54 Cf Krell v Henry supra note 53 at 754. 
55 See the discussion of the supposition in SA law below at section 2.3. 
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2.2.2.2 Frustration of purpose in the South African case law 
English law has had an insidious and pervasive influence on South Africa in the area 
of changed circumstances, as the above discussion of supervening impossibility 
shows.  Although the doctrine of absolute contracts was thrown out in Peters, 
Flamman, references to the doctrine of frustration remain in the South African case 
law.  As noted above, this is natural, given the history of British colonisation in South 
Africa and the fact that in many respects the doctrines of frustration and impossibility 
overlap.  Frustration of purpose, however, as a specific instance of the broader 
doctrine of frustration, is a more controversial issue.  Although frustration of purpose 
is given a very restricted role to play in English law,56 it has the potential, if 
unchecked, to undermine the South African protection of the binding force of 
contracts.57  An attempt will be made here to trace references to the doctrine of 
frustration in the South African law of impossibility and in particular to highlight 
instances of frustration of purpose. 
 
2.2.2.2.1 Cases in favour of the doctrine of frustration 
Aside from the discussion of English law in Peters, Flamman58 mentioned above, the 
typical starting point in this type of inquiry is with the following statement of De 
Villiers JA in African Realty Trust Ltd v Holmes:  
“There is authority for the proposition that when the basis of a contract falls away the contract 
falls away with it.” 59 
 
The authority to which the Judge of Appeal was referring was first and foremost the 
Coronation cases in Britain, of which Krell v Henry60 was cited in particular.  As will 
be seen in chapter four, this case is the locus classicus on frustration of purpose.  De 
Villiers JA cited not only English authority, however.  He also cited various passages 
                                               
56 See chapter 4 section 4.2.4.2. 
57 This is not to say, however, that discharge should never be granted in a situation of frustration of 
purpose.  Under appropriate circumstances and provided a significant threshold test is met, this thesis 
is in favour of discharge or contract modification due to frustration of purpose in South African law.  
See chapter 8. 
58 Supra note 1. 
59 1922 AD 389 at 400. 
60 Krell v Henry supra note 53. 
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from the Digest and the theories of certain continental authors, including 
Windscheid’s doctrine of Voraussetzung.61   
 
The basic facts of African Realty Trust were that the defendant (the appellant in this 
case) was purchasing agricultural land from the plaintiff and the contract between 
them provided that the agreement would lapse if certain works were not carried out 
by the Irrigation Board.62  One of these works was to construct a rock-fill dam on the 
Sundays River above the lands the defendant was purchasing.63  The director of the 
Irrigation Board was then replaced and a decision was taken to instead build a 
concrete dam, at nearly twice the price.64  This would greatly increase the cost of 
water on the land being purchased and the defendant sought to resile from the 
agreement.65  The court held (Solomon JA dissenting) that the contract allowed for a 
change in the nature of works done by the Irrigation Board and that the terms of the 
agreement made provision for a change of circumstances.66  The defendant was 
therefore held bound to the purchase of the land in question.67 
 
This rendered the whole discussion of frustration of purpose obiter.  De Villiers JA 
had hinted at this immediately after his discussion of the English doctrine with the 
following telling qualification: 
 “But, as a Court, we are after all not concerned with the motives which actuated the parties in 
entering into the contract, except in so far as they were expressly made part and parcel of the 
contract or are part of the contract by clear implication.”68   
 
The Appellate Division again had reason to consider the defence that the purpose of 
a contractual venture had been frustrated in MacDuff & Co Ltd (In Liquidation) v 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd.69  In that case MacDuff & Co had 
been involved in the import and export of coal in South Africa and was to have been 
                                               
61 See the discussion by De Villiers JA of this proposition at 400 – 402.  Windscheid’s doctrine of the 
Voraussetzung dealt with the problem of changed circumstances using the device of a supposition 
(see chapter 5).  Suppositions are discussed below in section 2.3. 
62 African Realty Trust supra note 59 at 391 – 392. 
63 Ibid at 390. 
64 Ibid at 392. 
65 Ibid at 393. 
66 Ibid at 403. 
67 Ibid at 398, 404. 
68 Ibid. 
69 1924 AD 573. 
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taken over by the defendant company.70  In an agreement concluded in November 
1920, the plaintiff was liquidated and its business transferred to the defendant.71  
Taking over the business of the plaintiff proved not to be to the advantage of the 
defendant, however, due to a subsequent slump in the coal market.72  Indeed, 
honouring its obligation would have led to significant losses.  The defendant 
therefore purchased the shares of all the shareholders in the plaintiff company in an 
attempt to make the problem go away.73  An action for breach of contract was 
brought by the liquidator of the plaintiff company against the defendant. 
 
One of the defences raised by the defendant company was that it became 
impossible for it to fulfil the agreement of November 1920.  In argument, this plea 
was extended along the lines that the agreement had been made on the basis that a 
particular state of affairs would continue to exist, and that since this state of affairs 
had come to an end, the purpose of the contract had been upset.74  Having found 
that the defendant had failed to establish impossibility, Solomon JA then turned to 
consider the defence of frustration of purpose.75  In support of the defendant’s 
contention he quoted the oft-cited passage from Tamplin Steamship Co v Anglo-
American Petroleum Co76 to the effect that in an instance of frustration a Court 
should examine the contract to see whether the parties implied that the contract 
should come to an end under those circumstances.77  This is the classic 
pronouncement of the implied term approach to frustration in English law.78  
Solomon JA cited it as authority for the proposition that a contract may come to an 
end if the state of affairs on which it rests ceases to exist.  The Judge of Appeal 
noted that there was scant authority for this finding in South African law, outside of 
                                               
70 Ibid at 583. 
71 Ibid at 584. 
72 Ibid at 584. 
73 Ibid at 584 – 585. 
74 See the discussion of this defence at 600 – 607.  
75 Ibid at 602.  Solomon JA had earlier pronounced in Peters, Flamman supra note 1 at 435 that 
South African courts had too willingly followed English law on impossibility in the past.  This meant 
that impossibility discharged a contract and ended the doctrine of absolute contracts.  Here Solomon 
JA is discussing a separate defence of frustration of purpose, which he seems to distinguish from the 
doctrine of impossibility.  His authority is English and he seems to ignore his own injunction to rather 
follow Civil law authorities in this area. 
76 [1916] 2 AC 397. 
77 The cited passage appears at p 403 of the Tamplin case supra note 76.  The extract appears at 
603 in the MacDuff case supra note 69. 
78 See the discussion thereof in chapter 4. 
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the finding of the Cape Provincial Division in Schlengemann v Meyer Bridgens & 
Co.79  Solomon JA assumed this finding to be good law.80 
 
In line with his assumption, Solomon JA examined the relevant change of 
circumstance, namely the decline in profitability of the coal trade.  He came to the 
conclusion that there would have been heavy losses for the defendant had it 
observed the contract, but that this did not amount to anything more than 
“commercial impossibility”, which was not a ground of discharge in English or South 
African law.81  The judge stated that the defendant company was aware the price 
might fluctuate and could have provided against this in its contract.82   
 
The MacDuff case thus provides only weak support for frustration of purpose 
doctrine: while Solomon JA assumed this was part of South African law, this finding 
did not avail the defendant, since the relevant change of circumstances was held to 
have been foreseeable.  This case and African Realty Trust are, however, the major 
Appellate Division pronouncements upon frustration of purpose in South Africa.  This 
illustrates the dearth of authority in support of this concept.  It is telling that this 
doctrine was never unequivocally adopted by the Appellate Division, even in the 
period in which the civil law notion of impossibility was relatively young as a defence 
and the influence of English law was still felt in this area.   
 
References to frustration continued to crop up in the provincial divisions, however.  
The first of these cases has already been referred to above and was cited in the 
MacDuff case: Schlengemann v Meyer, Bridgens and Co.83  The change of 
circumstances in that case was that the plaintiff, an erstwhile director in the 
defendant company, had been kept under house arrest for the duration of World War 
One.84  This prevented him from performing his duties as a director and he was 
removed from this office by the remaining directors.  As a founding member of the 
company, Schlengemann sued for reinstatement as soon as the war time restrictions 
                                               
79 1920 CPD 494.  This case will be discussed below. 
80 MacDuff supra note 69 at 603. 
81 Ibid at 606. 
82 Ibid at 607. 
83 Supra note 79. 
84 Ibid at 500. 
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on his freedom were removed.85  The defendant argued that the contract on which 
Schlengemann relied for reinstatement had come to an end due to impossibility of 
performance.86  (The contract stated that the three founding members of the 
company should serve as its directors and set out their duties in this regard.)   
 
In reaching his decision in this case, Gardiner J distinguished impossibility of 
performance from suspension of performance, stating that the English authorities 
had to be relied on in the latter scenario, since these principles were “at the root of 
any contract”.87  Gardiner J cited the same passage from the Tamplin Steamship 
case, which had been echoed in MacDuff: where a state of affairs on which a 
contract rests comes to an end, the contract terminates due to an implied term to this 
effect.  The judge held that the contract was based on the status quo whereby it 
would continue to be lawful for all the directors to serve in that capacity, when this 
state of affairs came to an end the contract was terminated.88  Gardiner J added that 
the facts totally negated the suggestion that the contract was only suspended: a 
state of war is presumed to be of a permanent character.89   
 
The ultimate reason given for this decision was thus “impossibility of performance”.90  
The reliance by Gardiner J on frustration thus seems, with respect, unnecessary, 
since the internment of Schlengemann seems to constitute casus fortuitus, as did the 
internment of the German subjects in Peters, Flamman.  The case does, however, 
demonstrate a tendency of South African courts to be influenced by the English 
doctrine of frustration. 
 
In the 1940s Herbstein J of the Cape Provincial Division relied on the same passage 
from another English frustration case, Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd,91 
to decide two separate cases before him.  The quoted extract was to the effect that if 
an unforeseen event frustrates the common object of two contracting parties, the 
                                               
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid at 500 – 501. 
88 Ibid at 502. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid at 504. 
91 [1926] AC 497. 
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contract must come to an end.  This is because to nevertheless hold a party bound 
under changed circumstances would be to hold him to a contract he never made.92   
 
In the first case, Benjamin v Myers,93 the plaintiff sued the defendant for eviction due 
to the breach of an agreement of lease.94  The premises were let for the purpose of 
running a garage business and one of the terms of the lease was that the defendant 
should maintain supplies of petrol.95  During the currency of the lease, however, the 
defendant had been convicted of contravening War Measure 53 of 1943 by illegally 
attempting to obtain a larger supply of petrol than what was permitted.96  As a result 
the defendant was prevented from obtaining any petrol at all and hence was in 
breach of the lease agreement.97  He attempted to argue that his performance of the 
lease agreement had been rendered impossible by his conviction, but Herbstein J 
held that this impossibility was self-induced and hence that the defendant’s 
performance was not discharged.98   
 
As a separate ground for this decision Herbstein J argued that since the defendant 
wanted only to find the obligation to maintain a supply of petrol discharged, but 
otherwise to keep the lease agreement intact, this was an attempt to hold the plaintiff 
to a new agreement following a change of circumstances.99  Herbstein J declined to 
assent with the defendant’s argument: his judgment seems to suggest that a finding 
that impossibility was present would require the whole agreement to be discharged 
and not merely one term of it.  Since the defendant was attempting to uphold part of 
the agreement, but discharge the rest, his argument was bad in law. 
 
The second invocation of the doctrine of frustration by Herbstein J is also slightly 
unusual, but for a different reason.  In Rossouw v Haumann both parties owned 
                                               
92 This is my paraphrased summary of the extract, which appears in Hirji Mulji supra note 91 at 507.  
Herbstein J cites this passage first in Benjamin v Myers 1946 CPD 655 at 662 – 663 and then again in 
Rossouw v Haumann 1949 (4) SA 796 (C) at 799 – 800. 
93 Supra note 92. 
94 Ibid at 657. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid at 659. 
97 Ibid at 660. 
98 Ibid at 662. 
99 Ibid at 663. 
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farms contiguous on the Berg River near Paarl.100  The parties had agreed not to 
undertake any works on the river except by means of the employ of a particular firm 
of engineers.101  The contract contained a term as to the maximum amount such 
works should cost, however.102  As it turned out, the quoted price of the proposed 
works by the engineers far exceeded the amount stipulated as the maximum in the 
contract.103  Both parties therefore agreed that the contract had become impossible 
of performance.104  The defendant therefore commenced work on the river, arguing 
that the agreement was at an end.105  Herbstein J confirmed that the agreement had 
terminated due to impossibility and therefore denied the plaintiff the interdict he was 
seeking to prevent the defendant from undertaking such works.106 
 
The unusual nature of the invocation of the frustration doctrine in this case is that 
Herbstein J relied on the extract from Hirji Mulji to set out the consequences of his 
finding that the agreement terminated due to impossibility.  While the judge could 
have invoked South African authority, such as the Peters, Flamman case, to this 
effect, he chose to cite an English case, which evidenced a doctrine which did not 
have the Appellate Division’s stamp of approval.  The only authority Herbstein J 
relied on for this invocation of the doctrine of frustration was his own previous 
decision in Benjamin v Myers.  This must also render this case of little value as a 
precedent.   
 
A more recent case in which the ultimate decision was partly based on the doctrine 
of frustration is Bischofberger v Van Eyk.107 This case concerned a sale of a property 
situated in Johannesburg.  The contract of sale provided that the purchase price 
would be paid in part by a loan secured by a mortgage bond of R35 000 and in part 
by a cession of R30 000 to the seller by a third party company, Hyperfin Ltd.108  The 
money for the cession was to be raised by the sale of a farm owned by the company.  
                                               
100 Supra note 92 at 797. 
101 Ibid at 797 – 798. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid at 798 – 799. 
104 Ibid at 798. 
105 Ibid at 799. 
106 Ibid at 802. 
107 1981 (2) SA 607 (W) 
108 Ibid at 608 – 609. 
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The capital secured by a mortgage bond was paid to the seller and the purchaser 
moved in.109  The sale of the farm fell through, however, and the seller never 
received the balance of the purchase price.110  Upon a demand by the seller for the 
money, the purchaser availed himself of stalling tactics, promising the money would 
be forthcoming.111  The seller then brought an action arguing for ejectment of the 
purchaser and cancellation of the agreement.112   
 
Boshoff JP held that when the source for the R30 000 fell away, the basis of this as 
part of the payment of the purchase price in terms of the agreement fell away too.113  
This finding suggests that a supposition or common assumption material to the 
contract had proved false and that hence the contract had terminated.  Such a 
supposition would have been one as to a future state of affairs, however, which is a 
controversial construction.114  The Judge President did not base his decision on this 
ground, however: he rather sought a basis in impossibility.  Having set out the 
uncontroversial rule that impossibility terminates a contract (citing Hersman v 
Shapiro and Peters, Flamman), Boshoff JP went on to state that English law did not 
seem to be at variance with South African law.115  Boshoff JP cited in this regard 
Morgan v Manser116 to the effect that an unforeseen, fundamental change of 
circumstances renders a contract at an end.  In applying this dictum, the Judge 
President reasoned as follows: 
“On the facts of the instant case the parties contracted on the basis that the money in respect 
of the sale of the Hyperfin Ltd properties was available to the respondent and would be ceded 
to the applicant within a reasonable time.  When that sale fell through and the guarantee was 
withdrawn there was a change of circumstances which was not within the contemplation of 
neither [sic] the applicant nor the respondent which made performance in terms of the 
agreement impossible.  In the circumstances the obligations under the agreement fell away 
and the agreement ceased to exist.”117   
 
                                               
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid at 609 – 610. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid at 610. 
113 Ibid at 610G. 
114 See below at section 2.3. 
115 Bischofberger supra note 107 at 610H – 611F. 
116 (1947) 2 All ER 666.  The quoted extract appears at 670. 
117 Bischofberger supra note 107 at 611F-G. 
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The seller was therefore granted his desired order of ejectment.  An alternative basis 
for the judgment was also offered, namely that the seller had validly placed the buyer 
in mora due to his failure to pay on time and consequently that the contract had been 
cancelled for breach.  With respect, payment by the purchaser was not objectively 
impossible: the impossibility lay in his own subjective failure to raise the necessary 
funds.  This renders the rule in Peters, Flamman inapplicable.  Hence no doubt the 
reliance on a broader doctrine of change of circumstances as found in the English 
doctrine of frustration.  It would have been more in tune with South African contract 
law to argue for a failed common assumption, since this more accurately reflects the 
facts of the case.  As pointed out above, however, this would have been 
controversial as the assumption related to a future event.  Once again there are 
flaws in the reasoning of this judgment employing the doctrine of frustration and no 
clear authority is cited for its invocation.  
 
The final case favouring incorporation of frustration is the much criticised Kok v 
Osborne.118  The facts involve a fairly complicated series of frauds committed by a 
certain Hobson-Jones.  Kok, the plaintiff, was involved in business as an estate 
agent and a money lender.119  She had lent Hobson-Jones money in the past which 
he had repaid.120  The latest debt of R50 000 remained outstanding, however.121  In 
the meantime, Hobson-Jones had entered into an agreement to purchase 
immovable property from Osborne at a price of R47 000.122  This amount was to be 
paid by means of three post-dated cheques.123  Kok came to learn of the purchase 
by Hobson-Jones of the property in question and demanded that the property be 
transferred to her, since she believed that he had bought it with money advanced by 
her.124  Hobson-Jones liased with Osborne to the effect that Kok and himself were 
going to buy the property together, but that only Kok’s name should appear on the 
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contract of sale.125  The contract was duly signed, without Kok and Osborne at any 
stage meeting.126  Osborne believed he was selling to a joint venture, Kok that she 
was receiving title in settlement of Hobson-Jones’s debt to her.127 
 
Hobson-Jones knew, however, that he had no funds to meet the payment of the 
post-dated cheques and he subsequently met with Osborne and they agreed to 
cancel the contract.128  Kok was not party to this agreement.129  Osborne then resold 
the property to another purchaser.130  When the error emerged,  the plaintiff tried to 
interdict transfer to this second purchaser, based on her belief that she was entitled 
to ownership thereof because of the payment which she believed Hobson-Jones had 
already made for this property.131  Plaintiff relied on the contract between her and the 
defendant; the defendant’s major argument in reply was that the contract was invalid 
due to lack of consensus.132 
 
Jones J held as to the defence of mistake that there was no consensus between the 
parties and that the contract was consequently void.133  Jones J went on to hold that 
there was a second ground on which the contract failed, however, namely a failed 
assumption that Hobson-Jones had made payment to Osborne (the defendant).134  If 
Jones J had reached this conclusion based on the law relating to suppositions, he 
would have run into the difficulty that it was Kok’s assumption alone that Hobson-
Jones had paid Osborne: Osborne did not share in this delusion.  Osborne’s 
assumption was that Kok would be providing capital along with Hobson-Jones.  
There is thus no common assumption (as Ramsden points out)135 so this conclusion 
is based on false premises and must fail.   
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Jones J did not take this approach, however: his reasoning was that the problem of 
the false assumption could be solved by an application of “the rule in Peters, 
Flamman… and African Realty Trust…”136  The judge took the wording of this rule 
from Kerr’s textbook Principles of the Law of Contract (fourth edition) where it is 
formulated as follows: 
“The basic rule is that if during the currency of a contract the conditions necessary for its 
operation cease to exist, the change not being due to the fault of either party or to a factor for 
which either party bears the risk, the contract ceases to exist.”137   
 
Jones J goes on to state: 
“The law recognises that the realities of the world of business demand that provision be made 
for a situation where unforeseen contingencies prevent the attainment of the commercial 
purpose which the parties had in mind when they contracted.  That, too, can amount to legal 
impossibility.”138 
 
The judge then cited African Realty Trust to the effect that when the basis of a 
contract falls away, the contract falls away with it.139  He stated further that 
“commercial impossibility” as evidenced in Krell v Henry had been accepted by a 
number of South African Courts.140  Examples of such decisions were Bischofberger 
v Van Eyk, Williams v Evans141 and Rossouw v Haumann.  Jones J concluded that 
the rule as to impossibility which he had adopted was applicable to this case, in 
accordance with the authority which he had cited.142  He summed up as follows: 
“The common object of the parties is frustrated because Hobson-Jones fraudulently induced 
Osborne not to present the cheques.  …The basis of the agreement, namely payment by 
Hobson-Jones, has accordingly failed and therefore the contract fails.”143 
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The criticism which has been levelled against this judgment is justified.  The 
theoretical basis of Jones J’s reasoning is flawed: not only is the supposition, which 
is said to terminate the contract not a commonly held one, but the impossibility is not 
absolute in the sense required for supervening impossibility to operate.  Neither of 
these grounds which are recognised in South African law was followed, however, no 
doubt because neither could terminate the contract on the facts.  The wording of the 
judgment suggests instead the acceptance of the doctrine of frustration of purpose, 
as Jones J’s use of African Realty Trust and Krell v Henry as authority implies.  
While this is a reported judgment and must stand as an instance of frustration of 
purpose in South African law, the errors in reasoning and lack of indisputable 
authority render this case (once more) weak authority for the doctrine of frustration 
being part of South African law. 
 
2.2.2.2.2 Cases opposing the incorporation of frustration into South African law 
Considerable space has been consumed in demonstrating that South African courts 
have in the past invoked the doctrine of frustration in deciding cases.  It was seen, 
however, that there has been no clear acceptance of this doctrine by the Appellate 
Division and that most of the provincial decisions which refer to frustration in 
consequence lack clear authority for their findings.  A discussion of this topic, 
however, would be incomplete without citation of several further cases, which 
contain clear dicta against the incorporation of frustration into South African law. 
 
The first of these is Bayley v Harwood.144  This is an interesting case, since it seems 
to be a clear instance where the purpose of the contract was frustrated.  The facts 
were that the respondent provided certain premises to the appellant in a contract of 
lease.145  The premises were in use as a health and pleasure resort, a business 
which the lessee intended to continue.146  It was thus expressly provided in the 
agreement that the respondent lessor would provide all trading licenses in respect of 
the premises to the lessee, who would return them at the expiration of the lease.147  
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During the currency of the lease, the lessee applied for the licences to be renewed, 
but permission was refused by the relevant authority unless certain structural 
alterations were made to the premises.148  The lessor refused to make these 
alterations, so the lessee vacated the property, cancelling the contract.149 
 
The lessor then challenged the termination of the lease agreement, against which 
the lessee argued (inter alia) that the lease agreement had been “frustrated”.  De 
Wet J held in the Transvaal Provincial Division as follows on this point:  
“…[I]t is clear from the judgment in [Peters, Flamman] that the English law doctrine of 
frustration does not form part of our law.  Under our law a person can only escape liability 
when he can prove that a contract has been discharged by impossibility of performance.”150  
 
De Wet J had already held that this was not an instance of impossibility since it was 
not the act of leasing itself which had become impossible, but merely the purpose for 
which the leased premises were to be used.151  This aspect of the decision was 
reversed on appeal to the Appellate Division.  Greenberg JA held that the legislative 
prohibition of the use of the premises for a health and pleasure resort constituted vis 
maior and hence that impossibility terminated the contract.152  This finding was 
based on the reasoning that if the premises had been damaged by physical means, 
the lease agreement would have terminated due to impossibility.  The legislative 
restriction on the use of the property was analogous and hence impossibility was 
likewise here present.153  The judges in the Appellate Division, however, omitted any 
reference to the argument as to frustration. 
 
Another interesting case where a frustration of the purpose of the contract occurred 
was Grobbelaar NO v Bosch.154  The respondent, Bosch, had been the partner of 
Grobbelaar in certain business ventures in the Eastern Cape.155  Grobbelaar had 
died and the executrix of his estate claimed certain assets of the partnership from 
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the respondent.156  In terms of a contract between the partners a life insurance policy 
had been taken out: the proceeds of the policy were to go to the family of the first of 
them to die, while the shares of such deceased were to be transferred to the 
remaining partner.157  No further payments were to be made, regardless of the 
relative values of the policy and the shares at the time of payment.  Then an 
unforeseen change of circumstances intervened, frustrating the purpose of the 
contract: Grobbelaar died, but Sanlam (the insurance company in question) refused 
to pay out on the life insurance policy.158  A far smaller amount was eventually 
recovered from Sanlam in settlement.159  Counsel for the appellant argued that the 
payment of the life insurance policy by Sanlam to the estate of the first-dying partner 
was the basis of the contract and the falling away of this basis discharged the 
contract.160 
 
O’Hagan J had the following to say to this argument: 
“The present case would appear to be concerned with what is generally known as the 
doctrine of impossibility of performance of a contract.  [The judge proceeded to quote the 
dictum from Peters, Flamman to the effect that supervening impossibility discharges a 
contract.]  Later decisions of the South African Courts have done relatively little to exemplify 
the application of this rule to cases falling outside common categories such as impossibility 
created by war or act of the Legislature.  The wealth of English judicial authority on the 
subject has not failed to influence the law of South Africa – see, e.g. Hersman v Shapiro & Co 
… – but as the Appellate Division has not, as far as I am aware, adopted the trend of 
development in the English cases, I think this Court should be chary of looking for a solution 
of the present problem in the many dicta of the English judgments which would not be without 
relevance to the matter.”161 
 
O’Hagan J went on to find that although destruction of the subject matter of a 
contract is a well known instance of impossibility, the comparable loss of the subject 
matter in this case was caused by the deliberate or negligent non-disclosure of 
relevant facts to Sanlam and hence the impossibility was self-created.162  This 
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involved some interesting leaps in reasoning by the judge, since performance was 
not impossible: it was merely the purpose of the contract which had been frustrated.  
The overall decision seems sound, however: even in English law this would probably 
have been held to be a case of self-induced frustration. 
 
The final case to be discussed here, Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall,163   contains 
a fairly detailed finding on the doctrine of frustration in South Africa.  In the case the 
plaintiff company brought an action against the defendant for the repayment of a 
loan of R7 200.164  The defendant and a partner had patented a method of 
packaging and founded two companies to exploit his invention.165  One of these was 
the plaintiff, the other Techni-Pak (Pty) Ltd.166  The defendant and his partner 
needed funding to exploit the invention, however.167  Thus two independent 
companies were granted shares in the plaintiff and provided financing in addition.168  
Ultimately these companies came to control the plaintiff company and to control the 
exploitation of the patent in South Africa.169  Royalties in respect of the use of this 
patent would be payable to Techni-Pak, however, should the plaintiff ever make a 
profit.170  In the meantime the defendant had a loan account with the plaintiff on 
which he ran up a debt.171  This account would only have to be repaid, however, out 
of royalties, should the plaintiff ever make a profit.172  When it started to look likely 
that the exploitation of the patent would prove profitable, the plaintiff sought to 
escape from its liability to pay royalties to Techni-Pak.173  One of the financing 
companies behind the plaintiff had lent money to Techni-Pak and it used this 
leverage to cancel the payment of royalties.174  The suggestion made by an 
accountant associated with the plaintiff to the defendant was that the extinction of the 
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obligation to pay royalties would extinguish his obligation to pay his own outstanding 
loan account, provided the plaintiff remained solvent.175   
Some time after this agreement the defendant was starting to become successful in 
a separate business and the plaintiff instituted action for the outstanding loan, 
arguing that it was an implied term of the agreement that in the event of the plaintiff’s 
right to royalties falling away, the defendant would have to repay his outstanding 
loan account.176  Colman J held that no such implied term was present.177   
 
In the alternative the plaintiff argued that its contract, which suspended the 
defendant’s obligation to repay the loan to it, had been frustrated, since the basis of 
this agreement was that the defendant would receive royalties from the plaintiff, 
which was no longer possible.  Colman J noted that there was a difference of 
approach in the English cases: some stated that frustration depended on an implied 
term in the contract, others that frustration was a broad equitable device to end a 
contract where justice demanded it.178  The judge noted that if frustration could be 
invoked even where there was no implied term as to a change of circumstances, “the 
granite concept of sanctity of contracts will be shattered”.179  He summed up as 
follows on the status of frustration in South African law: 
“In our Courts the doctrine of frustration has upon occasion been referred to by that name, but 
it is not clear to me that it has ever been applied to a situation which was not covered also by 
one or other of our more familiar rules relating to implied term [sic] or impossibility of 
performance.  Counsel have not been able to refer me to any case in which one of our Courts 
has assumed the type of broad equitable jurisdiction which Courts of England are said to 
have in respect of frustration.”180 
 
The argument as to frustration thus failed in this case as well.  While this was 
perhaps not the best example of a case ripe for equitable intervention at the 
plaintiff’s behest, or even an invocation of the doctrine of frustration, the position of 
Colman J is unequivocal.  Indeed, while the cases cited as being against the doctrine 
of frustration are all provincial decisions, and hence of equal weight to those in 
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favour from the point of view of precedent, they seem to be truer to the status quo of 
South African contract law.  The overall lack of authority in favour of frustration is 
telling and is preyed upon by the judges in the cases against this doctrine.  The 
conclusion of this inquiry must be that although some authority for the doctrine of 
frustration exists, it is not very persuasive.   
 
This ends the investigation into what South African Courts have actually said on the 
matter, but does not conclude the normative inquiry as to whether frustration should 
be part of South African law.  That question will be considered in chapter eight. 
 
2.2.3 Commercial impossibility 
As Ramsden notes, the term “commercial impossibility” is used in two senses in 
South African law: firstly to denote a situation of increased difficulty of performance 
or hardship and secondly as a synonym for frustration of purpose, that is where one 
or both parties’ motive for contracting is not achieved.181  Motives in contracting were 
discussed above under frustration of purpose and will be covered again below under 
the topic of suppositions.  It is the first sense of this phrase, namely increased 
hardship, which will be considered here. 
 
First and foremost it should be noted that increased difficulty in performance is not a 
ground of discharge in South African contract law.182  Even in English law, as will be 
discussed in chapter four, an increase in difficulty does not excuse performance.183  
Authority for commercial impossibility terminating a contract can, however, be found 
in the American doctrine of impracticability.184   
 
The doctrine of impracticability aims to protect the supplier of goods or services.  
Thus in a sense it is the converse of frustration of purpose, since the latter doctrine 
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protects a buyer, or party obliged to pay under a contract: should the reason for his 
obligation fall away, the contract falls away too.  Impracticability rather means that 
should it become more difficult or expensive to supply goods, then discharge may 
occur.185   
 
As stated at the outset, however, an increase in the expense or difficulty of 
performance does not discharge a contract under South African law.  It will be 
remembered that in MacDuff & Co Ltd v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co 
Ltd186 the defendant company had undertaken to form a new company and take over 
the assets and the running of MacDuff & Co Ltd.  A slump in the market made 
performance under this agreement disadvantageous to the defendant and it reneged 
on its promise.  The argument that it was “commercially impossible” for the 
defendant to uphold its contract was dismissed by the Appellate Division, referring to 
the English case of Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd v CS Nelson & Co.187  Likewise in 
Hersman v Shapiro,188 the defendant had failed to deliver a quantity of corn of a 
certain grade.  His defence that there was a scarcity of such corn and that in 
consequence performance was impossible was rejected by the Court: he had not 
offered “fancy” prices for the corn he sought, nor looked in more distant markets.189  
 
A more recent dictum against commercial impossibility can be found in Unibank 
Savings and Loans Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd.190  In that case Flemming DJP stated that: 
“Impossibility is furthermore not implicit in a change of financial strength or in commercial 
circumstances which cause compliance with the contractual obligations to be difficult, 
expensive or unaffordable.”191 
The position thus seems bleak for commercial impossibility in South African law.  
Roman-Dutch law recognised only absolute impossibility as a ground of discharge 
and this has been taken up into the South African case law.  Even the more 
permissive English doctrine of frustration, which has achieved a luke-warm reception 
                                               
185 Treitel op cit note 29 at 309. 
186 MacDuff supra note 69. 
187 Tennants (Lancashire) supra note 161.  The decision of the Appellate Division and the quotation 
appear at 606 in the MacDuff judgment. 
188 Hersman supra note 2. 
189 Ibid at 375 – 377. 
190 2000 (4) SA 191 (W). 
191 Ibid at 198D. 
35 
 
in the domestic case law, does not recognise increased difficulty as a ground of 
discharge.  It must thus categorically be stated that commercial impossibility forms 
no part of South African law.   
 
The fact that authority does exist for this concept in other jurisdictions should not go 
unnoticed, however.  As will be shown in later chapters, in several civil law codes as 
well as in the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the 
Principles of European Contract Law, discharge for impracticability is permitted.192  A 
review of the cases mentioned above suggests that impracticability does not form 
part of South African law at present.  Academic opinion seems to be less severe in 
this regard, however.  Certain commentators see an opening in this edifice through 
their belief that the standard of impossibility required to invite discharge is at least 
slightly flexible.  Consider the example mentioned earlier of a ship carrying a ring 
which sinks to the ocean floor.  Indeed De Wet and Van Wyk and others go so far as 
to suggest that the standard of impossibility required is a “verkeersmaatstaf” (or a 
“pragmatic”) one.193  If there is an element of practical commercial reality present in 
determining what is impossible and what is not, then in extreme cases of 
impracticability a case could be made that performance has indeed become 
impossible.  The law in this area may be less settled than appears at first glance and 
“commercial impossibility” may not be as much of a dead end in the South African 
law of contract as the cases considered above suggest.   
 
2.3 Other concepts relevant to changed circumstances: suppositions and tacit 
terms. 
 
A consideration of doctrines which deal with changed circumstances in South African 
contract law must of necessity cast the net wider than mere impossibility.  Given that 
our system does not currently allow for a broad doctrine specifically tasked with 
dealing with changed circumstances, the various disparate concepts which can have 
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an influence in this area must all be considered if we are to evaluate the approach of 
our domestic law to this issue.  A contract can be terminated by a failed common 
assumption (or supposition) or by a tacit resolutive condition.  If one were to state 
that the common assumption was that an existing state of affairs remain unchanged, 
then we would be precisely within the realm of change of circumstances.  Similarly if 
the continuation of a given set of circumstances is to be seen as a tacit condition of a 
contract, the contract could fall away should there be a fundamental shift in the 
status quo.  Arguably these two contractual concepts could be said to overlap – a 
possibility which will be explored below. 
 
It has been argued in section two of this chapter that the South African notion of 
impossibility does not encompass the viewpoint that when “the basis of a contract 
falls away the contract falls away with it”.194  This touches on the motives on which a 
contracting party bases his or her consent to a contract and these are generally not 
viewed as good grounds for discharge.195  Under certain circumstances, however, a 
party’s motives can form part of the contract – a view which will presently be 
defended.  This section three will argue for the position that the oft-quoted 
proposition from African Realty Trust – that when the basis of a contract falls away, 
the contract falls away with it – is not inconceivable.  Perhaps in this manner a 
version of frustration of purpose can be introduced into South African law, to at least 
allow some scope for dealing with changed circumstances. 
 
2.3.1 The theoretical nature of tacit terms and suppositions and their application to 
the problem at hand 
 
2.3.1.1 Tacit terms  
Here we are concerned with the issue of whether there can be a tacit term to the 
effect that should the circumstances on which a contract is based change, the 
contract will come to an end.  This would be a term implied by the facts of the 
case.196  The test for whether a tacit term exists in a contract is well established in 
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South African law and was originally accepted by the Appellate Division in the 
following terms: 
"You must only imply a term if it is necessary in the business sense to give efficacy to the contract; 
that is, if it is such a term that you can be confident that if at the time the contract was being 
negotiated some one had said to the parties 'what will happen in such a case'?, they would have 
replied 'of course, so and so.' We did not trouble to say that it is too clear."197 
Perhaps the leading modern case on this topic is Wilkens v Voges.198  This case 
turned on whether or not a tacit term could be proved in the contract under dispute 
and the Appellate Division set out a particularly useful statement on the topic.199  
According to the court in that case a tacit term can be actual or imputed, depending 
on whether the parties to the contract thought about the matter or not.  Even if the 
parties did not consider the matter at hand, a tacit term may still be imputed into their 
contract.200  Furthermore the content of the tacit term is a matter of inference to be 
derived from the express terms and the surrounding circumstances.201  The tests to 
be used for determining its existence are (as stated above) the bystander and the 
business efficacy tests.202 
 
In Lanificio Varam SA v Masurel Fils (Pty) Ltd,203 a contract for the sale of wool by a 
South African company to a Brazilian company was brought to an end due to a tacit 
term.  In terms of the contract, the appellant, (the Brazilian company) was to apply 
for an import licence, so that the respondent could ship the wool to Brazil.204  The 
contract was silent about the time frame within which this was to occur.  The wool 
was purchased on 19 October 1949.205  On 15 December that year, the respondent 
repudiated the contract as the requisite import licence had not yet been obtained.206  
The repudiation was not acknowledged by the appellant and on 11 February 1950 
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the licence was tendered to respondent.207  The respondent refused to ship the wool, 
claiming that the contract had been discharged since the licence had not been 
provided within a reasonable time.208  The Appellate Division accepted this 
argument: due to the fluctuating price of wool it could not be expected that the 
respondent would wait indefinitely to deliver the merx.209  
 
While it may be argued that price fluctuations within the wool market over time do not 
represent an unforeseen (or certainly not unforeseeable) change in circumstances, 
the Lanificio Varam case does, however, illustrate the point that a tacit term can 
bring a contract to an end subsequent to its conclusion.  This would probably be 
conceptualised as a tacit resolutive condition.  For an implied term to operate within 
a contractual setting it is not, however, necessary that the parties should have 
foreseen the necessity for that term at the time of contracting.  It is possible that a 
Court may read in a tacit term even if the parties never contemplated the 
circumstances to which it relates.210  This is referred to as an “imputed” tacit term.211  
Thus it is possible that a contract may contain a tacit resolutive condition that it 
would come to an end should a certain eventuality occur, whether or not the parties 
to that contract contemplated such an eventuality.  Clearly here we have a device 
capable of terminating a contract for changed circumstances.  
 
2.3.1.2 Suppositions 
A party to a contract will often enter that agreement with certain fundamental 
assumptions in mind.  These assumptions will often inform his consent and provide 
the motivation for why he entered into the contract in the first place.  Should such an 
assumption exist in the mind of that contracting party alone and never be expressed 
by him, it will be of no force or effect.  If the assumption proves false subsequent to 
the conclusion of the contract, the law would state that that party acted under an 
error in motive, which is a non-material form of mistake.212  Should the assumption 
be common to both parties the position is different: the contract will come to an end 
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should that assumption prove false, provided it is sufficiently fundamental.213  De 
Wet and Van Wyk give the following example: A is the owner of a property in a 
coastal village; B wants to buy this property, but only if it has a sea view.  A is not 
sure whether it has a sea view and therefore does not want to guarantee this fact.  
Therefore A and B enter into an agreement for the sale of the property on the 
common assumption that the property does have a sea view.214  The learned authors 
explain that this is not a conditional sale, in that the transaction does not depend on 
an uncertain future event.  The obligation to buy is either binding or not binding at the 
time of entering into the agreement, depending on whether or not the common 
assumption is true.215  This type of common assumption which is fundamental to the 
transaction concerned, is also referred to as a supposition. 
 
De Wet and Van Wyk’s example illustrates the classic conception of the supposition: 
a contract is based on a common assumption about a state of affairs, where the 
uncertainty in the minds of the contracting parties about that state of affairs prevents 
a full-blown warranty as to the existence of such circumstances.216  The example is 
closely related to the facts of Fourie v CDMO Homes (Pty) Ltd:217 the appellant had 
sold land to the respondent, who had developed that land at considerable cost.218  
Although the appellant seller had never guaranteed the right to pump water from an 
adjacent river attached to the property, it was the common assumption of the parties 
that such a right existed.219  When the assumption proved false, the buyer was 
released from its obligation to purchase and the contract was held to have been 
terminated.220  As spelt out by Holmes JA in that case (with reference to the above 
quoted passage from De Wet and Yeats), the common assumption relates to the 
present and is thus not a condition.221  Thus although the parties in that case had 
                                               
213 Dickinson Motors (Pty) Ltd v Oberholzer 1952 (1) SA 443 (A); Fourie v CDMO Homes (Pty) Ltd 
1982 (1) SA 21 (A). 
214 De Wet and Van Wyk op cit note 30 at 154. 
215 Ibid.  This argument and example received the Appellate Division’s stamp of approval in Fourie 
supra note 213 where the original passage (taken from an earlier edition of this work) was reproduced 
at 27E-H. 
216 Compare further the formulation in Van der Merwe et al op cit note 1 at 285.  
217 Fourie supra note 213. 
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used the word “condition”, it was in fact a supposition and the failure of the 
supposition to materialise rendered the contract at an end. 
 
A slightly different type of supposition occurred in Dickinson Motors (Pty) Ltd v 
Oberholzer.222  Again the contract failed due to a common assumption relating to the 
present proving false, but this time there was no uncertainty in the minds of the 
parties as to the truth of their assumption.  When the supposition proved false, the 
Appellate Division held that the contract was terminated on the grounds of common 
mistake.223  The facts of the case were that the appellant had sold a Plymouth motor 
car (“Plymouth A”) to the son of the respondent under a hire purchase agreement.224  
The son had in addition purchased an identical Plymouth (“Plymouth B”) from 
another car dealership, also under hire purchase.225  The son then exchanged 
Plymouth B for his father’s car and sold both this car and Plymouth A.226  The 
appellant then sought to attach Plymouth A and was told (untruthfully) by the son 
that it was on his father’s (the respondent’s) farm.227  This car (Plymouth B) was then 
duly attached, both appellant and respondent believing (incorrectly) that it was 
Plymouth A.228  The respondent then found himself without a car and agreed with the 
appellant to pay the outstanding balance owed by his son in respect of Plymouth A 
to recover the vehicle.229  This car was, however, Plymouth B and it was then 
attached again, this time by the second car dealership, who were the true owners of 
this vehicle.230  The identity of the car having been proved, it became apparent that 
the respondent had paid the outstanding balance based on a common mistake and 
he sought to recover from the appellant. 
 
The Appellate Division held (as explained above) that Oberholzer was indeed 
entitled to recover the sum which he had paid to Dickinson Motors, since the 
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agreement between them was terminated by a mistake.231  The reason for the failure 
of the contract was the false common belief between its parties.  Both were certain 
that the car was Plymouth A and when this proved false the basis of the transaction 
fell away.  Clearly this is a failed common supposition as to a present fact.  The 
Appellate Division chose to refer to this defect as a “common mistake”, however, and 
it is thus under this heading that this second type of supposition is categorised.232     
 
Suppositions may thus relate to a present or past fact and should the supposition 
prove false, the contract will be terminated either due to a failed common assumption 
(where there is uncertainty in the minds of the contracting parties as to the truth of 
their assumption) or due to common mistake (where there is no uncertainty in the 
minds of parties as to the truth of their assumption).   
 
A third category of supposition is also found in the case law, although this final 
construction is far more contentious.233  It was held in Williams v Evans234 that: 
“[T]here is authoritative support for [the] contention that where a contract is entered into on 
the basis of a common assumption as to a future state of affairs, it may fail if the assumption 
or supposition fails and it is established that the parties would not have entered into the 
agreement had they known that their expectations would not materialize.”235  
 
It is this third construction which is particularly relevant to a discussion of changed 
circumstances, since this is the only form of supposition which could take account of 
an unforeseen change of circumstances occurring subsequent to the conclusion of 
the contract.  Williams had entered into an agreement with Evans in terms of which 
Evans would purchase a dairy from Williams’s son and would undertake liability for a 
debt to her (Williams) of R20 000.236  To run the dairy and meet his financial 
obligations, Evans would need an overdraft facility from a bank, and as part of the 
contract Williams agreed to furnish security in order to enable him to obtain such a 
                                               
231 Ibid at 450. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Christie is vehemently opposed to the supposition in futuro, as appears from Christie op cit note 1 
at 328.  Van der Merwe et al op cit note 1 at 285 – 286 is far more circumspect, noting a divergence in 
opinion without really favouring either side.  
234 Williams v Evans supra note 141. 
235 Ibid at 1174G-H. 
236 Ibid at 1171. 
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facility.237  Thus a supposition on which the contract containing Evans’s 
indebtedness to Williams rested was that if Williams furnished the necessary 
security, Evans would be able to obtain an overdraft facility.238  After the conclusion 
of the contract the bank refused to grant this facility to Evans.239  Evans then sought 
discharge of the contract.  Broeksma J in the Cape Provincial Division found that 
Evans’s defence that the failure of a supposition in futuro was fatal to the contract 
was a good one and refused to grant Williams a declaratory order against the 
respondent.240 
 
Suppositions relating to the past and present are of no aid to a discussion of change 
of circumstances, since they are unable to take account of an unforeseen change of 
circumstances occurring after the conclusion of the contract.  It is thus the 
supposition in futuro which this inquiry will investigate and the possibility that it could 
be used to discharge a contract, where the common motivating foundation of the 
parties has fallen away.The authority which Broeksma J referred to, however, was – 
it is submitted – limited.  The shortcomings of this authority were highlighted by Van 
den Heever J in the subsequent case of Hare’s Brickfields Ltd v Cape Town City 
Council,241 where Williams v Evans was expressly overruled.242  Van den Heever J 
found that such a supposition must be either a term of the contract or a condition in 
order to have any effect.243  The major authorities cited by Broeksma J dealt with 
suppositions relating to past or present facts, rather than to the future, as pointed out 
by Van den Heever J in his criticism of the Williams judgment.244  This means that 
the only real support for the construction argued for came in the form of academic 
opinion where the concept was discussed in an article dealing largely with 
enrichment.245 
                                               
237 Ibid at 1172. 
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Despite the finding in Williams having been overruled by two judges of the Cape 
Provincial Division soon after it was made,246 support for the supposition in futuro 
remained.  In Osman v Standard Bank National Credit Corporation Ltd Friedman J 
stated that: 
“[i]f a contract is entered into on the basis of a common assumption as to a past, present or 
future state of affairs, and that assumption turns out to be unfounded, the contract will be 
void.  See Williams v Evans…”247  
 
Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen also argued for this construction in a case note 
on Hare’s Brickfields.248  They distinguish a supposition in futuro from a condition, 
since by definition a condition entails uncertainty, whereas parties labouring under 
this type of supposition are sure of the continuation of the assumed state of 
affairs.249 
 
In the Natal Provincial Division a full bench had occasion to consider an argument for 
the termination of an agreement due to a supposition in futuro in Sonarep (SA) (Pty) 
Ltd v Motorcraft (Pty) Ltd.250 Kumleben J held in that case that a supposition in futuro 
was indistinguishable from a tacit condition.251  The argument for the existence of a 
supposition in futuro failed on this basis, since the alleged tacit condition was at 
variance with the express terms of the contract in question and in any event did not 
meet the requisite test necessary to be implied into the contract.252  The judge 
expressly stated that an error in motive does not affect the validity of a contract and 
that despite a change in circumstances the express terms of the agreement should 
stand.253   
 
For many years that was where it stood: the supposition in futuro had certain limited 
academic support, but Williams v Evans had been overruled within the Cape 
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Provincial Division and the Natal Provincial Division had also rejected the 
supposition in futuro.  Then in Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v Smith NO the Supreme 
Court of Appeal finally pronounced on the matter.254  In that case a business had 
been purchased by the appellants, based on a due diligence conducted by them 
which reflected the business to have potential.255  The true position, however, was 
that the business was not as profitable as the due diligence stated and was fast 
approaching insolvency.256  When this fact came to light, the appellants sought to 
escape the contract, arguing that their purchase had been based on a common 
fundamental assumption that the business was viable.257  As pointed out by Harms 
JA, this supposition related to “an existing or past fact”.258  Harms JA went on to find 
that there was no common supposition at all, but rather a unilateral error in motive on 
the part of the appellants, which had no bearing on the case.259 
 
In the process of reaching his decision on this point, however, Harms JA pronounced 
on the status of suppositions as to a future state of affairs, quoting from the Sonarep 
case: 
“Assumptions or suppositions can have many forms and have different effects depending 
upon the circumstances.  An assumption relating to a future state of affairs 
‘relates to an agreement which is in operation and its recognition would have a direct 
bearing upon one of the terms of the agreement.  Such a supposition is 
indistinguishable from a condition,’ 
usually a resolutive condition, perhaps also a condition precedent or an ordinary term of the 
contract.  The use of the word ‘supposition’ or ‘assumption’ instead of ‘condition’ in this 
context is not conducive to clear thinking.”260   
 
In a footnote to this paragraph, the learned judge also stated that “Williams v Evans 
… is consequently wrong.”261  It is submitted that this statement was obiter, since the 
case turned on a supposition as to a present or past fact, yet it remains highly 
authoritative.  Further support for this view of Harms JA was set out in Transnet Ltd v 
                                               
254 Supra note 195. 
255 Ibid at 267. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid at [1]. 
259 Ibid at [9] – [13]. 
260 Ibid at [8].  The extract within the quote comes from the Sonarep case supra note 250 at 902F. 
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Rubenstein.262  In that case Cloete JA, in a separate concurring judgment cited the 
above quoted extract from Van Reenen Steel with approval.263  Cloete JA summed 
up as follows: 
“A supposition, to have legal effect, must translate into a mistake, a misrepresentation, a term 
or a condition (and the term or condition may be express or tacit).”264  
 
The position of the Supreme Court of Appeal on the status of the supposition in 
futuro thus seems to be clear: the only way in which such a reservation may have an 
impact on an agreement is if it is framed as a resolutive condition and is included in 
this form in the contract.  What this means for the problem of changed circumstances 
is that the parties to an agreement will not be able to argue for discharge on the 
basis of a common material assumption that the status quo would remain constant.  
If circumstances have changed and a party wishes to escape the contract, he will 
have to show that there was a resolutive condition that the contract would end given 
such change.  There is, however, hope for a party seeking discharge for an 
unforeseen change of circumstances: the resolutive condition may be implied.  Thus 
in the absence of a hardship clause (or some similar provision) a contracting party 
may still escape due to the failure of a common assumption as to the future, 
provided that he can frame it as a tacit resolutive condition.  This is a possibility to be 
considered in future chapters, since it may provide a solution to the problem of 
changed circumstances. 
 
2.4 Change of circumstances in the context of specific performance 
 
One area of South African contract law where hardship resulting from changed 
circumstances is recognised is in the context of specific performance.265  Specific 
performance is a remedy for breach of contract in South African law which enforces 
performance of the letter of the contract against the defendant.  In principle a party 
has a right to an order of specific performance in an instance of breach, but this is a 
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discretionary remedy and may be refused by a court.266  Since Benson v SA Mutual 
Life Assurance Society267 it is clear that while a refusal may be made on the ground 
of hardship (for instance) this remains merely a factor relevant to the exercise of the 
discretion and not a concrete rule preventing an award of specific performance.268 
 
In Haynes v King William’s Town Municipality269 the respondent municipality had 
built a dam on the Buffalo River near King William’s Town in 1911.270  The 
appellant’s farm was situated downstream from this dam and in terms of an 
agreement concluded in 1911, the respondent had agreed to release a daily quantity 
of 250 000 gallons of water from the dam into the Buffalo River.271  This agreement 
was honoured until 1949, when there was a drought in the region.272  The 
municipality refused to release the contractual amount of water at this time, due to 
the necessity of maintaining a water supply for King William’s Town.273  The 
appellant sought specific performance of the agreement, but the Appellate Division 
held that due to the change in circumstances and the resultant hardship to the 
respondent specific performance would not be awarded.274  
 
The relevance of this rule to the present discussion is that while a South African 
court may not discharge a contract on the grounds of hardship alone, there is a 
concession made to the circumstances of the debtor through the above mentioned 
limitation on the doctrine of specific performance.  As the Haynes case demonstrates 
this does grant at least partial relief to the position of a debtor for whom performance 
has become more onerous due to a change in circumstances.  This may explain how 
the South African legal system is able to operate without a doctrine of contractual 
hardship, although this partial relief still does not adequately allocate risk amongst 
contracting parties, due to the remaining possibility of a damages claim which can be 
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brought against the debtor for non-performance.  This means that the costs of a 
unforeseen event could still potentially fall on one party alone. 
 
2.5 Legislation on change of circumstances? 
 
2.5.1 South African Law Commission 
In 1998 the South African Law Commission proposed a draft Bill to address the 
problem of unfairness in contracting.275  This Bill was to provide legislative impetus 
for the good faith movement, giving concrete enactment to the notion of fairness in 
contract.  This Bill was never enacted, however, and has today largely been 
superseded by developments in the specific area of consumer law, namely the 
promulgation of the Consumer Protection Act.276  The feature of the draft Bill which 
makes it highly relevant to the present discussion is its inclusion at clause 4 of 
detailed rules to deal with changed circumstances.   
 
Clause 4 sets out almost verbatim the same rules as those contained in the 
Principles of European Contract Law on change of circumstances.277  While these 
provisions provide a valuable solution to the problem of changed circumstances, 
which will be discussed below, it should be noted that the report does not motivate 
for the choice of this particular set of rules, rather than any of the other comparative 
models available.278  Why the PECL rules should be included to the exclusion of, for 
example, those contained in the Unidroit PICC is not explained.  Nevertheless the 
attempt to address this problem in some way is laudable. 
  
At clause 4(1) the draft Bill begins by setting out the default position of pacta sunt 
servanda, namely that “a party is bound to fulfil his or her obligations under the 
contract even if performance has become more onerous…”   
 
                                               
275 Reporton Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts, South African 
Law Commission, Project 47, April 1998 at 208. 
276 Act 68 of 2008.  This Act will be considered in chapter 7. 
277 Change of circumstances is dealt with in the PECL at art 6:111.  See Ole Lando & Hugh Beale 
Principles of European Contract Law (Parts I and II) (2000) at 322.  These PECL provisions will be 
dealt with in more detail in chapter 6. 
278 Report op cit note 256 at 188 – 191. 
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In clause 4(2) the threshold for relief is set as when performance has become 
“excessively onerous because of a change in circumstances”.  If this position 
eventuates, the parties are bound to enter into negotiations with a view to adaptation 
or termination of the contract, provided certain further tests are met.  These are that 
the change must have occurred after the time of the conclusion of the contract, or if it 
had already occurred at the time of conclusion, then it was of such a nature that it 
could not reasonably have been known to the parties.279  Thus relief will be granted 
not only in true instances of frustration, but also in cases of common mistake.280  
Further requirements are that the change of circumstances could not reasonably 
have been taken into account at the time of conclusion of the contract281 and that the 
risk of change of circumstances had not been allocated by the contract.282 
 
If a court should find that the threshold for relief is met, it may terminate the contract 
at a date and on terms to be determined by the court, or it may adapt the contract to 
distribute the losses and gains between the parties in an equitable manner.283  
Finally the obligation to renegotiate prior to court intervention is given teeth by the 
inclusion of clause 4(3)(c), which allows a court to award damages for a refusal to 
renegotiate or breaking off negotiations in bad faith. 
 
Thus the draft Bill would have provided a solution to the problem of changed 
circumstances.  If enacted, the Bill would not only permit discharge for frustration of 
purpose and impracticability, it would also go beyond the all-or-nothing approach of 
English law and grant a broad discretion to courts as to how to address the problem 
of changed circumstances.  Although this would present a limitation of the concept of 
pacta sunt servanda, it would remain the default position as clause 4(1) 
demonstrates and in any event a person seeking to rely on clause 4 would bear the 
burden of proving that the threshold of “unreasonableness, unconscionableness or 
oppressiveness” was met.284  Although the Bill was not enacted, its provisions 
                                               
279 Cl 4(2)(a).  This is a major difference from the PECL which do not allow release for changed 
circumstances in a situation of common mistake. 
280 This is the same as the position under the German and Dutch codes.  See chapter 5. 
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282 Cl 4(2)(d). 
283 Cl 4(3). 
284 Cf Jan L Neels “Die aanvullende en beperkende werking van redelikheid en billikheid in die 
kontraktereg” (1999) TSAR 684 at 703. 
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nevertheless provide an indication that the problem of changed circumstances has 
been identified as an issue of concern by the South African Law Commission (as it 
then was) and hence is ripe for address. 
 
2.5.2 National Credit Act285  
Perhaps the only true example of contract revision due to changed circumstances 
occurs in the context of debt review under the recently promulgated National Credit 
Act.  This statute deals with the revision of debts due to over-indebtedness of the 
debtor and/or the prior extension of reckless credit by a credit provider at chapter 
four part D.  In terms of this part of the Act, debt counsellors facilitate restructuring of 
debt and Magistrates’ Courts are empowered to rearrange the contractual 
obligations of consumer debtors should the threshold tests of over-indebtedness 
and/or reckless credit be met.286 
 
In terms of the application of these provisions, this part of the Act states at the outset 
that it only applies to consumers who are natural persons.287  Further thresholds are 
established by the definitions of over-indebtedness and reckless credit.288  Over-
indebtedness exists when the “preponderance of available information at the time a 
determination is made” indicates the consumer will not be able “to satisfy in a timely 
manner all the obligations under all the credit agreements” to which he or she is 
party.289  In order to initiate debt review proceedings a court may refer a consumer to 
a debt counsellor or itself declare that he or she is over-indebted,290 alternatively the 
consumer may himself apply for debt review.291  If the consumer makes an 
application for debt review himself under s 86, he will be required to provide an in-
depth account of his financial affairs in terms of the regulations to the Act.292  
 
As part of the debt review process, in addition to finding that a consumer is over-
indebted a debt review counsellor may also find that a particular credit agreement is 
                                               
285 Act 34 of 2005. 
286 The specific empowering sections are discussed in more detail below. 
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288 Section 79 & 80. 
289 Section 79 (1). 
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reckless.293  A credit agreement will be reckless if the credit provider failed to do the 
necessary background check into the debtor’s financial status at the time of granting 
credit, or having done so, ignored signs that the consumer did not appreciate the 
extent of his obligations or would be rendered over-indebted.294  A court may set 
aside or suspend any reckless credit agreement.295  If it does so it must then 
consider whether a consumer is over-indebted and hence stands to have his or her 
debt restructured.296  If a court does consider a consumer to be over-indebted, it may 
then refer the consumer to a debt counsellor or restructure the debt itself.297   
 
After an assessment in terms of s 86(6) as to whether a consumer is over-indebted 
and/or reckless credit has been granted, the debt counsellor may reject the 
consumer’s application, recommend voluntary negotiation between the consumer 
and his or her credit providers or find that over-indebtedness is present and make a 
recommendation to the Magistrates’ Court having jurisdiction.298  This 
recommendation can be that there should be a finding that reckless credit is present 
and/or that one or more of the consumer’s obligations be rearranged.299 
 
Once a consumer has applied for debt review he or she may not enter into any new 
credit agreements, or be extended further credit under a credit facility such as a 
credit card, until the application has been rejected or all debts paid in terms of the 
rearranged payment plan.300  Enforcement proceedings by creditors are stayed 
during the review process, unless the consumer defaults on his or her rearranged 
debts.301 
 
One of the purposes of this Act is to promote “responsibility in the credit market”.302  
It is in this vein that the Act has introduced the concepts of “over-indebtedness” and 
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“reckless credit”.303  Rather than force sequestration upon a debtor, the new 
measures take account of subjective circumstances and allow for review due to 
economic hardship.304  This form of contract revision is closely supervised by 
qualified debt counsellors305 and is conducted under the auspices of the Magistrates’ 
Courts.  This provides a clear instance where a contract can be revised (inter alia) on 
the ground of the changed circumstances of the consumer and allows for a 
supervised form of renegotiation or termination of the contract in question.  Thus, 
although the sphere of application of this provision is carefully limited, it represents a 





The conclusion which should first and foremost be drawn from this brief analysis is 
that the South African common law has no common law doctrine to deal with 
changed circumstances in contract law.  Our notion of impossibility is severe: 
anything short of absolute impossibility will not suffice to excuse a party from 
performance in accordance with the terms of the contract.  The case law seems to 
be against arguing for an expansion of the concept of impossibility to include 
impracticability: both English and South African law are clear that increased difficulty 
or expense will not excuse performance.  Both systems adhere closely to a policy of 
pacta sunt servanda in this regard.  South African writers have argued that the 
standard of impossibility is a pragmatic one, depending on the factual circumstances 
of the case, however, and while there is little case authority to support this contention 
it seems to be based in sound logic.  In addition, if the increase in difficulty were 
sufficiently severe, it is possible that demanding performance could become 
unconscionable and hence be against public policy, but such an argument is beyond 
the scope of this chapter.   
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The same is true of the converse of impracticability, frustration of purpose.  It is this 
feature of the English doctrine of frustration which means that although it overlaps in 
part with the South African law of impossibility, it remains an alien concept.  This 
type of accommodation of changed circumstances is at odds with the indigenous 
Roman-Dutch common law, and some development in this area would be required to 
introduce provisions in this regard.   
 
The supposition in futuro is a concept capable of dealing with an unforeseen change 
in circumstances subsequent to the conclusion of a contract and is arguably 
analogous to frustration of purpose in English law.  This construction is not 
acceptable in South African law, however: in order to have an effect on a contract, 
such a commonly held assumption must form part of the contract as a term of it.  
There is no reason, however, why a resolutive condition could not be implied into a 
contract to the effect that should the status quo change the contract will come to an 
end.  This is a possible means of dealing with changed circumstances, although the 
test for a tacit term would have to be satisfied in order for it to operate.  This type of 
argument, however, remains to be tested in our courts. 
 
Thus the emergent picture is bleak: there are no accepted technical doctrines 
capable of dealing with changed circumstances in South African law.  Although 
general legislation has been mooted to address the problem, it has never progressed 
beyond the stage of being a draft Bill.  The only permissible instance of review for 
changed circumstances appears to be in the limited context of debt review under the 
National Credit Act.  Given that South African law is at least partly based on 
European continental roots through our Roman-Dutch law heritage, there needs to 
be a study of the historical authority in the ius commune for a doctrine to deal with 




Chapter Three: Historical perspective – the clausula rebus sic 
stantibus∗ 
 
3.1 Origins and development of the clausula idea 
 
The idea of going back on one’s word has troubled the conscience of writers since 
antiquity.1  Large tracts have been written by those with a philosophical bent on 
promises and the importance of keeping them.  The more perceptive of these writers 
have recognised that qualifications may exist to the general rule of conscience that a 
promise should not be broken.  One such qualification is the problem of change of 
circumstances.  If circumstances change after one has promised, then it may no 
longer be just to hold the promisor to his word.  This qualification has been 
recognised since antiquity.  The authors of classical Rome mentioned this limitation 
in their writings on promises2 and this idea was taken up by writers in later times to 
the extent that it eventually became the basis of what was known from about the 
fifteenth century as the clausula rebus sic stantibus.3 
 
“Clausula rebus sic stantibus” refers to a tacit condition in a contract that 
circumstances remain unchanged.4  What immediately becomes apparent is that a 
conceptual leap has been made here.  We started off dealing with promises in 
general and have now refined the concept to legally binding promises: contracts.  
This leap did not occur quickly.  From the writers of ancient Rome, the problem of 
changed circumstances was taken up both in the writings of Christian philosophers 
and in the works of the early writers on the European ius commune.  It was over 
centuries of development that the limitation on promises was extended into legal 
application and came to serve as a restriction on the binding force of contracts.  In 
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(which I have cited), but much of the rest is my own work, however, and any errors therein are for my 
own account. 
1 For examples see Cicero De Officiis I, x; III xxiv – xxv; Seneca De Beneficiis IV, 35 & 39; Thomas 
Aquinas Summa Theologiae Q 10, art 3, v. 
2 Cicero op cit note 1; Seneca op cit note 1. 
3 For examples see Sylvester Summa Summarum Iuramentum, III, num 3; Molina  De Iure et Iustitia, 
Vol II, Disputatio 272; Lessius De Iustitia et Iure Book II, Chap 18, Dubitatio x. 
4 My translation. 
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other words, the clausula rebus sic stantibus became the antithesis of the opposing 
concept: pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be upheld). 
 
This chapter will examine the roots of the clausula doctrine in the classical Roman 
writers and trace its development in both the religious sphere and in the early civil 
law writers up to its culmination as a fully fledged legal doctrine in the later writers of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  The focus will then turn to the subsequent 
demise of the doctrine in the age of codification in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  This enquiry will set the scene for the rest of the comparative studies 
which follow in later chapters.   
 
3.1.1 Origins in classical Roman literature 
Ancient Rome had a well developed social infrastructure, which is well documented 
today, given the transmission of so many texts from the time.  The senate, which 
was the ruling body during Rome’s years as a republic, was made up of the upper 
classes.5  There were then various stratifications from the less wealthy citizens to 
freed men to slaves.  Roman society was thus hierarchical in nature and social 
responsibilities were placed upon members of each class which ensured the efficient 
functioning of society and indeed the state.  It is this concept of social 
responsibilities, or duties, with which Cicero was concerned when he wrote De 
Officiis in 44 BC.  This work was philosophical in nature and came at a time when 
the Roman republic was crumbling:  Caesar had been murdered on 15 March 44 BC 
and the resultant upheaval which resulted in the principate of Augustus was in full 
swing.6  Perhaps it was thus a little ironic for a statesman to be philosophising on 
social responsibility at this time, indeed one author has described it as “fiddling while 
Rome burned”.7  This work nevertheless stands as the musings of an influential 
Roman thinker on various topics wound up with maintaining social order. 
 
Promises and maintaining good faith were an important part of the everyday duties 
of a Roman citizen.  Particularly given the system of patronage, whereby a wealthy 
man looked out for the interests of his more humble supporters, keeping one’s 
                                               
5 Klaus Bringmann A History of the Roman Republic (2007) at 8. 
6 Ibid at 276. 
7 Paul MacKendrick The Philosophical Books of Cicero (1989) at 249. 
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promises to others was fundamental to social infrastructure and formed a vital part of 
being an honourable man.8  It is at this juncture that the problem of changed 
circumstances cropped up.  Would it ever be honourable, or indeed socially 
acceptable, not to honour one’s promise?  An important philosophical issue indeed, 
particularly to a man such as Cicero who was concerned with justice and the greater 
public good.   
 
Cicero deals with the effect of changed circumstance on a promise at two places in 
De Officiis.  Cicero notes at the outset in this section that there may be 
circumstances where there may not be a duty to fulfil a promise.  This is based on 
two fundamental principles of justice: first, that no harm be done to anyone, and 
second that common interests be conserved.9  This statement is followed by the crux 
of the argument: promises should not be kept if keeping them will prove harmful to 
those to whom they have been made.10  Similarly if keeping a promise will do more 
harm to you than good to the person to whom it has been made, it should also not be 
kept.  The example Cicero gives is of an advocate who has made a promise to 
defend someone in court.  If subsequently the advocate’s son should fall gravely ill, it 
is no breach of a moral duty not to keep his promise.   
 
In Book Three of De Officiis Cicero again picks up on this thread.11  He specifies at 
the outset that he is talking about promises obtained not by duress or fraud, but 
legitimately.12  He goes on to give the example of a man who is given a cure for a 
dangerous illness on the promise that he will never make use of the cure again 
should he recover.  What if he does recover, but subsequently contracts the disease 
again?  Since the apothecary is unfeeling in refusing his request for a cure and no 
harm will be done to the apothecary if the man does use the cure, he is justified in 
breaking his faith.  Another example follows: what if a wise man has been given a 
large inheritance on the promise that he will dance in the Forum before adiating.13  It 
                                               
8 Fritz Schultz Principles of Roman Law (1936) at 231 – 232. 
9 De Officiis I, x (31).  I used the Loeb edition (1913). 
10 De Officiis I, x (32). 
11 De Officiis III, xxiv – xxv. 
12 De Officiis III, xxiv (92). 
13 De Officiis III, xxiv (93). 
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is morally wrong for him to dance in the Forum and better that he break his promise 
and refuse the inheritance.  
 
After a few more examples from mythology, Cicero moves to the conclusion that 
promises are sometimes not to be kept and that things left in your care are not 
always to be restored.14  He then cites the classic example, which was reiterated 
throughout the following ages in discussions of changed circumstance: what if a man 
has left a sword with you in right mind and then later demands it back in a fit of 
madness?15  It would be criminal to restore it to him; it is your duty not to restore it to 
him, is Cicero’s answer. 
 
The discussion in Book III of De Officiis seems to echo that of Book I, leaving us with 
further examples to illustrate Cicero’s central arguments that promises are binding 
unless their fulfilment would do harm to those to whom they are made, or if fulfilling a 
promise will do more harm to you than good for the person to whom the promise was 
made.  It thus emerges that in the context of duties and social responsibilities, one is 
only bound by one’s word where this is expedient.  Also one has a duty towards 
others, to ensure they do not ask for what will harm them: perhaps slightly 
paternalistic, but to be read within the context of the patron-client type relationships 
with which Cicero was concerned. 
 
Writing about 100 years later, between AD 56 and 64, Seneca devoted a 
philosophical treatise specifically to the giving and receiving of favours (De 
Beneficiis).  This work also needs to be read against the backdrop of the patron-
client relationships, which were still the norm in Roman society.  Seneca was a self-
proclaimed Stoic16 and in De Beneficiis he turns his Stoic conceptions to the 
questions of liberality and gratitude, the central tenets of giving and receiving 
favours.  Seneca argues that a patron should give generously, despite the possibility 
of ingratitude and that a client can be indebted with dignity: gratitude in itself repays 
                                               
14 De Officiis III, xxv (95). 
15 This example appears to have been taken from Plato (427 – 347 BC), who uses it to illustrate the 
point that doing right does not always consist just in truthfulness and returning anything that has been 
borrowed.  See Plato The Republic Book I at para 331. 
16 Brad Inwood Reading Seneca – Stoic Philosophy at Rome (2005) at 68-69. 
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the kindness.17  Again the question crops up of whether a promise need be kept if 
circumstances have changed.  Seneca deals with this question in Book IV of De 
Beneficiis.  He begins the discussion with the general statement that a benefit is 
promised unless something occurs to show that he ought not to give it.18  He cites a 
few examples, mostly of supervening legal impossibility, such as promising to a man 
his daughter’s hand in marriage, only to discover later that that man is not a citizen.  
Seneca sums up with the conclusion that a promise is only binding if circumstances 
remain unchanged.  Any change gives rise to the opportunity to revise the promise.19  
He follows this with more examples, this time of the classic changed circumstances 
variety rather than impossibility.  For example: I have promised legal assistance, but 
then discover that a precedent is being sought to harm my father.  I have promised 
to make a journey, but then am informed that the road is infested with robbers. 
 
Seneca makes a brief departure from the topic at this point in De Beneficiis, then 
returns at chapter 39 with more examples of changed circumstances:  I will go out to 
dinner because I have promised, even if the weather is cold, but not if there is a 
snowstorm.20  I will get up from the table to attend a betrothal because I have 
promised, even if I have not finished digesting my food, but not if I have a fever.21  
Seneca then restates his argument as to a tacit condition that circumstances remain 
unchanged: when you seek fulfilment of a promise, see to it that everything is as it 
was when I promised.  Then if I fail, I will be at fault.22  
 
As with Cicero’s De Officiis, Seneca’s work constituted philosophy of social 
institutions and practices.  In a system where favours were granted for the sake of 
liberality, a promise held value both for the reputation of the benefactor and could 
conceivably be relied upon by the grantee.  It was thus important to the functioning of 
society that such promises be observed.  Seneca echoes Cicero in calling for the 
                                               
17 Ibid at 91-92. 
18 De Beneficiis IV, 35.  I used the Loeb edition (1935). 
19 De Beneficiis IV, 35: Tunc fidem fallam, tunc inconstantiae crimen audiam, si, cum eadem omnia 
sint, quae errant promittente me, non praestitero promissum; alioquin, quidquid mutatur, libertatem 
facit de integro consulendi et me fide liberat. 
20 De Beneficiis IV, 39. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid: Subest, inquam, tacita exception: “Si potero, si debebo, si haec ita erunt.”  Effice, ut idem 
status sit, cum exigis, qui fuit, cum promitterem; destituere levitas erit. 
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revision of promises in a situation of changed circumstances and his examples also 
hark back to Cicero.  We see again the impact of the illness of a son, or the 
necessity of breaking a promise to appear in court.  It is thus possible and indeed 
likely that Seneca drew on Cicero when writing his own philosophical treatise: both 
works deal with aspects of social responsibility and the element of honour and 
keeping one’s word is central to both.  Both of these authors were to provide an 
important philosophical source for the writings on changed circumstance which 
followed.  
 
3.1.2 Appearance in religious doctrine and canon law 
The ubiquitous nature of the Roman hegemony in Europe meant that even during 
and after its demise Roman texts were the subject of study for learned individuals.  
As time passed and the influence of the church and Christian teaching grew, these 
learned individuals came increasingly to be men of the church.  The relevance of this 
to a discussion of changed circumstances is that the texts of antiquity surfaced again 
several centuries later in the writings of theologians.  Hence the next phase in the 
development of the clausula doctrine was a Christian one.  The first major Christian 
author to comment on changed circumstances and the effect of this on a promise or 
an oath was St Augustine.   
 
St Augustine lived from the mid fourth century into the fifth century AD and has been 
described as perhaps the most significant Christian thinker after St Paul.23  It was in 
his work Enarrationes in Psalmos, a collection of sermons on all 150 Psalms, that St 
Augustine discussed change of circumstances, drawing on the examples cited by 
Cicero.  Indeed this particular passage from St Augustine’s work was later 
incorporated into the Decretum of the monk Gratian in about 1140.24  This work, 
known in Latin as the Decretum Gratiani, was a collection of texts deemed to be 
authoritative in the law of the church (canon law) and which sought to bring harmony 
to that system of law in much the same way that the Digest of Justinian had done for 
the civil law.25  The inclusion of St Augustine’s writing on changed circumstances 
                                               
23 Encyclopedia Brittanica Online “Saint Augustine” available at: www.search.eb.com (last accessed 
30 November 2009).   




thus gave an official air to these texts and underlined the importance of this doctrine 
for the canon law.  
 
In his dealing with the question of what is a lie, a question dealt with in some detail 
by many of the theologians to be examined here, St Augustine deals with the issue 
of changed circumstances.  St Augustine picks up on Cicero’s example of a man 
who has deposited a sword with another and later seeks its return in a fit of 
madness.26  St Augustine says that the depositor will not have a false heart, nor can 
he be said to have been lying when he promised to keep the sword in deposit should 
he thereafter refuse to return the sword to the madman.  Rather his promise would 
be “empty words” (verbi gratia). 
 
Since the Decretum was seen as an authoritative text, St Augustine’s writing therein 
came to be commented upon by a series of glossators, who wrote commentaries 
upon the text of that work.  An influential gloss for the purposes of this study was 
made at the beginning of the thirteenth century in the writings of the German 
canonist, Johannes Teutonicus.  He wrote in a gloss on the word “furens” (“mad”), 
which was used to describe the changed state of mind of the depositor in St 
Augustine’s above-mentioned passage, the condition: “if circumstances remain in the 
same state”.27  Although Feenstra has questioned whether this was actually an 
original condition by Teutonicus, or whether he took it from an earlier civilian 
glossator,28 this does appear, in our present state of knowledge, to be the first time 
this concept of changed circumstances was cited as a tacit condition to a 
transaction.29 
 
As a parallel to this development in canon law, a similar idea arose in the theological 
works of St Thomas Aquinas (1224 – 1274).  St Thomas, like St Augustine, was 
inspired by the Roman writers of antiquity.  His studies also encompassed the works 
of rationalist thinkers from ancient Greece, such as Aristotle, as well as certain 
                                               
26 Decretum Gratiani C 22, q 2, c 14. 
27“Si res in eodem statu manserit” – Gloss on the word furens in c. Ne quis (Decretum Gratiani C 22, 
q 2, c 5).  
28 Robert Feenstra “Impossibilitas and clausula rebus sic stantibus” in Alan Watson (ed) Daube 




philosophers of the Arabic world.30  St Thomas brought this rational, scientific 
method of thought to bear on his own discipline of theology, resulting in his major 
work, the Summa Theologiae.  This work discusses religious ideas in a series of 
questions, which are then argued for and against.  St Thomas deals with changed 
circumstances under the problem of whether every lie is a sin.31  He starts with the 
statement that although one who does not keep his promise would seem to act 
faithlessly, he can be excused on two accounts.  The first is if the thing promised 
was illegal: changing his mind would then be a good act.  Secondly, if there has 
been a change in the condition of the parties and of the transaction at hand.  To back 
up his argument, St Thomas then cites Seneca to the effect that for a man to be held 
to his promise, all the circumstances must remain unchanged.  If this is not the case 
then he is not faithless in failing to keep his promise.   
 
The concept of changed circumstances had thus been taken up into Christian writing 
by the end of the thirteenth century.  The origins of this idea were firmly based in the 
classical Roman writers, Cicero and Seneca, but it was beginning to take root as an 
accepted tacit condition, particularly in the canon law.32  The jump to civil law 
contracts had yet to be made, however. 
 
3.1.3 Appearance in the civil law 
As Feenstra notes, the civil law only came up with a clausula concept, in the form of 
a tacit condition that circumstances would not change, much later than the canon 
                                               
30 Denise Meyerson Essential Jurisprudence (2006) at 34 – 35. 
31 Summa Theologiae (Eyre & Spottiswoode edition (1972)) Quaestio 110, articulus 3, ad quintum: 
“…ille qui aliquid promittit, si habeat animum faciendi quod promittit non mentitur, quia non loquitur 
contra id quod gerit in mente.  Si vero non faciat quod promisit, tunc videtur infideliter agere per hoc 
quod animum mutat.  Potest tamen excusari ex duobus.  Uno modo, si promisit id quod manifeste est 
illicitum, quia promittendo peccavit, mutando autem propositum bene facit.  Alio modo, si sunt 
mutatae conditiones personarum et negotiorum.  Ut enim Seneca dicit in libro De benefic., ad hoc 
quod homo teneatur facere quod promisit, requiritur quod omnia immutata permaneant.  Alioquin nec 
fuit mendax in promittendo, quia promisit quod habebat in mente sub intellectis debitis conditionibus; 
nec etiam est infidelis non implendo quod promisit, quia eaedem conditiones non extant.” 
32 The standard text cited in the canon law as authority for a tacit condition that circumstances remain 
unchanged is a decretal of Pope Innocent III, generally quoted as “c. Quemadmodum”.  This text 
deals with a promise by a man to marry a woman, which need not be performed if he later discovers 
that she is not a virgin.  See: Feenstra op cit note 28 at 82.  
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law.33  It was only in the age of the commentators, arguably at the instance of 
Bartolus (1314 – 1357), that this occurred.34   
 
In the civil law, the clausula rebus sic stantibus started out life by another name: the 
clausula rebus sic se habentibus.  This phrase was used by Accursius (c1184 – 
c1263) in his Glossa Ordinaria to the Digest of Justinian.35  Accursius’s “Standard 
Gloss”, although drawing heavily on the works of his predecessors, represents the 
pinnacle of the scholarship of the glossators and was to have great influence after 
his death.36  Accursius used the phrase “rebus sic se habentibus” in commenting 
upon D.12.4.8, although this comment did not intend the same legal significance 
which was to be attached to that phrase in later years.37  D.12.4.8 (lex Quod Servius) 
deals with the circumstances under which a dowry given for a marriage can be 
returned where one of the parties is below the lawful age.  The text at D.12.4.8 
reasons that so long as their “quasi-matrimonial” relationship exists, the money 
cannot be recovered: “So long as the potential remains, there is no recovery.”38  
Accursius comments on this text that if this potential is deemed to exist while both 
parties are alive, then the dowry can never be reclaimed, even after a divorce.39  
However, he reasons, since this type of marriage does in fact occur, it must be 
adjudged according to the status quo for as long as matters remain unchanged 
(rebus sic se habentibus). 
 
As stated above, the age of the commentators saw the transmission of the tacit 
condition approach encapsulated in the clausula doctrine from its roots in the canon 
law to the civil law.  The commentators predominated the legal landscape of the ius 
commune from the fourteenth century onwards and were predominantly the products 
of Italian universities.40  Like the glossators, the commentators produced 
commentaries on the Corpus Iuris Civilis, although they allowed influences from 
                                               
33 Feenstra op cit note 28 at 83. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Feenstra op cit note 28 at 83. 
36 Robinson et al op cit note 24 at 3.6.3. 
37 Feenstra op cit note 28 at 83. 
38 D.12.4.8.  Alan Watson’s translation of the Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger edition (1985). 
39 See Feenstra op cit note 28 at 83 for the text from which I have translated. 
40 Robinson et al op cit note 24 at 4.2.1. 
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contemporary legislation.41  In addition, the commentators are renowned for 
producing collections of opinions on legal questions, known as consilia.42  It is in the 
commentaries of certain of these writers on the Digest that we find reference to the 
phrase rebus sic se habentibus with the meaning of a tacit condition in legal acts. 
 
Bartolus de Saxoferrato (c1313 – 1357) was the first of these commentators to 
formulate a tacit condition rebus sic se habentibus.  In his comments on D.12.4.8 we 
find the clausula concept.43  Bartolus begins by echoing Accursius that the phrase in 
D.12.4.8 which states “as long as the marriage is able to be contracted” must be 
understood as meaning that circumstances must remain unchanged (rebus sic se 
habentibus), with the parties to the marriage as they are at present.  Bartolus then 
adds that the concept rebus sic se habentibus must be kept in mind whenever 
anyone waives a right (renunciat), even in another type of matter.  This applies both 
to present as well as to future rights (spes).   
 
In his comment on D.12.4.8, Baldus (1327 – 1400) is even more explicit and extends 
the clausula concept to promissiones, in the sense of legally binding promises.44  
Baldus was a canonist as well as a civilian lawyer,45 which might explain the links 
between the clausula concept as found as a tacit condition to promises in the canon 
law and his excursus of it here as a tacit condition in contractual promises.  Indeed in 
his gloss on D.12.4.8 Baldus refers to his gloss on another passage, D.19.2.54.1, 
where Feenstra notes that Baldus refers directly to the canon law.46   
 
Reference to the clausula doctrine is also made by a slightly later commentator, 
Jason de Mayno (1435 – 1519), in his comments on D.12.4.8.  Having stated that 
with regard to this rule in the Digest the tacit condition, rebus sic se habentibus, must 
be understood, Jason goes on to add that this tacit term is also understood as being 
present in last testaments (ultima voluntas); in contracts (contractus); in laws in 
                                               
41 Robinson et al op cit note 24 at 4.4.1. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Feenstra op cit note 28 at 83 – 84.  Feenstra cites the passage I used here in the original Latin at 
84. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Robinson et al op cit note 24 at 4.5.7. 
46 Feenstra op cit note 28 at 84. 
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favour of or against an individual (privilegium); in oaths (iuramentum) and in statutes 
(statutis iuratis).47   
 
Thus we see that although the canon law, as well as Thomas Aquinas, had applied 
the concept to oaths and promises by the end of the thirteenth century, it was not 
until a century later that the concept really entered the civil law.  The civil law at this 
stage was predominantly concerned with the Roman law of Justinian, so perhaps the 
connection was waiting for someone schooled in both spheres of jurisprudence, such 
as Baldus, to make.  While Bartolus had also applied the clausula with the required 
legal significance, it was Baldus who would appear to be the first to have extended it 
to contracts.  From the writings of Baldus it seems clear that he drew on the canon 
law in this application of the clausula doctrine to civil law concepts, which explains 
the origins of the concept.  This application was further extended by Jason de 
Mayno, perhaps reflecting the advances which had been made in the law in the 
intervening century.  Thus by the end of the age of the commentators, the clausula 
rebus sic stantibus, in the guise of the clausula rebus sic se habentibus, had already 
come to have much of the significance it would enjoy in the years to come. 
 
3.2 The refinement of the idea into an established doctrine 
 
As shown above, in the later middle ages the clausula doctrine, in the sense of a 
tacit condition, made the leap from the writings of moral philosophers first to the 
canon law and then from there was taken up into the civil law.  As the authorities to 
be examined below will demonstrate, there was a close connection between church 
and law in medieval times, which is noticeable in the development of the clausula 
doctrine.  As the doctrine reached its peak during the course of the next few 
centuries, it always appeared largely in the writings of Christian scholars, given the 
pre-eminence of the church in European society.  Hence the description of the 
doctrine inevitably contained religious undertones, which reflected the philosophical 
climate of the times.  The roots of the doctrine were still discussed, however, and the 
citation of the Roman origins of the clausula concept was still the basis of most of the 
discussions we shall examine.  The examples given similarly drew on the original 




texts, but the influence of the canon law doctrine and Christian thought in general is 
manifest. 
 
In what is perhaps the most useful account (in English) of the development of the 
clausula rebus sic stantibus, Feenstra traces the links between the texts of antiquity 
and of the earlier canon law and Grotius’s writings on the subject in his De Iure Belli 
ac Pacis.48  Given the influence of Grotius’s work, particularly for the South African 
context, I will follow the outline of Feenstra’s excursus for this portion of the 
clausula’s history and examine those writers who influenced Grotius’s discussion of 
the clausula rebus sic stantibus.49   
 
The tracing of the thread of the clausula concept shall begin with the writings of an 
Italian theologian, Cajetan.  Born in 1469, Cajetan taught theology in Rome, where 
he wrote his most influential work, a commentary on the Summa Theologiae of St 
Thomas Aquinas.  Although primarily a theologian, Cajetan was also knowledgeable 
in the law and it is in this commentary that we find his discussion of the clausula 
rebus sic stantibus. 50   His discussion of the clausula is not based on the passage of 
St Thomas’s work which I quoted earlier,51 but on a passage further on in the 
Summa Theologiae where St Thomas again discusses the effect of lies.52  In his 
discussion of changed circumstances, St Thomas had referred to the relevant 
passages from Seneca.  Cajetan, in his commentary, cites Cicero.  Cajetan 
reiterates Cicero’s thesis that there are two eventualities in which one is not bound 
by one’s promise.  The first is where keeping the promise is potentially harmful to the 
promisor, such as returning a sword to a depositor who has gone insane.  The 
second is where keeping the promise would do more harm to the promisor than good 
for the person to whom the promise has been made.  The example is where a 
promisor has undertaken to appear as an advocate on behalf of another the next 
                                               
48 Feenstra op cit note 28 at 77ff. 
49 Copies of the texts of several of the authors referred to in this section have proved to be 
unavailable despite extensive efforts to obtain them.  The narrative here is thus largely based on 
secondary sources, largely comprising Feenstra’s account. 
50 Feenstra op cit note 28 at 99n89. 
51 Summa Theologiae Quaestio 110, articulus 3, ad quintum. 
52 Summa Theologiae Quaestio 113, articulus 2. 
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day, but come the time for performance he discovers that his son is gravely ill.  He is 
no longer bound to fulfil the promise under these changed circumstances.53   
 
Cajetan goes on to set out his own formula for changed circumstances: “it is 
important to consider supervening obstacles along with the subject of the promise 
and once the deeds have been gathered together, the honest thing to do is to be 
persuaded by proper opinion at the time of performance, considering the 
circumstances of the places, the people, the times and the transactions.”54  As 
Feenstra notes, this is slightly different from the tacit condition formula employed by 
St Thomas, given the inference of the objective standard of what “proper opinion” 
requires, although the general idea remains the same.55  Cajetan imports an 
objective standard into the equation, which would determine whether it was 
acceptable to break the faith or not, namely “proper opinion” (recta ratio).  This 
objective standard brings a greater degree of protection to the promisee: it will not 
suffice for the promisor to simply change his mind. 
 
3.2.1 Earlier medieval authors 
Sylvester Prierias (1456 – 1523), an Italian Dominican, refers to a change of 
circumstances as a limitation on the binding force of a promise or an agreement in 
his discussion of the pactum in his handbook for confessors the Summa Summarum 
(or Summa Sylvestrina).56  This discussion of the limitations extends to the binding 
force of these agreements on one’s conscience.  Thus the question was whether it 
would be subjectively right to break a promise, rather than whether the external 
world would consider such a breach valid.  When dealing with the scenario where 
the promisor has strengthened his promise by swearing an oath (iuramentum), 
Sylvester gives a full account of the clausula doctrine as found in canon law, as well 
as in the civil law writings of authors such as Bartolus.57  Sylvester also discusses 
the following question (quaestio): “I have made an agreement with my enemy and 
                                               
53 This example is taken from Cicero De Officiis I, x, 32. 
54 Ibid: “Oportet ergo considerare impedimenta supervenienta et conferre cum re promissa, et, 
collatione facta, quod recta tunc ratio suadet, pensatis conditionibus locorum, personarum, temporum 
et negotiorum, honestum exequi.” 
55 Feenstra op cit note 28 at 85. 
56 Summa Summarum Pactum, num 4 (as cited by Feenstra op cit note 28 at 99n92). 
57 Feenstra op cit note 28 at 85. 
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promised not to harm him.  He is then banished and proscribed by legislation.  If I kill 
him would I be breaking my faith?”58  Bartolus had held that it would be acceptable to 
kill one’s enemy in these changed circumstances.59  Sylvester adds the statement 
that there is a tacit condition that the circumstances remain unchanged, using the 
classic “rebus sic stantibus” formula:60 
“item quia ita videtur facta pax, id est rebus sic stantibus…”  
(“Likewise although it would seem thus that peace has been made, this is while 
circumstances remain unchanged.”)61 
 
Sylvester goes on to state his formula for changed circumstances as follows:  
“that change of circumstances which excuses one from an oath is understood in two ways: 
the first is when the newly arising circumstance is such that if it had been there from the 
beginning, the oath would have been rash and this is obvious in itself.  The second is when 
the newly arising circumstance is such that if it had been there from the beginning, the person 
swearing the oath would not have sworn…”62 
 
This idea of relaxing a promise where the promisor would not have promised had he 
foreseen the change of circumstances is the standard reiteration of the clausula 
concept as we shall see from the sources which follow. 
 
The question of foresight of the changed circumstances is echoed in the writings of 
Navarrus (1493 – 1586), a Spaniard who wrote soon after Sylvester.  Navarrus was 
known as a canonist as well as a moralist and his opinion is relevant since it deals 
not only with the binding force of a promise on one’s conscience (forum interius) (as 
per Sylvester), but also with its binding force from the objective perspective in the 
world at large (forum exterius).  In his work, Enchiridion sive Manuale 
confessariorum et poenitentium, Navarrus notes that in certain situations a change of 
                                               
58 Summa Summarum Iuramentum, III, num 3.  See Feenstra op cit note 28 at 99n95.  The cited 
extract from Bartolus is taken from his comments on D.45.1.96. 
59 Feenstra op cit note 28 at 85. 
60 Feenstra notes that he has been unable to find from what source Sylvester took this formula.  See 
Feenstra op cit note 28 at 99n97. 
61 My translation. 
62 Summa Summarum Iuramentum, III, num 3 (as cited in Feenstra op cit note 28 at 86):  “Et ista 
rerum mutatio excusans a iuramento dupliciter intelligitur: primo quando casus noviter emergens est 
talis quod si fuisset a principio, iuramentum fuisset temerarium et hoc per se patet; secundo quando 
est talis quod si fuisset a principio, iurans non iurasset, secundum multos doctores…” 
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circumstances will release the promisor from his promise.63  The examples which 
Navarrus cites in support of this contention are largely the tried and tested ones of 
antiquity and the canon law, hence we see the sword which need not be returned to 
an insane depositor and a promise to marry which need not be fulfilled if the woman 
concerned turns out not to be a virgin.  Navarrus then makes the following statement 
with regard to the binding force of promises: 
“[This tacit condition] is not understood as part of any sort of change, but about a change 
which if the promisor had had foresight of, he would not have promised: this man does not 
break his faith in the context of the conscience. …In addition, in the context of the world at 
large, [the tacit condition operates] if, according to the opinion of prudent men, in the 
circumstances of the transaction he would never have promised if he had had foresight of that 
change of circumstances…”64 
 
Thus we see the inference of an objective standard into the equation of whether a 
promise is binding after a change of circumstances.  It is not enough where a 
promise impacts on the affairs of others that one can simply revoke a promise if 
circumstances change.  Although the decision as to whether to be bound or not 
remains unilateral, there is at least some standard against which such a choice can 
be judged.  It is submitted that if a court were of the opinion that the promisor would 
have promised even had he foreseen the ultimate change in circumstances, his 
repudiation of his promise would not be valid.  This legal analysis of Navarrus’s 
doctrine appears to be justified, given the juristic nature of the examples he gives: 
failure to restore an item given under a loan for use (commodatum) and breach of a 
promise to marry. 
 
3.2.2 Late scholastic authority 
The next set of writers to be considered here came from a philosophical movement 
known as the late scholastics.  One of the key features of this movement was the 
stress placed upon natural law. 65  Gordley notes that the rise of natural law theory in 
contract was part of a broader movement: the sixteenth century revival of Thomistic 
                                               
63 Cap 18, Num 17. 
64 Ibid. 
65 James Gordley “Natural law origins of the common law of contract” in John Barton (ed) Towards a 
General Law of Contract (1990) at 368. 
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philosophy.66  Gordley describes the origins of this natural law theory as beginning 
with a rejection of the nominalist philosophy of William of Ockham in favour of that of 
St Thomas.67  The adherents of this school “disliked nominalism in philosophy, 
Protestantism in religion and absolutism in politics”.68  The aim of natural law was to 
discover an implicit law in human society, which could be reached through the moral 
philosophy of St Thomas.  This meant that there was a moral basis to law and that it 
was not merely the whim of the sovereign.69   
 
Although the early adherents of this school were Dominicans (like St Thomas 
himself), the later members in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
were Jesuits.  It is in the writings of two of these later Jesuits, Luis de Molina (1535 – 
1600) and Leonard Lessius (1554 – 1623) that we find discussions of the clausula 
concept which were to have an impact on Grotius.   
 
Molina, a Spaniard, discussed the clausula rebus sic stantibus in his major work De 
Jure et Justitia.70  The discussion is found in a text which is concerned with “under 
what circumstances one should be allowed not to fulfil a promise which has been 
made but not yet performed”.71  Molina takes as his starting point the general 
statement that “if someone is bound to fulfil a promise, which obligates him in some 
way, it is necessary that the circumstances of the parties, the surrounding facts and 
the transaction have not changed”.72  Molina cites St Thomas, as well as Seneca 
and Cicero as the origin of this statement, along with Cajetan, de Soto and Navarrus 
who are said to subscribe to the idea it contains.  He immediately qualifies this 
statement to the effect that not every change of circumstance will result in absolution 
from a promise.  A change would have this effect, however, under two 
circumstances, the first of which is where performance has become impossible, 
either in fact or in law.  Thus if you have promised to give a particular slave or horse 
on a given day and come that day they have died, you are not bound to fulfil your 
                                               
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid at 369. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 I used the edition Moguntiae (1602). 
71 Disputatio 272 in volume 2 of the work at columns 82 – 85. 
72 Vol II, col 82. 
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promise.73  Similarly if you have promised to give a sword to someone, but before 
you hand it over the promisee goes mad, you will not be bound to give it to him.74  
This archetypal example of Cicero is quoted as an instance where performance is 
impossible in law, taking the broad natural law view that something repugnant to 
nature should also be against the law. 
 
The second circumstance in which one will not be bound to fulfil a promise is the 
classic clausula type situation, where the change does not exactly result in 
impossibility but where:  
“if the change had occurred to the promisor when he promised, he would have excluded this 
eventuality from his promise and, if you had asked him about it at that time, he would have 
replied that it was not his intention to bind himself under those circumstances.”75   
 
Molina gives three examples in support of this contention.  The first is religious and 
concerns a vow made to God to fast on the sixth holiday every year.76  If this holiday 
should in a particular year turn out to be Christmas, it cannot be presumed that if you 
had foreseen this eventuality you would have promised to abstain from meat.  An 
objective opinion of prudent men can be sought should you fear that you might be 
breaking a vow without just cause: although this would appear to be an example of a 
promise which should only be binding on the conscience (forum interius) and hence 
only subjective justification should be required, an objective opinion could be sought 
as extra justification should you fear breaking a vow to God.77   
 
The second example is taken from the canon law78 and is again the archetypal 
qualification that a man need not fulfil his promise to marry a woman if she turns out 
not to be a virgin.79  In addition to this instance Molina adds that a promise to marry 
will also not bind if the woman turns out to be a leper, or to be paralysed, or repels 
the eyes or the nose.  Finally if you have promised your labour to someone for the 
administration of his affairs (or something similar) and a grave illness should 
                                               
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Vol II, cols 82 – 83. 
76 Vol II, col 83. 
77 Ibid. 
78 c. Quemadmodum. 
79 De Iure et Iustitia Vol II, col 83. 
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subsequently strike your son, causing you to be unable to attend to both matters, 
you will not be bound to fulfil your promise, since you did not intend to bind yourself 
under those circumstances.80  This third example is taken from Cicero.81   
 
Lessius was of the same philosophical school as Molina, yet he was a native of 
Belgium.  In his principal work, “De Iustitia et Iure caeterisque Virtutibus 
Cardinalibus” he discusses the clausula concept under the following dubitatio: “under 
what circumstances does a promise, which has been made, but not yet performed, 
cease to bind”.82  Lessius begins his discussion with the familiar formula that a 
promise ceases to bind when the circumstances of the matter or of the parties have 
changed to such an extent that if the promisor had foreseen this change, he would 
not have wished to promise.83  He cites Navarrus as authority for this proposition.  
The dubitatio distinguishes four scenarios in which a promise fitting the description in 
its title ceases to bind.  Of these, only the first two are relevant to this discussion.84  
The first scenario is where the thing which has been promised becomes illegal, loses 
its usefulness or becomes impossible.  The second is our classic clausula situation:  
“[I]f the circumstances of the matter or of the parties are changed to such an extent, that the 
promisor, according to prudent opinion, does not seem to have wished to bind himself in that 
eventuality.  This must be judged from the state of the thing which has been promised, of the 
promise itself and from the disposition of the promisor and other circumstances.”85   
 
Cajetan is cited as authority for both of these scenarios.  Illegality and impossibility 
remain today grounds for terminating a contract in most modern legal systems.  
“Lack of usefulness” (inutilis) seems to echo the Ciceronian proviso that a promise 
need not be performed if it is of less advantage to the promisee than is justified by 
the effort required for performance by the promisor.86  The first scenario thus seems 
                                               
80 Vol II, col 84. 
81 De Officiis I, x (32).  See the discussion above at section 3.1.1. 
82 I used the Antwerp edition (1612).  The clausula rebus sic stantibus is dealt with in Book II, Chap 18 
at Dubitatio x. 
83 II, 18, x. 
84The third scenario which will not be discussed here is when two men have made reciprocal 
promises and one of them wishes to avoid performance: the performance of the innocent party is 
excused.  The fourth scenario is when there is an error in motive concerning performance of the 
promise.  The example given is if you have promised something for a particular reason and that 
reason fails to materialise. 
85 II, 18, x. 
86 De Officiis I, x (32). 
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more or less trite.  The second scenario is of interest to our discussion, although 
again, Lessius adds nothing to what his predecessors have said.  The examples 
Lessius cites in support of this second scenario are also not original: we see Cicero’s 
example (although Cajetan is cited) of a task which need not be performed if one’s 
son falls ill subsequent to promising one’s services and the canon law example of 
the man who need not fulfil his promise to marry if the betrothed turns out not to be a 
virgin.87 
 
3.3.3 Northern natural law school 
Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645) was a Dutch jurist and scholar.  Due to the influence of 
his key publication De iure belli ac pacis,88 Grotius has been referred to as the 
“father of international law”.89  Grotius was a member of what Gordley describes as 
the “Northern natural law school”.90  As such, Grotius’s writings reflect the influence 
of earlier natural law thinkers, such as Molina and Lessius, of the late scholastic 
school.91  According to Gordley the distinguishing feature of natural lawyers such as 
Grotius is that they distinguished rules which were thought to be correct in theory 
from the rules of Roman law practised in most of Europe at the time.92  This 
distinction was referred to as being one between “natural law” and “positive law”. 
 
As a so-called “old authority” of Roman-Dutch law, Grotius’s work is particularly 
relevant in the South African context.  The clausula rebus sic stantibus is more likely 
to have influence in South Africa if it is supported by a binding source of law, such as 
Roman-Dutch law.  Of the Roman-Dutch law authors, however, only Grotius and Van 
Bynkershoek (1673 – 1743) dealt with the doctrine and then only in the context of 
international law.93  Grotius discusses the clausula concept in De iure belli ac pacis 
(“On the law of war and peace”) in a chapter on the interpretation of treaties.94  Van 
                                               
87 c. Quemadmodum. 
88 “On the law of war and peace” – first published in Paris in 1625. 
89 Cf Encyclopaedia Britannica Online “Grotius, Hugo” (Last accessed 26 January 2010).  
90 Gordley op cit note 65 at 367. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid at 371. 
93 F Brandsma “Some remarks on Dutch private law and the ius commune” (2007) 11 Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law 1 at 6-7. 
94 De iure belli ac pacis “De interpretatione” Bk II, Ch xvi, §22 – 27.  
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Bynkershoek discussed the clausula only very briefly in his work Quaestiones iuris 
publici (“Inquiries in public law”), which will be considered below.95 
 
Before turning specifically to the issue of the clausula concept, Grotius deals with the 
issue of where there is a “defect in the intent” (defectu voluntatis) of a promisor.96  
According to Grotius:  
“A restrictive interpretation, outside of the natural meaning of the words containing the 
promise, is derived either from an original defect in the intent, or from the incompatibility with 
the intent of a case occurring.  A defect inherent in the intent is recognized from the absurdity 
which evidently would otherwise result, or from the cessation of the reason which alone 
furnished the full and effective motive for the intent, or from a defect in the subject-matter.”97 
 
Although the nature of this passage is rather abstract, which perhaps is 
understandable given that it deals with interpretation in general, it seems to deal, at 
least in part, with the concept of an error in motive.  Where the sole reason (or 
motive) behind the intention of the promisor falls away there is a defect present in 
that intention and hence a restrictive interpretation of the promise must be sought.  
This general statement paves the way for a more specific discussion of the clausula 
rule itself: 
“The question also is commonly raised, whether promises contain in themselves the tacit 
condition, ‘if matters remain in their present state.’ 
To this question a negative answer must be given, unless it is perfectly clear that the present 
state of affairs was included in that sole reason of which we made mention.”98    
 
Thus it would seem that Grotius denies the validity of the clausula, except in limited 
circumstances.  If the “sole reason” (unica ratione) he refers to in §25.2 is the same 
as the motive behind the promisor’s intention (and the phrase “of which we made 
mention” at the end of this passage does seem to refer back to the previous passage 
at §22) then we are left with some sort of doctrine of tacit suppositions, similar to that 
developed by the later German author Windscheid.99  That is that a promise will 
cease to bind if at the time of promising, the promisor had certain reservations in his 
                                               
95 Quaestiones iuris publicis Lib II, Cap X. 
96 De iure belli ac pacis II, xvi, 22. 
97 Ibid.  Translations throughout by Francis Kelsey On the Law of War and Peace: Three Books 
(1925). 
98 De iure belli ac pacis II, xvi, 25.2. 
99 See below section 3.3.3 on Windscheid. 
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mind of when the promise would no longer have to be honoured, and a change of 
circumstances was one of them.100  This does not grant to the promisor the benefit of 
hindsight when electing to end his obligation: the reservation must have been there 
from the start.101  Hence rather than standing as a tacit condition to any promise, the 
continuation of the status quo must be a supposition in the mind of the contracting 
party.102  Should it prove false, the contract would be at an end, due, according to 
Grotius, to an error in motive.103  
 
Grotius continues, however, with the topic of unforeseen circumstances in §26.  He 
notes that an actually occurring case may be incompatible with the intent of the 
promisor.  This intent (voluntas) may be inferred from natural reason (ex naturali 
ratione) or from some other sign of intent.  Grotius then states that for the purpose of 
an inference from natural reason, Aristotle relied on a concept of equity (aequitas).  
This sense of fairness, or equity, seems to permit the operation of a clausula type 
principle, not only in promises, but also in wills and contracts: 
“Now the use of these qualities, within proper limits, ought to be made applicable to wills also, 
and compacts.  For since all contingencies can neither be foreseen nor set forth, a degree of 
freedom is needed in order to make exceptions of cases which the person who has spoken 
would make an exception of, if he were present.  Yet recourse to such a restriction of 
meaning should not be had rashly – that, in fact, would be to make oneself master of 
another’s act – but only on sufficient implications.”104   
 
Thus, although Grotius has limited the application of the clausula concept in §25.2, 
he returns to the problem here and defends its application, even in certain juristic 
acts, provided certain implications (indicia)105 are present.  This requirement of 
“implications” being present appears at first glance to be a Grotian innovation, since 
such a qualification did not appear in the writing of his predecessors of the late 
                                               
100 Basil S Markesinis, Hannes Unberath and Angus Johnston The German Law of Contract (2006) at 
320 – 322. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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scholastic school.  When Grotius sets out these two implications, however, he 
follows closely on the writings of earlier authors: 
“The most certain implication is if the literal meaning would in any case involve something 
unlawful, that is, at variance with the precepts of the law of nature, or of divine law.”106 
 
The examples Grotius quotes in support of this contention are all taken from earlier 
texts: namely that a sword need not be returned to an insane depositor (Cicero) and 
that an item which has been given in deposit will be returned to its rightful owner, 
rather than to the depositor, should such an owner emerge (D.16.3.31 is quoted in 
support of this second example). 
 
The second implication is the classic clausula situation where a change of 
circumstances has made performance intolerable: 
“A second implication will become manifest if, while the literal interpretation may not in itself 
involve something unlawful, the obligation, in the view of one who judges the matter fairly, 
shall appear to be burdensome and unbearable, whether the condition of human nature is 
considered in the abstract, or the person and matter under consideration are brought into 
comparison with the result of the act itself.”107 
 
Grotius gives a broad range of examples to support this argument, taken from 
various areas of the law.  The first example is of the institution of a loan for use 
(commodatum):  
“Thus a man who has lent a thing for some days will be able to demand its return within those 
days, if he himself is greatly in need of it; for the nature of a generous act is such that it is not 
to be believed that any one has wished to obligate himself to his own great disadvantage.”108 
 
The second example is from international law: 
“Thus, again, one who has promised aid to an ally will be entitled to excuse in so far as he 
himself needs his troops as long as he is in danger at home.”109 
 
The final example is taken from public law: 
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“Also the exemption from taxes and tribute is to be understood as covering the usual daily 
and yearly requirements, not requirements imposed by extreme necessity, which a state 
cannot do without.”110 
 
Thus we find the classic statement of the clausula doctrine applied in quite a wide 
variety of cases, not just in the classic setting of contract.  This is not an original 
development: as Feenstra shows in his discussion of Grotius’s passages on the 
clausula, all these examples are taken from earlier writers such as Molina and 
Lessius, as well as certain older texts from the postglossators.111   
 
Grotius then proceeds to criticise Cicero’s view that a promise need not be kept if 
keeping it is of no advantage to the promisee, or if keeping the promise is of more 
harm to the promisor than of advantage to the promisee.112  The reason for this is 
that a promisor ought not to judge whether a thing will be useful to the promisee 
(except in the case of madness, as in the deposited sword example).113  Cicero’s 
example of not having to work for another when detained by the serious illness of 
one’s son is, however, approved by Grotius.  He states that this type of harm to the 
promisor is an exception to his earlier statement, in view of the nature of the act 
(natura actus).114  Grotius then concludes his discussion with a lengthy quote from 
Seneca.  This passage is the classic statement from De beneficiis that a promise will 
only remain binding while circumstances are unchanged.115  Grotius qualifies this 
passage with the statement that although “all things” must remain the same as when 
the promisor promised in order to bind him to his promise, the words “all things” must 
be understood in the light of his statement about the “nature of the act” mentioned 
previously.116 
 
Thus despite Grotius’s statement at §25.2 that the clausula doctrine only applied in 
limited circumstances, he makes significant inroads into that statement in §§26 – 27, 
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where he sets out the basic outlines of the concept as found in earlier authors such 
as Molina and Lessius.  Grotius uses new terms in his discussion, stressing the 
concepts of “implications” (indicia) in the interpretation of the will of the promisor 
(voluntas) and the “nature of the act” as qualifying which circumstances would allow 
the promisor to revise his promise.  It is clear from a study of Grotius’s sources, 
however, that once he has set out his argument in full it does not really develop the 
clausula doctrine greatly beyond that of his predecessors.  Hence we see that the 
“implications” are the standard statements of when a promise will cease to bind in 
Molina and Lessius, for example, and even the concept of the “nature of the act” is 
similar to that of earlier writers not examined here.117  The mere fact that Grotius 
discusses this doctrine lends weight to it, however, given the influence which 
Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis enjoys.  He provides a useful reiteration of the earlier 
texts and despite his careful circumscription of the doctrine at the outset, he goes on 
to largely approve much of what had been written before.  
 
The other authority of the Roman-Dutch law period who mentions the clausula rebus 
sic stantibus is Cornelius Van Bynkershoek.  Van Bynkershoek was President of the 
Supreme Court of Holland, Zeeland and West Friesland from 1724.118  He deals with 
the clausula doctrine very briefly in his work on international law, Quaestiones Iuris 
Publici,119 under the chapter heading “On the faith which must be honoured in state 
agreements, and whether there are any tacit exceptions to these agreements?”120   
 
Van Bynkershoek begins the chapter by noting that state agreements are binding 
because of the good faith of the parties.  He proceeds to state that the first 
troublesome inquiry is whether state agreements have to be kept in every 
eventuality.  Van Bynkershoek notes that there is an opinion (sententia) that every 
agreement contains a tacit condition rebus sic stantibus.121  He states that while 
some authors have rejected this doctrine, others have (somewhat shyly) 
                                               
117 Feenstra op cit note 28 at 104n152 points to similarities between the texts of Grotius and those of 
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acknowledged it.  Van Bynkershoek adds that he does not know whether this 
acknowledgement is more just.  According to this doctrine, it is appropriate to 
withdraw from an agreement: 
“i) If a new motive, which is suitable enough, intervenes; ii) If the matter should be driven back 
to a point from which it is not possible to begin; iii) If the reason for the agreement itself 
ceases; iv) If the necessity and utility of the State demand otherwise.”122 
 
Having set out the clausula doctrine, however, Van Bynkershoek warns against such 
“treacherous loopholes” (perfidiae latebris) which can seize the minds of Heads of 
State.   
 
Van Bynkershoek’s discussion of the clausula, is not directly pertinent to the present 
topic, since he discusses it in the international law context rather than that of private 
contracts.  Given his significance in South Africa as a Roman-Dutch authority, 
however, this passage is worth mentioning.  The way in which Van Bynkershoek 
distances himself from the doctrine is particularly noticeable, along with his caution 
against the uncertainty which it brings to agreements. 
 
Another famous member of the Northern natural law school was the German, 
Samuel Pufendorf (1632 – 1694).  Pufendorf’s most influential work was titled De 
Iure Naturae et Gentium, published in 1672.  This work was based on the social life 
of man and was firmly in the natural law tradition, following authors such as Grotius 
and the philosopher, Hobbes.123  Pufendorf begins this work by setting out a general 
system of principles for social living and then applies it to private, public and 
international law.124  Robinson et al note that Pufendorf relied quite heavily on 
Grotius for the content of his legal rules, but worked out the consequences more fully 
himself.125  Hence in Pufendorf’s discussion of the clausula rebus sic stantibus it is 
not surprising that we find much of Grotius’s discussion of this topic reproduced 
almost verbatim, with additional comments here and there.126 
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Pufendorf deals with the clausula doctrine in his chapter on interpretation of 
agreements (as does Grotius).  He begins his discussion by echoing Grotius in 
asking whether promises contain a tacit condition rebus sic stantibus.127  Pufendorf 
answers (again drawing heavily on Grotius): 
“Which is in general denied; for since this condition is odious, as being apt to render the act 
null, it ought not easily to be presumed, if it be not actually added; unless it appears plainly 
that the present posture of affairs was included in that one only reason which we have been 
talking of.”128 
 
Pufendorf goes on to state, however, that a general rule (along the lines of pacta 
sunt servanda) should be limited: 
“Moreover, a general law ought to be restrained; if, although it be not absolutely unlawful to 
stick to the letter, yet upon weighing the thing in candour and prudence, it appears to be too 
grievous and burdensome, either in respect of the condition of human nature absolutely 
considered, or in regard of the person and thing in debate, compared with the end of it.”129 
 
In support of this contention he cites the same examples as Grotius: a man may 
request the return of an item loaned before the expiry of the loan, should he need it 
for his own use.  A prince who has promised military assistance to an ally is 
excused, should he require his forces on the domestic front.  A grant of immunity 
from taxes includes only ordinary taxes and not those required by the State for a 
special and urgent purpose.130 
 
Pufendorf’s views indeed seem little more than a restatement of those of Grotius: in 
general the application of clausula doctrine is denied, but this rule is to be limited 
where the circumstances point to great injustice of the enforcement of pacta sunt 
servanda.  Again, however, Pufendorf’s failure to deny the existence of the clausula 
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3.2.4 Later German authority 
Augustin Leyser (1683 – 1752) was a German scholar of the early Enlightenment 
period who supported the clausula rebus sic stantibus.  He discusses the clausula 
concept in his major work, Meditationes ad Pandectas.131  Leyser begins his 
discussion with a general statement: 
“In every agreement and every promise it must be understood that circumstances remain 
unchanged.”132 
 
As authority for this he cites the well-known passage from Seneca.133  Leyser notes 
at the outset as well that this rule has been disparaged by Grotius and, following him, 
Pufendorf (amongst others).134  He does, however, note that even these authors 
permit the clausula concept where the enforcement of a promise or an agreement 
would lead to the ruin of the promisor or another person.135 
 
Leyser then asks the question why then a general rule of changed circumstances 
should not be formulated: 
“Why then should it not be permissible to formulate a general rule that an obligation will cease 
to bind and a promise will not be able to be exacted from a promisor, if such a great change 
should occur, that in consequence nothing more of the former state of affairs remains, and if 
the promisor had foreseen this change, he would not have promised.”136  
 
This statement is followed by another famous passage from antiquity, this time by 
Cicero.137  As his example of changed circumstances releasing a promisor from his 
promise, Leyser cites a case where a man owned two houses.  One house was 
promised to his son-in-law as a dowry, but before transfer could occur, his own 
house burnt down.  Leyser’s opinion was that the father-in-law could not be 
compelled to act to his own detriment in this matter.138 
 
                                               
131 Meditationes ad Pandectas Vol I, Sp XL, §IV.  I used the Halae edition (1772). 
132 Ibid. “Omne pactum, omnis promissio, rebus sic stantibus, intelligenda est…” 
133 De beneficiis IV, 35. 
134 Meditationes ad Pandectas Vol I, Sp XL, IV. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 De officiis I, x (31 – 32). 
138 Meditationes ad Pandectas Vol I, Sp XL, IV. 
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Leyser proves an interesting study for clausula purposes, due to his unequivocal 
support of the doctrine.  Despite noting the criticism of this concept by other authors 
of the Northern natural law school, Leyser throws his weight behind it, citing the 
doctrine as a more or less unqualified rule, similar to the earlier texts of the late 
scholastics.  This was unusual, for in the time in which he wrote, the doctrine was 
already beginning to decline in popularity. 
 
3.3 The clausula rebus sic stantibus in the age of codification 
  
The rise of natural law in the seventeenth century resulted in the following century in 
the Enlightenment.  This shift in the intellectual climate in Europe saw a 
modernisation of thinking.  In civil law, the Enlightenment saw a desire to simplify the 
law and make it easily accessible through a process of codification.139  Thus from the 
eighteenth century onwards we see the development of various codes of civil law in 
European countries. 
 
3.3.1 The eighteenth century natural law codes 
The first code to be considered here was enacted in Bavaria, a southern state of 
Germany, under the auspices of the Elector Max Joseph III.  The Codex 
Maximilianeus Bavaricus civilis was promulgated in 1756.  The arrangement of the 
code itself followed the precedent of Justinian’s Institutions.  Robinson et al note that 
the code did not adhere to any particular theory of natural law, but to a large extent 
simply restated the rules of the usus modernus Pandectarum (the contemporary 
application of the rules of the Digest).140  These writers do acknowledge that there is 
evidence of a natural law influence, however.141  This influence manifests itself, for 
example, in the use of German in the code, although its title was in Latin.  The shift 
towards a more understandable code was echoed in its clarity of language.   
 
The Bavarian civil code deals with the clausula rebus sic stantibus in Part IV, which 
is concerned with the law of obligations.  The discussion of the doctrine comes under 
                                               
139 Robinson et al op cit note 24 at 15.1. 
140 Ibid at 15.4.4. 
141 Ibid at 15.4.5. 
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a general article dealing with when an obligation will be suspended.142  The article 
begins by describing the circumstances under which the perishing of the thing 
promised will extinguish the obligation and then moves to a discussion of the 
clausula doctrine proper.  The article notes that the clausula rebus sic stantibus is a 
tacit condition in every transaction and hence a change in circumstances suspends 
the obligation, provided the following requirements are met:  first, the change must 
not be attributable to the fault of the debtor, whether by late performance or other 
positive act.143  Second, the change must not have been readily foreseeable and 
finally, the change must be such that had the debtor known about it beforehand, he 
would not have promised performance (in the impartial opinion of the competent 
observer).144  Whether or not the obligation is entirely suspended, or merely 
adjusted, however, is left to the discretion of the court.145 
 
The Bavarian code thus reflects the classical statement of the clausula doctrine as 
developed in the works of writers such as Lessius and Molina and as had been 
endorsed a few years earlier by the German, Leyser.  The only limitations on this 
tacit condition were that it must not have been attributable to the fault of the debtor or 
have been foreseeable and that it must satisfy an objective standard of intolerability 
before performance would be excused.  Again, these conditions were nothing new 
and were the usual limitations cited by most previous authors.  Hence despite the 
criticism of the clausula doctrine by many authors of the natural law school, the first 
code in the natural law tradition retained the concept.  
 
In the north of Germany, work had begun on a new code for the state of Prussia as 
early as 1713, under the auspices of Friedrich Wilhelm I.  His successor, Friedrich 
the Great ordered the production of a code which was to be “based purely on reason 
and on the constitution of the territory; [it] was to be in character German and in 
application general.”146  This ruler died in 1786, and it was only under Friedrich 
Wilhelm II that the final code was promulgated in 1794 as the Allgemeines Landrecht 
                                               




146 Robinson et al op cit note 24 at 15.5.3. 
82 
 
für die preussischen Staaten.  The final product governed the entire sphere of legal 
application: private and public law, as well as canon law and feudal privileges.147   
 
The Prussian code (“ALR”) did contain a clausula type principle, although it did not 
refer to it by its Latin name as the Bavarian code had done.  The relevant provisions 
appear under a section dealing with the cancellation of contracts.148  Change of 
circumstances is one of the grounds on which a contract can be cancelled.149  
Section 377 of the ALR provides that apart from actual impossibility, a change in 
circumstances is no reason for refusing to perform one’s obligation.  This is 
immediately followed by section 378, however, which provides as follows: 
“If, however, an unforeseen change makes it impossible to achieve the final aim pursued by 
the parties as expressed in the contract or inferable from the nature of the transaction, then 
each of them may withdraw from the unperformed contract.”150 
 
According to section 380, if the change in circumstances resulted in impossibility for 
only one party, he may rescind from the contract, although section 381 thereafter 
provided that this withdrawing party must pay full damages to the other side if he 
was responsible for the change in circumstances. 
 
The ALR thus did not include the clausula doctrine by name as the Bavarian code 
had done.  Rather the provisions on change of circumstance were somewhat more 
circumscribed and dealt rather with something akin to frustration of purpose.151  The 
purpose in question had to be an express term of the contract or inferable from its 
nature, however, which moves the provision from the subjective realm of the 
clausula type reservation into that of a more objectively determinable condition.  
 
 
                                               
147 Ibid at 15.5.6. 
148 §§ 349 – 423, I, 5 ALR. 
149 §§ 377 – 384, I, 5 ALR. 
150 § 378, I, 5.  Translation by Werner Lorenz “Contract modification as a result of change of 
circumstances” in Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedman (eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law 
(1995) at 360. 
151 Compare the analysis of Philipp Carl von Alvensleben Fundamental change of circumstances and 
the principle of causa finalis (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Stellenbosch 2001) at 58: “[t]he 
provisions [§§ 377 – 384, I, 5 ALR] thus confine the effect of the clausula to the thwarting of the 
contractual purpose, but not any purpose – only the purpose expressly agreed upon or which self-
evidently arose from the very nature of the contract.” 
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3.3.2 The French experience 
The first written constitution after the French revolution of 1789 envisaged a new civil 
code, in line with the earlier Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789.  
The French civil code of 1804 also followed Justinian’s Institutes as a model, 
although it was composed in the French natural law tradition of the period.  Although 
several individuals were influential in the process of codification, perhaps the most 
influential expert was Pothier (1699 – 1772).  Although Pothier had died in 1772, this 
erstwhile Professor of law had written an extremely influential work, the Traité des 
Obligations (first published in 1761), which dealt with the entire law of obligations in 
the French system.  Pothier followed this work with a dozen or so books on specific 
contracts before his death.  Robinson et al note that Pothier has been called the 
“father of the Code” and that there is little in the French code which is in discord with 
Pothier’s work.  Indeed a lot of the code’s provisions are drawn directly from his 
writings.152   
 
For an inquiry into the existence of the clausula rebus sic stantibus in the French 
tradition, it is thus particularly apt to first briefly examine Pothier’s writing, before 
turning to consider the provisions of the code itself.  In the Traité des Obligations, 
Pothier discusses impossibility of performance in contract under the chapter 
heading: “Of the extinction of an obligation by the extinction of the thing due; or when 
it ceases to be susceptible of obligation; or when it is lost, so as not to be known 
where it is.”153  This chapter sets out in detail the circumstances in which 
impossibility will render a contract at an end, but does not at any point deal with the 
situation where performance is not impossible, but merely more difficult due to a 
change of circumstances.  There is certainly no express mention of the clausula 
itself.  It can thus be inferred that Pothier did not consider this doctrine to form part of 
the French law of his day.154    
 
                                               
152 Robinson et al op cit note 24 at 15.7.7. 
153 Pothier A Treatise on the Law of Obligations or Contracts Part III, Chapter 6; translation by William 
David Evans (1853). 
154 It is perhaps worth noting that the seminal English case on frustration, Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 
B&S 826, cited the chapter of Pothier discussed here in reaching a decision that the destruction of the 
subject matter of a contract of lease extinguished the obligation.  Taylor’s case discussed the civil law 
position on impossibility at 834 – 835.   
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It is thus perhaps not surprising that we find no mention of a clausula type concept in 
the French civil code itself.  Indeed the civil code stresses the opposing concept of 
pacta sunt servanda: 
 
“Art.1134.  Contracts lawfully entered into have the force of law for those who have made 
them.  They can only be cancelled by mutual consent or for causes allowed by the law.  They 
must be carried out in good faith.”155 
 
This article was relied upon by the Cour de cassation (the highest court in private law 
matters) in 1876 in rejecting a claim that a change of circumstances could relieve a 
party of his obligations under a contract.156  In this case an argument was rejected 
that the court could modify the contract based on the theory of révision pour 
imprévision (“modification on the ground of unforeseeability”).  The civil courts have 
adhered to this position over the years,157 although it is to be noted that the 
administrative court, the Conseil d’Etat does apply the theory of imprévision under 
certain circumstances to administrative contracts which come before it.158 
 
3.3.3 The German experience 
In Germany in the late seventeenth century the popularity of the natural law school 
began to decline in favour of a new movement: the historical school.  Law was 
expected to embody the spirit of the people and thus had to be firmly rooted in the 
context of the nation, which necessitated a knowledge of legal history.  One of the 
leading figures of the historical school in Germany was Von Savigny (1779 – 1861), 
who stressed the Germanic context in the reception and development of Roman law 
                                               
155 Henry Cachard The French Civil Code (1930).  French law allows discharge only in situations of 
force majeure.  See Joern Rimke “Force majeure and hardship: application in international trade 
practice with specific regard to the CISG and the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts” (1999 – 2000) Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) 193 at 204 – 205. 
156 Civ 6 Mar 1876, Canal de Craponne, DP 1976.1.193 note A Giboulot. 
157 Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (eds) Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000) at 
561n22.  See generally also Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law (1998) 
at 524 – 527. 
158 Ibid at 562.  This distinction is criticised by Zweigert & Kötz op cit note 157 at 527, based on the 
fact that the legislature has had to intervene in the civil law to address contracts struck by hardship 
following both of the World Wars. 
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during the middle ages in Germany.159  Von Savigny does not, however, even 
mention the clausula doctrine in his writing.160  
 
Following the Napoleonic wars, Germany recovered several states which had been 
under French rule and there was a growing sense of German nationalism and calls 
for a code for Germany as a whole became more pronounced.161  Codification as a 
process in individual German states continued, however.  One of the states freed 
from French rule was Baden and it passed its own Landrecht in 1809.  This code 
was essentially a translation of the French civil code,162 however, and echoed the 
French rejection of any sort of clausula doctrine with a restatement of article 1134 of 
the Code Civil which stressed the opposing concept of pacta sunt servanda.163   
 
The historical school in Germany was followed closely by another movement in legal 
scholasticism, known as the Pandectists.  The Pandectists took their name from the 
Pandects (ie the Digest) of Justinian and were concerned about the ordering of 
Roman law for contemporary use.164  Indeed the Pandectists began as an “off-shoot” 
of the historical school before developing into a philosophical school in their own 
right.165  One of the most influential of the Pandectists was Windscheid (1817 – 
1892).   
 
The clausula rebus sic stantibus had declined almost entirely in popularity by 
Windscheid’s day.  The nineteenth century was a time of freedom of contract, 
economic liberalism and certainty of law, all of which ran counter to the ethos behind 
a tacit condition that limited the validity of a contract.166  While Windscheid rejected 
the clausula doctrine itself,167 he nevertheless attempted to accommodate the 
problem of changed circumstances under his own theory of “presupposition” 
                                               
159 Robinson et al op cit note 24 at 16.2.4. 
160 Von Alvensleben op cit note 151 at 59. 
161 Robinson et al op cit note 24 at 16.2.5. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Von Alvensleben op cit note 151 at 59.   
164 Robinson et al op cit note 24 at 16.3.1. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Reinhard Zimmermann Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition 
Today (2001) at 81. 
167 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts Vol I § 98. 
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(Voraussetzung).168  This theory was put forward in 1850 in a monograph titled Die 
Lehre des römischen Rechts von der Voraussetzung.169  The essence of this theory 
was that when a contracting party makes his contractual promise, he assumes that 
the intended legal consequences will occur only in certain circumstances.  Hence 
there is an assumption that the circumstances will remain unchanged, although this 
is not elevated to a term of the contract and thereby made an express condition.  If 
the other party to the contract had realised that this assumption had been 
fundamental for the promisor, then the promisor should not be bound by the 
agreement if his presupposition was falsified by a change in circumstance.  Thus the 
contract was concluded under (what is analogous to) a tacit condition that the 
circumstances remain unchanged, which is why Windscheid referred to the 
presupposition as an “inchoate condition” (unentwickelte Bedingung). 
 
While Windscheid’s presupposition had thus to be material to the contract, it was not 
a term of the contract, nor even necessarily a common assumption.  It was merely a 
unilateral motive which was known to the other party.  To many in Germany this 
struck at the root of contractual certainty and Windscheid’s theory was subjected to 
much criticism.170   Lenel attacked Windscheid’s doctrine on the basis that it failed to 
sufficiently distinguish between an assumption and a legally irrelevant motive.171  
Windscheid remained adamant about the necessity of a doctrine to deal with 
changed circumstances, however.  His answer to critics was the oft-quoted 
statement that “thrown out by the door, this problem will always re-enter through the 
window”.172 
 
In the meantime, the German Empire was formed in 1871 and in 1877 the supreme 
federal court at Leipzig was granted jurisdiction over all areas of law.  Thus the 
foundations were in place for a unified German law.  The drafting commission for the 
                                               
168 This translation of the German term “Voraussetzung” used by Windscheid is taken from Markesinis 
et al op cit note 100.  Markesinis et al discuss Windscheid’s doctrine at 320 – 322. 
169 This theory is also discussed in Windscheid’s major treatise Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts at §§ 
97 - 100. 
170 Eg. Otto Lenel “Die Lehre von der Voraussetzung (in Hinblick auf den Entwurf eines bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuches)” (1889) 74 AcP 213 & “Nochmals die Lehre von der Voraussetzung” (1892) 79 AcP 
49. 
171 Von Alvensleben op cit note 151 at 60. 
172 Windscheid “Die Voraussetzung” (1892) 78 AcP 197. 
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German civil code had already been founded by this time and included leading 
practitioners and academics, such as Windscheid himself.  A first draft was 
published for comment in 1887.  At this point Windscheid left the drafting 
commission, however.  Windscheid’s concern for the problem of changed 
circumstances in contract also fell by the way, due to the perceived threat to legal 
certainty and in response to criticism by authors such as Lenel.  The final draft of the 
German civil code (the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) (“BGB”) was promulgated on 1 
January 1900 and contained no mention of any doctrine akin to the clausula rebus 
sic stantibus. 
 
The omission of a clausula doctrine from the enduring French and German codes 
reflected the decline into obscurity which this type of tacit condition had suffered by 
the nineteenth century.  Already from the seventeenth century the doctrine had 
decreased in favour to the point where it is found only in the international law realm 
in Roman-Dutch writers and even there is carefully circumscribed.  While it did not 
die out immediately due perhaps to the fundamental nature of the problem of 
changed circumstances, economic advance demanded contractual certainty as time 
progressed.  As a result academics and jurists were wary of allowing a unilateral 
escape provision in a contract, particularly one which was so readily available as the 
clausula rebus sic stantibus of the middle ages.  It is thus not surprising that 
legislators took a hard line on the doctrine and omitted it from the later codes.  
Windscheid’s caution that the problem of changed circumstances in contract 
remained a vexing one, was to prove prophetic, however.  While the clausula 
doctrine may have died out towards the end of the eighteenth century, this was not 
the end of the problem which it sought to address, as chapter five will show with 




What emerges from a study of the clausula rebus sic stantibus is just how enduring 
the problem of changed circumstances is.  Whenever there is a promise, one needs 
to bear in mind that that promise is based on certain motivating factors and the 
promisor may wish to resile from the contract should those factors change 
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drastically.  We have seen this principle in the moral philosophy of ancient Rome and 
how it was transmitted to the canon law and then the civil law.  At maturity, the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus stood as a qualification on the binding force of 
contracts.  A contract would cease to bind should the promisor with be faced with a 
changed situation, which if he had had foresight of he never would have promised.  
Sometimes an objective standard of what reasonable public opinion would consider 
a just outcome was inferred, sometimes not.  We have seen also that this doctrine 
waned in the age of codification and the stress fell upon the opposing concept of 
pacta sunt servanda. 
 
The position was slightly different in the United Kingdom from that of continental 
Europe, and the process by which the harshness of the doctrine of pacta sunt 
servanda could be limited took a different course in the common law jurisdiction.  It is 
thus to the doctrine of frustration that this thesis now turns. 
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The problem of change of circumstances is dealt with in English law under the 
banner of the doctrine of frustration.  As we shall see below, however, frustration is a 
broad concept and refers to any situation where there is discharge due to a radical 
change in the obligation subsequent to the conclusion of the contract.  This extends 
thus also to the impossibility defence.  English contract law and along with it the 
doctrine of frustration have been exported to many so-called “common law” countries 
around the globe, including the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.1  
This chapter will unfortunately not be able to investigate the doctrine of frustration in 
each of these jurisdictions, due to space constraints.  There will, however, be a 
careful examination of the parent system of English law as well as a brief look at US 
law, where the concept of frustration has undergone considerable local development. 
 
It should be noted at the outset that slightly different terminology is used in the US 
and in England.  “Frustration” is a catch all term in English law, used to refer to any 
invocation of the defence of supervening change of circumstances.   In the US 
“frustration” is used merely to refer to the situation where the purpose of the contract 
has been frustrated.  Other instances of change of circumstances or impossibility are 
referred to as “impracticability”. 
 
4.2 English Law 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
In The Super Servant Two2, Bingham LJ outlined five propositions concerning 
frustration, which he stated were “established by the highest authority” and were “not 
open to question”.3  The propositions were as follows (authorities omitted): 
                                               
1 Compare generally: Guenter Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure (2004).  This is a very detailed 
and helpful examination of frustration in English law, with reference to the laws of other common law 
countries where appropriate. 
2 J Lauritzen AS v Wijsmuller BV (“The Super Servant Two”) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1. 
3 Ibid at 8 (authorities omitted).  The five propositions follow this statement. 
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“1. The doctrine of frustration was evolved to mitigate the rigour of the common law’s 
insistence on literal performance of absolute promises.  The object of the doctrine was to 
give effect to the demands of justice, to achieve a just and reasonable result, to do what 
is reasonable and fair, as an expedient to escape from injustice where such would result 
from enforcement of a contract in its literal terms after a significant change in 
circumstances. 
 
2. Since the effect of frustration is to kill the contract and discharge the parties from further 
liability under it, the doctrine is not to be lightly invoked, must be kept within very narrow 
limits and ought not to be extended. 
 
3. Frustration brings the contract to an end forthwith, without more and automatically. 
 
4. The essence of frustration is that it should not be due to the act or election of the party 
seeking to rely on it.  A frustrating event must be some outside event or extraneous 
change of situation. 
 
5. A frustrating event must take place without blame or fault on the side of the party seeking 
to rely on it.” 
 
This statement constitutes a merit-worthy attempt to capture in a nutshell an unruly 
doctrine, which has been developed largely in an ad hoc fashion over many years.4  
To paraphrase even further one might rely on an earlier pronouncement, which will 
be used below to establish a theoretical basis for the doctrine of frustration:  
 “[F]rustration occurs whenever the law recognizes that without default of either party a 
contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances 
in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from that which 
was undertaken by the contract.”5  
 
From these extracts we see that essentially frustration occurs when there is a 
fundamental change of circumstances regarding a contract, which renders the 
required performance “radically different” from that which was promised.  What 
follows is an attempt, in brief, to set out the English law on frustration.  This account 
will begin with a brief history of the doctrine, followed by an examination of its 
                                               
4 Hugh Beale et al (eds) Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (2002) at 607 notes that in 
instances of frustration, “[t]he system has been built up in layers and does not necessarily form a 
coherent whole.” 
5 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696 at 729. 
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theoretical basis.  These two topics go hand in hand, since the latter has developed 
over time along with the doctrine.  Once the theoretical basis of frustration is known, 
a test can be formulated for when it is present in a contractual setting.  The chapter 
will then turn to specific instances of frustration to determine the scope of this 
defence.  The allocation of risks under the contract itself and by operation of law is 
also relevant to the determination of the ambit of frustration, since this shows the 
limits of the doctrine.  Finally the effects of frustration on a contract will be 
investigated, to see what the impact of the doctrine is. 
    
Given the ad hoc nature of frustration and indeed the English common law in 
general, a discussion of certain leading cases is inevitable.  This section does not, 
however, aim to be a definitive case by case account, but will rather focus on the 
underlying theory in an attempt to gauge a general conception of the doctrine in the 
abstract.   
 
4.2.2 Early case history 
Although frustration has developed into an undisputed doctrine in English law and 
the concept has been exported to several common law countries, the doctrine does 
not date back to time immemorial in the English legal system.  Indeed frustration 
developed as an exception to the prevailing rule of absolute contracts.  The rule in 
Paradine v Jane6 is usually cited as authority for this original position in English law.  
In Paradine’s case, a tenant was sued for outstanding rent under a contract of lease.  
The tenant argued that he should be excused from payment on the ground that he 
had been prevented from occupying the leased premises for two years by an alien 
army which had been occupying the territory.  The court found against the tenant 
and refused to excuse performance under the contract: 
 “When the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to 
make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he 
might have provided against it by his contract.  And therefore if the lessee covenant to repair 
a house, though it be burned by lightning, or thrown down by enemies, yet he ought to repair 
it.”7 
 
                                               
6 (1647) Aleyn 26. 
7 Ibid at 27. 
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There were exceptions to this doctrine, however, which were elucidated by the 
subsequent case law.  Supervening illegality was recognised as an exception in 
Brewster v Kitchell8 as early as 1691.  Another logical exception was for contracts 
requiring a personal service, which were excused by the death or incapacity of the 
debtor: 
“If an author undertakes to compose a work, and dies before completing it, his executors are 
discharged from this contract: for the undertaking is merely personal in its nature, and, by the 
intervention of the contractor’s death, has become impossible to be performed.”9 
 
The beginning of a general doctrine of frustration dates from the case of Taylor v 
Caldwell,10 however.  In Taylor’s case, the plaintiff had hired a music hall and its 
surrounding gardens to the defendant for the purpose of holding concerts over 
several specified days.  Before the date of performance arrived, however, the music 
hall was destroyed by an accidental fire.  There was no fault on the part of the 
plaintiff in causing this fire.  When the defendant refused in consequence to pay the 
fee for the stipulated hire, the plaintiff sued for breach.  Blackburn J, relying on civil 
law authority in the form of Pothier’s Treatise on the Law of Obligations, as well as 
on the various exceptions to the rule of absolute contracts mentioned above, derived 
a rule that an implied term existed in the contract that it would terminate should 
performance become impossible.11 
 
The decision of Blackburn J marked a turning point in English contract law. Once 
recognised, the exception to absolute contracts was soon extended beyond actual 
impossibility to cases where the chartering of a ship had been “frustrated” by 
unforeseen delay.  This class of cases, referred to as “frustration of the adventure” is 
typified by the decision in Jackson v Union Marine Insurance Co Ltd.12  A ship was 
chartered to carry a cargo of iron rails from Newport to San Francisco.  On the way 
to Newport, however, the ship ran aground and it took a month to refloat it.  At this 
point it required extensive repairs, which were effected in Liverpool.  By the time the 
                                               
8 (1691) 1 Salk 198.  See also: Atkinson v Ritchie (1809) 10 East 530, 534 – 535. 
9 Taylor v Caldwell 3 B&S 826 cites this passage at 835. 
10 Supra note 9. 
11 Ibid at 833 – 834.  This debt to the civil law was acknowledged by Vaughan Williams LJ in Krell v 
Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 at 747 – 748, where he described frustration as a “principle of the Roman law 
which has been adopted and acted on in many English decisions”.  
12 (1874) LR 10 CP 125. 
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ship was ready to sail again, about eight months had passed and the charterers had 
already chartered another ship to carry the cargo to San Francisco.  The ship’s 
owner (Jackson) then claimed from his insurers for the contract price which he had 
lost out on due to misfortune at sea.  In order to prove his claim, Jackson had to 
demonstrate that the charterers had been justified in cancelling their contract with 
him.  The court held that the delay in performance by Jackson’s ship was such as to 
put an end to the venture in a commercial sense.  In explanation of this decision, 
Bramwell B explained that this was a case of “frustration of the adventure”.13  
 
The next phase in the expansion of the doctrine was to extend it beyond commercial 
contracts, where time was of the essence, to cases where the basis of the contract, 
common to both parties, had fallen away.  This class of cases, referred to as being 
instances of “frustration of purpose”, date back to the “Coronation cases”, the most 
famous of which is Krell v Henry.14  King Edward VII was to be crowned on 26 June 
1902 and there was to be a coronation procession that day and the next through the 
streets of London.  Henry had hired a flat in Pall Mall, which overlooked the route 
which the procession was to take.  It was known both to Henry and to Krell, the 
lessor, that the viewing of the coronation was the basis on which the lease was 
entered into and the rent was correspondingly priced.  Indeed, the hire of the 
premises was for the day of the procession alone and not the night, further 
underlining the common purpose of the transaction.  On 24 June the King fell ill with 
appendicitis and a decision was taken to operate on him.  As a result the procession 
had to be cancelled.  Henry refused to pay the outstanding rental and Krell sued.  It 
was held by the court that the contract was discharged due to the collapse of the 
“foundation” of the contract.15   
 
Thus it can be seen that once derived in Taylor v Caldwell, the doctrine of frustration 
was taken up into the English contract law and quickly entrenched itself into the 
common law.  Although at first, in its growth phase, there was a tendency to expand 
the doctrine to new types of cases, in later years the sphere of application of 
frustration was more carefully defined and limited.  Hence we can reconcile the early 
                                               
13 Ibid at 148. 
14 Supra note 11. 
15 Ibid at 754. 
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expansionist tendencies with the later statement in The Super Servant Two that 
“[frustration] is not to be lightly invoked, must be kept within very narrow limits and 
ought not to be extended”.16  The modern approach to the allocation of risk under a 
contract and the effect of frustration on this balance will be discussed below.17 
 
4.2.3 The theoretical basis of frustration 
An examination of the history of frustration thus shows that the doctrine was a 
general principle derived from specific exceptions to the rule of absolute contracts in 
Taylor v Caldwell.  From this starting point it spread on an ad hoc basis to other 
classes of cases.  This lack of a strong doctrinal foundation created difficulty in the 
development of the doctrine when courts sought to ascribe a theoretical basis to 
frustration. 
 
a) The implied term 
As we have seen from the discussion of the decision in Taylor v Caldwell, the initial 
basis for frustration was the implied term.  The classic statement of this theory 
appears in the judgment of Lord Loreburn in FA Tamplin Steamship Co Ltd v Anglo 
Mexican Petroleum Products Co Ltd:18 
 “[A] Court can and ought to examine the contract and the circumstances in which it was 
made, not of course to vary, but only to explain it, in order to see whether or not from the 
nature of it the parties must have made their bargain on the footing that a particular thing or 
state of things would continue to exist.  And if they must have done so, then a term to that 
effect will be implied, though it be not expressed in the contract. …Sometimes it is put that 
performance has become impossible and that the party concerned did not promise to perform 
an impossibility.  Sometimes it is put that the parties contemplated a certain state of things 
which fell out otherwise.  In most of the cases it is said that there was an implied condition in 
the contract which operated to release the parties from performing it, and in all of them I think 
that was at bottom the principle upon which the Court proceeded.”  
 
The essence of this approach was thus that the contracting parties based their 
contractual agreement upon a given state of affairs.  Should that state of affairs be 
varied to a sufficiently significant degree, a court would be able to infer that the 
                                               
16 The Super Servant Two supra note 2 at 8. 
17 See section 4.2.5. 
18 [1916] 2 AC 397 at 403 - 404. 
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parties would not have wished to continue with their contractual obligations given the 
change.  This theoretical approach bears marked similarities to the clausula rebus 
sic stantibus, which also rested upon an implied condition.19 
 
The major criticisms facing the implied term approach were twofold:  in the first 
instance an implied term was imputed to the parties in circumstances which were 
unforeseen and hence by definition beyond the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of contracting.20  A second point is that, had the parties indeed foreseen the 
change of circumstance, their implied term would in all likelihood have been to vary 
the contract and somehow keep it alive, rather than to discharge it.21 
 
b) Radical change in the obligation 
In criticism of the implied term approach to frustration, Lord Radcliffe noted in Davis 
Contractors v Fareham UDC22 (as stated above) that it was a legal fiction to impute 
an implied term to the parties to a frustrated contract, since the frustrating eventuality 
was typically unforeseen (and unforeseeable).23  Rather frustration occurred when a 
court applied an objective rule of the law of contract to a case at hand: 
 “[F]rustration occurs whenever the law recognizes that without default of either party a 
contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances 
in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from that which 
was undertaken by the contract.  Non haec in foedera veni.  It was not this that I promised to 
do.”24  
 
This objective standard has been subsequently accepted by the House of Lords in 
several decisions as the test for whether a contract has been frustrated.25  This test 
for frustration involves a process known as “construction of the contract”, whereby a 
court will construe the terms of a contract in the light of the nature of that contract 
                                               
19 See chapter 3 for a discussion of this doctrine. 
20 Lord Radcliffe dismisses the implied term approach using this argument in Davis Contractors supra 
note 5 at 728. 
21 See Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd v Fraser (James B) & Co Ltd [1944] AC 265 at 275. 
22 Supra note 5. 
23 Ibid at 728. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v Noblee Thorl GmbH [1962] AC 93 at 131; National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina 
(Northern) Ltd [1981] AC 675  at 700; Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd [1982] AC 724 at 744, 
745, 751; Paal Wilson & Co A/S v Partenreederei Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1 AC 854, 909, 918.  
See also Jack Beatson Anson’s Law of Contract (2002) at 544n78; Ewan McKendrick “Discharge by 
frustration” in HG Beale Chitty on Contracts Vol I (2008) at 1487. 
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and then compare this with the situation which exists after the occurrence of the 
supervening event.26  If there has been a radical change in the obligation, the 
contract will be discharged.  The use of the word “radical” to describe the change of 
circumstances on which a finding of frustration can be based indicates that the 
doctrine will not lightly be invoked.  This has been shown (above) to be a central 
feature of frustration.  The question today is thus whether a change in circumstances 
is sufficiently significant and unforeseen to bring about a finding of frustration.27  This 
of course necessitates a discussion of the allocation of risk between the parties to a 
contract, both inter se and as imposed by the common law.28 
 
4.2.4 Which eventualities give rise to discharge by frustration? 
Frustration is quite a broad-ranging concept in English law.  Although (as this 
chapter will attempt to demonstrate) the doctrine is not lightly invoked in the modern 
English jurisprudence, as has already been seen from the definition given above, it 
stretches (at least in theory) beyond impossibility to any supervening change of 
circumstances which renders the obligation radically different from what was 
undertaken at the outset.  For the purposes of a South African audience, this section 




The classic historical starting point for the doctrine of frustration is the case of Taylor 
v Caldwell.29  The destruction of a music hall by fire in this case excused 
performance by its owners, who had contracted to supply the hall as a venue for a 
function.  It is thus clear that the doctrine of frustration originally evolved to cover 
instances of actual impossibility.  Hence if performance has become impossible 
under a contract, it will be frustrated.   
 
                                               
26 McKendrick in Beale op cit note 25 at 1487. 
27 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law (1998) at 530 argue that the 
question is less about whether one is concerned with an implied term or is construing the contract and 
more about whether liability should be imposed given the nature of the frustrating event and the 
surrounding circumstances. 
28 See section 4.2.5 below. 
29 Taylor v Caldwell supra note 9. 
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In addition, as noted in Taylor’s case, death or incapacity will render a contract of 
personal service impossible of performance and hence frustrate it.30   
 
Unforeseen delay has also been held to be a ground for frustration in several cases, 
particularly those involving shipping.  Where the delay is of such a nature that it 
makes the contract something radically different from what was initially undertaken, 
the contract will be discharged for frustration.31  The facts of Jackson v Union Marine 
Insurance32 illustrate this point.33 
 
4.2.4.2 Frustration of purpose  
Frustration of purpose occurs where performance under the contract is still 
technically possible, but the value of that performance to the recipient party has 
dramatically decreased.34  This is because the purpose for which he desired the 
performance, which was the common knowledge of both parties, has ceased to 
exist.35  The classic starting point for discharge because of frustration of purpose in 
English contract law is the “Coronation cases” mentioned above.  In Krell v Henry,36 
the cancellation of the coronation procession led to a successful claim that the 
foundation of the contract had fallen away and the agreement was hence 
terminated.37  Although this case has been criticised as allowing too easy an escape 
from a contract, there is thus precedent that the doctrine of frustration applies where 
there has been a frustration of the contractual purpose.  In other words, when the 
basis of the contract falls away, the contract should fall away with it.  It should be 
                                               
30 See section 4.2.2. 
31 It should be noted that South African law adopts a slightly different approach.  If performance under 
a contract becomes temporarily impossible in South Africa the obligation is suspended until the 
impossibility ceases to exist.  The creditor will have the option to terminate the contract if the 
interruption is likely to endure for an unreasonably long time.  The question of what is an 
unreasonably long period of time is one of fact.  See Niemand v Okapi Investments (Edms) Bpk 1983 
(4) SA 762 (T); World Leisure Holidays (Pty) Ltd v Georges 2002 (5) SA 531 (W); RH Christie The 
Law of Contract in South Africa (2006) at 474; Tjakie Naudé “Termination of obligations” in Dale 
Hutchison & CJ Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa (2009) at 384. 
32 Jackson v Union Marine Insurance supra note 12 discussed above at § 2.1. 
33 See also: Metropolitan Water Board v Dick Kerr and Co [1918] AC 119; Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v 
Fairbairn, Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32; Denny, Mott and Dickson Ltd v James B Fraser 
& Co Ltd supra note 20.   
34 Treitel op cit note 1 at 309. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Krell v Henry supra note 11 discussed above at section 4.2.2. 
37 See also Chandler v Webster [1904] 1 KB 493 (discussed below at section 4.2.6.2).  A different 
result was reached in Griffith v Brymer (1903) 19 TLR 434; Herne Bay Steam Ship Co v Hutton [1903] 
2 KB 683 & Blakely v Muller & Co [1903] 2 KB 760. 
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noted that the term “frustration of purpose” was not used in Krell’s case.  Vaughan 
Williams LJ preferred a formula which stated that the contract had become 
“impossible of performance by reason of the non-existence of a particular state of 
things”.38  The term “frustration of purpose” seems to have come afterwards, but is 
the common parlance.39 
 
Although firmly established as a ground on which frustration will be permitted by Krell 
v Henry, this precedent has not been followed often in subsequent decisions.  Treitel 
goes so far as to state that since the Coronation cases, there has been no instance 
in English law where the doctrine of frustration of purpose has been applied.40  
Indeed, even in Krell v Henry Vaughan Williams LJ stressed that the doctrine would 
only apply where the foundation of the contract which is alleged to have fallen away 
was common to both parties.  The Lord Justice distinguished the scenario where a 
cab driver is engaged to take a person to see a horse race in another town.  The 
subsequent occurrence of the horse race is fundamental only to the passenger: to 
the cab driver he is just another passenger, even if the price has been suitably 
enhanced due to the fact that the race is The Derby.  Should the race be cancelled, 
the passenger would still have to pay.41   
 
It should also be noted that not all the Coronation cases were decided in favour of 
the consumer.  In Herne Bay Steam Boat Co v Hutton42 the defendant had hired a 
ship to take his guests to see the Naval Review on 28 June 1902, which was to 
accompany the Coronation, and the following day to take the party around the fleet 
and the Isle of Wight.  The cancellation of the Naval Review was held not to 
discharge the contract, since this was not the foundation of the agreement.43  All 
three judges in this case make the point that the contract was to hire the ship for a 
                                               
38 Krell v Henry supra note 11 at 749. 
39 McKendrick in Beale op cit note 25 at 1496; Treitel op cit note 1 at 309ff; Zweigert & Kötz op cit 
note 27 at 529.  Beatson op cit note 25 at 534 prefers a formula similar to that actually used in the 
Krell case (performance depending on the “existence or occurrence of a particular state of things 
forming the basis on which the contract had been made”), but the result is the same. 
40 Treitel op cit note 1 at 346. 
41 Krell v Henry supra note 11 at 750 – 751. 
42 Supra note 37. 
43 Ibid at 689. 
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voyage, not a particular purpose incidental to that voyage.44  Vaughan Williams LJ, 
who was also on the bench for this case, stated that it was analogous to his earlier 
example of the cab-driver.45  Though these two Coronation cases may not be easy to 
reconcile with one another, the Herne Bay case does demonstrate Treitel’s 
argument: immediately subsequent to the creation of the frustration of purpose 
defence by the English Courts they were already limiting its application.   
 
Another group of cases which dealt with frustration of purpose were the so-called 
“black-out” cases.  During World War One, legislation was passed in England which 
prevented the illumination of street lights in cities to avoid enemy detection.  The 
local authorities then tried to escape from contracts which they had entered into with 
power companies to keep these street lights lit.  Clearly the purpose of such a 
contract had been frustrated.  In Leiston Gas Co Ltd v Leiston-cum-Sizewell Urban 
District Council46 the plaintiff gas company had contracted to provide the necessary 
infrastructure and gas for street lighting  for a period of five years, beginning in 1911.  
In 1915, government regulations prohibited the lighting of such lamps.  The 
defendant local authority then tried to argue that the contract had been frustrated, 
while the plaintiff sued to recover the amounts outstanding under the remainder of 
the contract period.  The purpose of the contract, namely obtaining street lighting 
was temporarily impossible to achieve, but  execution of the remaining parts, such as 
maintaining the lights and supplying the gas, was still possible.  Despite the 
defendant’s plea that the purpose of the contract as a whole had been frustrated, the 
Court of Appeal held for the plaintiff. The performance of the maintenance functions 
of the gas company remained possible and it could not be said that the foundation of 
the contract had fallen away.47  
 
Similarly in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v John Walker & Son Ltd,48 
the listing of a building as being of special architectural or historic interest did not 
frustrate a contract for the purchase of that building, even though the purpose of the 
purchasers, which was known to the sellers, was to redevelop the building, an object 
                                               
44 Ibid at 688 – 693. 
45 Ibid at 689. 
46 [1916] 2 KB 428. 
47 Ibid at 431 – 440. 
48 [1977] 1 WLR 164.  This case is discussed further below at section 4.2.7. 
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which was now prohibited by the listing.  Indeed the market value of the property 
dropped to a fraction of the sale price, but this did not influence the Court’s decision.  
The court held that the risk of listing was one which “inheres in all ownership of 
buildings” and refused to discharge the purchaser.49 
 
Clearly, while frustration of purpose remains a ground for discharge by frustration in 
English law, the Courts will not lightly release a party for this reason.  The policy 
decision at play seems to favour the position of the supplier of goods or services, so 
that the motive of the consumer for entering into the contract is of little significance to 
the ultimate bargain which is struck and the commercial interests of the supplier are 
protected.  English law strikes a balance in this regard by refusing to discharge the 
supplier where performance has become more difficult to the extent that the contract 
is impracticable, which is in a sense the converse of the situation of frustration of 
purpose.50 
 
4.2.4.3 Impracticability  
Impracticability is the term used (particularly in America) for the situation where 
performance by the supplier of goods or services becomes significantly more difficult 
or expensive.51  As stated above, this is in a sense the converse of frustration of 
purpose.  While with frustration of purpose the common basis of the contract, which 
caused the recipient of the service to contract, falls away, with impracticability it is 
the basis on which the supplier of a service contracted which changes.  Thus, for 
example, severe inflation or a shortage of raw materials may make performance 
something entirely different from what the supplier intended.  Although performance 
is not exactly impossible, the increase in expense or difficulty would often result in 
dire consequences for the supplier.   
 
The seminal case dealing with impracticability in the US is Mineral Park Land Co v 
Howard,52 which will be dealt with under the discussion of American law.  It is 
                                               
49 Ibid at 173. 
50 Treitel The Law of Contract (1999) at 824. 
51 Uniform Commercial Code § 2 – 615; Second Restatement of Contracts § 261. 
52 156 P 458 (1916). 
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relevant, however, that in Mineral Park the doctrine was indirectly derived from the 
English decision of Moss v Smith.53  In Moss’s case it was stated that: 
 “A man may be said to have lost a shilling when he had dropped it in deep water, though it 
might be possible by some very expensive contrivance to recover it.”54 
 
Despite this dictum, which is a variation of the test for impossibility set out in various 
authorities,55 it would appear that impracticability is no ground for discharge in 
English law.56  Indeed there are several dicta, of high authority, to this effect, such as 
the statement of Lord Loreburn in Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd v CS Wilson & Co 
Ltd:57 
 “The argument that a man can be excused from performance of his contract when it becomes 
‘commercially’ impossible, …seems to me a dangerous contention, which ought not to be 
admitted unless the parties have plainly contracted to that effect.”58 
 
In British Movietonews Ltd v London and District Cinemas Ltd59 in a discussion of 
whether an “uncontemplated turn of events” would frustrate a contract, Lord Simon 
stated that the parties to a contract are often faced with “a wholly abnormal rise or 
fall in prices” or a “sudden depreciation in currency”, but that these factors would not 
affect their contractual obligations.60  Indeed there is a dictum which states that a rise 
in price would have to be at least a hundredfold before discharge could be permitted 
on this ground.61   
 
                                               
53 (1859) 9 CB 94.  Treitel op cit note 1 states at 264 that the rule in Mineral Park stems from a 
statement in Beach on Contracts Vol I at para 216 that “a thing is impossible in legal contemplation 
when it is not practicable” for which the only authority cited is the case of Moss v Smith. 
54 Ibid at 103. 
55 Treitel op cit note 1 at 265 refers to the German example given in Karl Larenz Schuldrecht 14th ed 
(1987) Vol I at 99 of a ring which is dropped on the ocean floor.  A similar example was discussed in 
the South African context in chapter 2.  The South African authorities William Arthur Ramsden 
Supervening Impossibility of Performance (1985) at 64 and JC De Wet & AH Van Wyk Kontraktereg 
(1992) at 85 – 86 mention an almost identical example.   
56 Apart from the dicta quoted below, see the conclusion of Treitel op cit note 1 at 290 – 291. 
57 [1917] AC 495. 
58 Ibid at 510. 
59 British Movietonews Ltd v London and District Cinemas Ltd [1952] AC 166. 
60 Ibid at 185. 




In the leading case of Davis Contractors v Fareham UDC,62 building contractors had 
contracted to build 78 houses in eight months for a price of £94 000.  Because of 
labour shortages, however, the project took 22 months to complete and cost £115 
000.  The contractors then argued that the delay and the increase in costs had 
frustrated the contract.  The Court disagreed, holding that these eventualities were 
foreseeable in the normal course of commercial undertakings of this nature.63 
 
Another case of impracticability occurred when the closure of the Suez canal due to 
war in the Middle East made shipping of goods from Asia to Europe much more 
expensive and time consuming, since ships would have to travel via the Cape of 
Good Hope.  In Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v Noblee Thorl GmbH64 the sellers agreed to 
sell a quantity of Sudanese groundnuts to the buyers and to ship the nuts from 
Sudan for delivery in Hamburg.  The agreement was entered into in October 1956 
and shipment was to take place between November and December of that year.  On 
2 November 1956 the Suez Canal was closed.  The route via the Cape was twice as 
long and far more costly.  The House of Lords held however that the change of 
circumstances was not sufficiently fundamental to discharge performance by 
frustration.65 
 
Exceptions do exist, however.  In Staffordshire Area Health Authority v South 
Staffordshire Waterworks Co66 a hospital had given up its rights to take water from a 
well in favour of a Waterworks Company in 1919 and in return the Waterworks 
Company had undertaken to supply the hospital with water “at all times hereafter” at 
a fixed price.  By 1975, the cost of supplying water to the hospital had risen to 18 
times the stipulated price and the Waterworks Company attempted to escape the 
deal.  The Court of Appeal held that the Company was able to escape the 
agreement, since it was of indefinite duration and hence contained an implied term to 
the effect that either party could cancel with reasonable notice.67  Hence a specific 
                                               
62 Davis Contractors supra note 5. 
63 Ibid at 730 – 731.  Treitel op cit note 1 states at 287, however, that this case does not necessarily 
indicate a difference between American and English law, since the margin of cost increase would not 
have been sufficient to invoke the doctrine of impracticability in America either. 
64 [1962] AC 93. 
65 Ibid at 116, 119, 123, 129, 134. 
66 [1978] 1 WLR 1387 
67 Ibid at 1397. 
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class of exceptional cases can be created which do not fall within the prohibition of 
discharge for increased cost. 
 
4.2.4.4 Supervening illegality  
Where performance under a contract becomes illegal subsequent to the conclusion 
of that contract, it will be discharged for frustration.  The basis on which this rests is 
one of supervening illegality: while performance may not be impossible and the 
purpose of the contract may not have been frustrated, it is not in the public interest 
that this type of obligation be fulfilled, since this would result in a breach of the law.  
Supervening illegality may arise either because of a change in law or because of a 
change in circumstances.  
 
In Denny, Mott & Dickson v James B Fraser & Co Ltd68 the parties entered into a 
contract for the purpose of trade in timber.  The contract made provision for the sale 
of timber by one party to the other, as well as for the lease of a timber yard, with an 
option to buy that yard.  During World War Two, however, the trade in timber of the 
type in question was prohibited by war time regulations.  As a result of this 
prohibition the contract was held to be frustrated.  The contract was held to be a 
single entity and both the provisions concerning sale and those dealing with lease 
and the option to purchase became invalid.  This change in the law made continued 
performance under the contract illegal and hence the contract was frustrated by 
supervening illegality.  
 
The case of Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn, Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd69 
concerned a contract for the sale of machinery from an English company to a Polish 
company.  The goods were to be shipped to Gydnia, Poland.  The contract was held 
to be frustrated when enemy forces occupied Poland in 1939 before delivery had 
occurred.  Although performance remained possible, the change of circumstances 
                                               
68 Denny, Mott & Dickson v James B Fraser & Co Ltd supra note 21. See also Baily v De Crespigny 
(1869) LR 4 QB 180; Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust Ltd v Leighton’s Investment Trust 
Ltd [1945] AC 221. 
69 The Fibrosa supra note 33.  See also Ertel Bieber & Co v Rio Tinto Co Ltd [1918] AC 260. 
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regarding the port of destination made performance illegal due to the prohibition on 
trading with the enemy.70 
 
4.2.5 Allocation of risk: limitations on the application of frustration 
 
Since frustration is caused by an unforeseen change of circumstances, the doctrine 
must seek to allocate the risk of such unforeseen eventualities between the 
contracting parties.  The contract comes to an end and all obligations are discharged 
from the moment of the frustrating event.  While this may bring relief to one of the 
parties under certain circumstances, it may also bring hardship and loss.  The parties 
to a contract may thus well want to guard against the occurrence of a frustrating 
event by seeking to allocate the risk of this between them.  They may do this 
expressly by use of a force majeure clause.  In certain circumstances the risk of 
frustration may also have been consciously assumed by one party, such as where 
the frustration was foreseeable.  It may then not be just for a Court to discharge his 
further obligations.  Beyond this a party may actually be the cause of the resultant 
frustration of contract (whether by negligent act or not), which may again militate 
against discharge. 
 
Thus it becomes clear that risk is a central issue in cases of frustration.  The above 
scenarios may limit the application of the doctrine of frustration, arguably on policy 
grounds based on this allocation of risk.  These limitations are important to an 
understanding of the application of frustration and will be discussed below. 
 
4.2.5.1 The wording of the contract: force majeure clauses 
“Force majeure” is a French term used to refer to events which are beyond the 
contracting parties’ control.  The term has come to have a technical meaning in 
English law, however.  Swadling attempts a definition of “force majeure” in English 
law as follows: 
 “[A]n event will be a force majeure event if it constitutes a legal or physical restraint on the 
performance of the contract (whether or not occurring through human intervention, although it 
                                               
70 In South Africa this would be referred to as a case of supervening legal impossibility.  See RH 
Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa (2006) at 95. 
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must not be caused by the act, negligence or omission or default of the contracting party) 
which is both unforeseen and irresistible.”71   
 
An English term with a similar meaning might be “act of God”, while in South Africa 
the conventional term would be “vis maior”.72  A force majeure clause seeks to make 
provision for the occurrence of unforeseen events and to allocate the risks between 
the contracting parties should a change of circumstances occur.73  A second type of 
clause, which overlaps to a certain extent with a force majeure clause is a hardship 
clause.  The operation of this type of clause is also triggered by a change of 
circumstances, but its effect is slightly different in that it is usually aimed at 
renegotiation of the contract.74  Hardship clauses usually also require a sanction for 
non-performance.  As Schmitthoff notes, a hardship clause without a sanction “is 
hardly worth the paper it is written on”.75  Although the concept of force majeure is 
unknown to English law, this is nevertheless the name given to this type of clause 
within the English law jurisdiction.76  An important question is as to the extent to 
                                               
71 William Swadling “The judicial construction of force majeure clauses” in Ewan McKendrick (ed) 
Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract (1995) at 8. 
72 In Matsoukis v Priestman & Co [1915] 1 KB 681 the court held that the terms “act of God” and “vis 
maior” were not the equivalents of “force majeure”, since they did not cover acts involving human 
intervention, such as strikes.  The court in Lebeaupin v Richard Crispin & Co [1920] 2 KB 714 at 719 
– 720 accepted this view.  Force majeure is thus a broader category than the other two terms, but the 
idea of a force beyond the contracting parties’ control is essentially the same.  In the US “act of God” 
refers also to events beyond a contracting party’s control which have been caused by human agency.  
See James P Nehf “Impossibility” in Joseph M Perillo (ed) Corbin on Contracts (2001) at Vol 14 at 26 
– 27.  
73 See generally Ewan McKendrick “Force Majeure and Frustration – their relationship and a 
comparative assessment” in McKendrick op cit note 71 at 33. 
74 Michael Furmston “Drafting of force majeure clauses – some general guidelines” in McKendrick op 
cit note 71 at 59, 62.  See also generally Clive M Schmitthoff “Hardship and intervener clauses” 
(1980) Journal of Business Law 82. 
75 Schmitthoff op cit note 74 at 88.  
76 McKendrick op cit note 71 at 33.  A generic example of a force majeure clause might read as 
follows: “Neither party shall be responsible for any delay or failure to perform its obligations under this 
Agreement or for any loss or damage caused as a result of  such delay or failure if such delay or 
failure is due to any act of God, war, riot, strike, lockout, trade dispute or labour disturbance, accident, 
breakdown of plant or machinery, failure or shortage of power supplies, fire, flood, drought, explosion, 
difficulty in obtaining  workmen, materials or transport, refusal of any license or permit or any order, 
sanction or request of any Government or governmental authority or any other matters beyond the 
control of the party concerned. In the event of any such circumstances the affected party shall send 
notice of the same and the reason for it to the other party within 7 calendar days from the time the 
affected party knew or should have known of the force majeure in question. During the continuance of 
the force majeure the party subject to it shall use all reasonable endeavours to avoid or mitigate the 
effect of such force majeure on its obligations under this Agreement and on the other party. The 
performance of the affected party shall be deemed suspended so long as and to the extent that any 
such force majeure continues; provided however, that after 90 days of such suspension on the part of 
either party, the non-affected party may by notice in writing to the other party terminate this 
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which parties to a contract can make provision for a frustrating event and thus 
exclude or vary the doctrine of frustration by prior agreement.  In Bremer 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Vanden Avenne-Izegem PVBA77 Mocatta J stated that 
there was “much to be said” for an argument that the doctrine of frustration was 
excluded by reason of elaborate provisions contained in a force majeure clause in a 
contract of sale.78  This was not a conclusive finding in this regard, however, and 
there are several cases of long standing authority, which establish that a force 
majeure clause does not exclude the doctrine of frustration.79  It is these factors 
which lead McKendrick to confidently assert that the existence of a force majeure 
clause does not exclude the operation of the doctrine of frustration.80 
 
What a force majeure clause does indicate, however, is that the frustrating event 
may have been foreseen by the contracting parties.81  In addition it is accepted in 
English law that a contract is not frustrated if it made express provision for a 
subsequent frustrating event.82  A reading of the cases indicates that English courts 
interpret force majeure clauses restrictively, however, so that a widely phrased 
clause may well not exclude the doctrine of frustration.  In Metropolitan Water Board 
v Dick Kerr and Co,83 for example, a firm of contractors contracted with the plaintiff 
Water Board to construct a reservoir.  The project commenced in 1914 and was to 
be completed within six years.  A widely worded clause in the contract provided for 
the granting of an extension of time for delays “whatsoever and howsoever 
occasioned”.  The Government put a stop to the project in 1916, however, due to war 
time restrictions on civil building.  The House of Lords held that the clause in 
question did not cover an interruption which “vitally and fundamentally changes the 
conditions of the contract”.84  The basis of this finding was that the war time 
restrictions “could not possibly have been in the contemplation of the parties to the 
                                                                                                                                                  
agreement with immediate effect and the parties shall be relieved from any liability hereunder if and to 
the extent that the affected party's performance has been so prevented or delayed.” 
77 [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 133. 
78 Ibid at 163. 
79 Eg. Metropolitan Water Board v Dick, Kerr and Co [1918] AC 119; The Fibrosa supra note 33; The 
Super Servant Two supra note 2. 
80 McKendrick op cit note 71 at 34. 
81 The proposition that foreseeability may limit the application of the doctrine of frustration is 
discussed below at § 2.5.3. 
82 Metropolitan Water Board v Dick, Kerr and Co supra note 79. 
83 [1918] AC 119. 
84 Ibid at 126. 
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contract when it was made.”85  The House of Lords unanimously held that the 
enforcement of the contract following the delay would have been to enforce a 
contract different from that which was entered into.86  The contract was therefore 
discharged.   
 
Unforeseen delays due to wartime conditions have been likewise held to frustrate 
contracts despite express provision for delay contained in clauses of those 
contracts.87 
 
It is thus clear that force majeure clauses per se cannot exclude the doctrine of 
frustration.  Even where such a clause does make provision for a frustrating event, it 
is likely to be interpreted restrictively and discharge may still result.  Nevertheless 
force majeure clauses do have a role to play in allocating risks between contracting 
parties, since the doctrine of frustration only applies within narrowly circumscribed 
parameters.  Parties may wish to take account of factors relevant to their own 
particular transaction, such as currency exchange rates or the availability of a labour 




It is a general principle of the doctrine of frustration that the frustrating event should 
not have been foreseen or foreseeable by the parties.  The justification for this is that 
the contracting parties base their contractual obligations (such as the contract price) 
on the risks which they foresee as likely to affect their contract.  If a Court then rules 
that frustration has occurred when a risk which was actually foreseen materialises, 
this upsets the balance of risks which the parties have created by negotiation.  
Although Treitel states that no English case has been decided directly on this 
ground, there are many dicta which support the contention that foreseeability stands 
as a limit to the doctrine of frustration.88  This view is echoed by McKendrick.89  The 
                                               
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid at 127, 130, 136, 141. 
87 Eg. The Fibrosa supra note 33; Denny, Mott and Dickson Ltd v James B Fraser & Co Ltd supra 
note 21. 
88 Treitel op cit note 50 at 840.  Supporting dicta in, for example, Tamplin supra note 18 at 424; Davis 
Contractors supra note 5 at 731; The Hannah Blumenthal supra note 25 at 909. 
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test for foreseeability is a higher one than is found in tort (delict), however.90  Thus it 
is necessary that the parties actually foresaw the event which occurred, or the 
degree of foreseeability was a very high one.91   
 
That this high degree of foreseeability is necessary appears from an examination of 
the relevant cases.  In WJ Tatem Ltd v Gamboa92 a ship was hired during the 
Spanish civil war by the Republicans for the evacuation of their supporters from 
Spain.  The ship was hired for a period of 30 days, beginning 1 July.  The cost of hire 
was to be £250 per day “until her redelivery to the owners”, but the payment of this 
fee would cease if the ship went “missing”.  On 14 July the ship was seized by the 
Spanish Nationalists and was not released until 7 September.  The ship was only 
returned to its owners on 11 September.  The costs of hire had been paid in advance 
up to 31 July, but the owners claimed for the outstanding days up to 11 September.  
The claim for outstanding hire fees was denied on the ground that the contract had 
been frustrated.93   
 
Treitel explains this finding with the argument that it was not foreseeable that the 
ship would be detained not only for the period of her charter but for longer 
thereafter.94  He strengthens this argument by noting that possibility of the ship being 
captured and not returned was foreseen by the parties and hence the condition that 
payment of the hire fee should cease if the ship was lost.95  The temporary 
detainment was not foreseen and hence the contract was able to be frustrated.  The 
finding of Goddard J was based, however, on the proposition that should a “certain 
state of facts” which was the “foundation” of a contract come to an end, frustration 
would follow whether or not this was foreseen by the parties.96  While it may logically 
be inferred that the parties in this case foresaw that the ship might be lost during the 
war and indeed made provision for this in their contract, the exact nature of the 
ship’s detention was not foreseen, nor the resultant circumstances of the subsequent 
                                                                                                                                                  
89 McKendrick in Beale op cit note 25 at 1515 – 1516.   
90 Treitel op cit note 50 at 841. 
91 Ibid.  McKendrick in Beale op cit note 25 at 1516 concurs in the opinion of Treitel. 
92 [1939] 1 KB 132. 
93 Ibid at 138. 
94 Treitel op cit note 50 at 841. 
95 Ibid at 842. 
96 WJ Tatem Ltd v Gamboa supra note 92 at 135. 
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contractual claim.  This supports Treitel’s view that while foreseeability may in theory 
be a defence to a claim for frustration, it will not lightly be invoked and the degree of 
foresight required is quite an accurate one. 
 
In Edwinton Commercial Corporation, Global Tradeways Limited v Tsavliris Russ 
(Worldwide Salvage & Towage) Ltd (The “Sea Angel”)97 the Court of Appeal 
approved the discussions as to foreseeability by Treitel and by McKendrick writing in 
Chitty on Contracts.98  The unanimous Court of Appeal went on to hold that most 
events are to a greater or lesser extent foreseeable, but that this does not mean that 
such an event cannot lead to frustration.99  The court continued: “[t]he less that an 
event, in its type and its impact is foreseeable, the more likely it is to be a factor 
which … may lead to frustration.”100  A further consideration discussed by the court 
was what the dictates of justice required.101  This was held to be a relevant factor 
which underlies the doctrine of frustration and which must be considered in its 
application.102 
 
In the further case of CTI Group Inc v Transclear SA103 the Court of Appeal was 
faced with a situation where the defendants had failed to deliver a quantity of cement 
as contracted for.  The defendants had attempted to obtain a supply of cement in 
Indonesia with the intention of selling it on to the buyers, who wanted to break the 
cement cartel in Mexico.  When the Mexican company Cemex learnt of this, 
however, it used its influence to prevent the sale of cement to the defendants.  The 
defendants then tried to obtain supplies in Taiwan with the same result.  Unable to 
obtain cement, they were sued by the plaintiffs for breach of contract.  The 
defendants’ defence was that the contract had been frustrated. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that most situations in which a supplier of goods failed to 
provide goods to an intermediate purchaser would not constitute frustration, since 
                                               
97 [2007] EWCA Civ 547. 
98 Ibid at [102] – [103]. 
99 Ibid at [127]. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid at [132]. 
102 Ibid. 
103 [2008] EWCA Civ 856. 
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delivery remains physically and legally possible.104  In the context of the allocation of 
contractual risks, the court held that it was not concerned with whether the parties 
would have contracted differently had they foreseen the ultimate situation.105  
Although performance may have been “commercially impossible,” the contract was 
not frustrated.106   
 
Thus the importance of the foreseeability of an event as a tool for assessing whether 
frustration has occurred seems to be less important than the allocation of risks 
achieved by the actual contract between the parties.  In the recent Edwinton case 
the importance of this foreseeability criterion was undermined and in the CTI case 
the fact that the frustrating event was unforeseen did not preclude the failure of a 
frustration argument.  While the analysis of Treitel and McKendrick is thus important, 
the central test based on the construction of the contract as laid down in Davis 
Contractors107 seems to be the overriding consideration in this type of case. 
 
4.2.5.3 Self-induced frustration 
A contract will not be held to have been frustrated where the frustrating event is the 
result of one of the parties’ conduct.  In The Eugenia108 a ship was chartered in 
September 1956 to carry a cargo of iron and steel goods from certain Russian ports 
to India.  A clause in the charterparty stated the vessel was not to be ordered into a 
war zone without first obtaining the consent of its owners.  The ship was 
nevertheless ordered to proceed to India via the Suez Canal, despite the crisis in the 
Middle East.  As she passed through the canal she was detained by the Egyptian 
authorities.  Since the passage to the East via the Suez Canal was effectively 
blocked, the charterers claimed that the contract had been frustrated.  Lord Denning, 
however, held that the contract was not frustrated.  The charterer’s own breach of 
contract in ordering the Eugenia into a war zone had bought about the delay in the 
charterparty.109  The alleged frustration was self-induced.  In any event the contract 
                                               
104 Ibid at [23]. 
105 Ibid at [26]. 
106 Ibid at [26] – [27]. 
107 See the discussion above at section 4.2.3. 
108 Ocean Tramp Tankers v V/O Sovfracht [1964] 2 QB 226. 
109 Ibid at 237. 
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was held not to have been frustrated since passage to India was still available via 
the Cape of Good Hope.110   
 
The Eugenia was a fairly clear cut case, where the alleged frustration was as a result 
of one party’s own breach of contract.  A slightly less obvious line of cases is those 
where a contracting party was faced with outstanding obligations under a number of 
contracts and due to a change in circumstances was unable to perform under all 
those contracts and was as a result forced to choose which of them he would 
breach.  Two leading cases illustrate this problem.  The first is Maritime National Fish 
Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd.111  This was a case arising in Canada, which came before 
the Privy Council on appeal.  The defendants in that case intended to operate a fleet 
of five fishing ships, which would fish using an otter trawl.  Three of the ships they 
owned directly or through subsidiaries, two they chartered.  To fish with an otter 
trawl, however, a government licence was required and though the defendants 
applied for five licences, they received only three, which they allocated to their own 
ships.  They then argued in response to a claim for breach of contract by the owners 
of the chartered ships that these contracts had been frustrated.  The Privy Council 
disagreed: the reason for the lack of licences for the chartered ships was the 
defendants’ own decision to allocate the licences they did have to the other ships.  
The frustration was thus self-induced and did not discharge their obligation. 
 
The second case where the parties were faced with a choice between contracts was 
The Super Servant Two.112  In that case the defendants owned two barges specially 
designed for towing oil rigs.  These were known as Super Servant One and Super 
Servant Two respectively.  The defendants contracted to transport the plaintiffs’ oil 
rig on a fixed date and took an internal decision to allocate Super Servant Two to this 
task.  Super Servant One was allocated to a different job.  Before the time for 
performance, however, Super Servant Two sank whilst performing a different 
contract in the Zaire River and was thus unavailable for the contract to which she 
had been allocated.  Super Servant One was also already otherwise detained as 
stated.  Thus the defendants negotiated a more expensive means of transport for the 
                                               
110 Ibid at 240. 
111 [1935] AC 524. 
112 The Super Servant Two supra note 2. 
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plaintiffs’ oil rig, causing unforeseen expense for which the plaintiffs claimed.  The 
defendants’ case was based on two grounds: firstly that the contract had been 
frustrated by the sinking of Super Servant Two or secondly that this event resulted in 
discharge under the force majeure clause in the contract.  Neither argument was 
successful.  The plaintiffs relied on the Maritime National Fish case to demonstrate 
that the defendants’ own election had led to their failure to perform and that the 
frustration was hence self-induced.  The Court of Appeal agreed with this argument 
and the defendants were held not to be discharged by frustration.113  With regard to 
the force majeure clause, it was held that this would give the defendants the right to 
cancel the contract, but not if negligence was present in the sinking of the Super 
Servant Two.114  The way in which this appeal was framed assumed that negligence 
could be proven by the plaintiffs, without going into the matter. 
 
4.2.5.4 Fault 
A further question, which relates to the doctrine of self-induced frustration, is whether 
a contract can be discharged for frustration if the frustrating event occurs as a result 
of the defendant’s own negligence.  In other words, what if the frustrating event can 
be seen as having been caused not by the deliberate choice, but by the negligent act 
of one of the parties?  In Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting 
Corporation Ltd115 an explosion on board a ship while it was in the harbour 
prevented it from carrying a cargo for the plaintiffs as agreed in a charterparty.  The 
cause of the explosion was not ascertained, but the plaintiffs argued that it had 
occurred due to the negligence of the defendant ship owners and as a result a 
finding that the contract had been frustrated was precluded.  The House of Lords 
disagreed, however, and held that there was no onus on the defendants to prove 
that the explosion had not been due to their fault and hence that the contract was 
discharged. 
 
Lord Simon distinguished those cases where there was deliberate choice on the part 
of the defendants which led to the frustrating event, so-called “self-induced” 
frustration, from the broader class of cases where the frustrating event was caused 
                                               
113 Ibid at 10. 
114 Ibid at 7 – 8. 
115 [1942] AC 154. 
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by a “default” on the part of defendant, which he stated was often treated as the 
equivalent of negligence.116  Lord Simon stated that the ambit of “default” to disable 
a plea of frustration was not clear in English law: 
“Some day it may have to be finally determined whether a prima donna is excused by 
complete loss of voice from an executory contract to sing if it is proved that her condition was 
caused by her carelessness in not changing her wet clothes after being out in the rain.  The 
implied term in such a case may turn out to be that the fact of supervening physical incapacity 
dissolves the contract without inquiring further into its cause, provided, of course, that it has 
not been deliberately induced in order to get out of the engagement.”117 
 
A more modern pronouncement on the issue of fault can be found in The Super 
Servant Two.118  In that case (discussed under § 2.5.4 above) the plaintiffs tried to 
argue that the sinking of Super Servant Two was caused as a result of the 
negligence of the defendants and hence that a plea of frustration was precluded.  
Bingham LJ stated that the “real question” is “whether the frustrating event relied 
upon is truly an outside event or extraneous change of situation or whether it is an 
event which the party seeking to rely on it had the means and opportunity to prevent 
but nevertheless caused or permitted to come about.”119  The Lord Justice did, 
however, go on to hold obiter that if negligence had been established on the part of 
the defendants, their plea of frustration would have been precluded.120 
 
McKendrick notes that the issue of whether a contract may be frustrated by an event 
caused by the defendant’s negligence has never been finally resolved.121  In a more 
recent contribution in Chitty on Contracts, McKendrick states that the “real question” 
is whether the party seeking to invoke the doctrine of frustration had the means and 
opportunity to prevent the frustrating event, but nevertheless caused or permitted it 
to come about.122  Treitel argues that negligence should exclude frustration.123  This 
view is echoed by Beatson who argues that this conclusion “appears logical”.124     
                                               
116 Ibid at 166. 
117 Ibid at 166 - 167. 
118 The Super Servant Two supra note 2. 
119 Ibid at 10. 
120 Ibid. 
121 McKendrick op cit note 71 at 50. 
122 McKendrick in Beale op cit note 25 at 1518.  This “question” is taken from the Super Servant Two 
case supra note 2 at 10.  Writing from an American perspective, Nehf notes that a supervening event 
caused intentionally or negligently by the defendant will generally not discharge performance.  He 
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4.2.6 Effect on a contract 
 
4.2.6.1 The general rule 
The effect of frustration on a contract is to bring it to an end forthwith and 
automatically.125  The contract thus terminates from the time of the frustrating event 
(e nunc) and any future obligations are discharged.126  The result for the parties to a 
contract is discharge of any obligations which their agreement had imposed upon 
them.  A question left unanswered by discharge ex nunc, however, is what is to 
become of performance already tendered under a contract before the frustrating 
event?  It is possible that a party may have paid money in advance under the 
contract, or that a party may have acted in reliance upon the contract in performing 
work or incurring expense.  To allow the losses to lie where they fall could lead to 
injustice (and did do so in the earlier case law).  Hence there needs to be a process 
of adjustment following a frustrating event.  This was recognised first in the case law 
and was then incorporated in statute as the law developed.   
 
4.2.6.2 Adjustment for payments made under the contract 
The original position in the common law was that obligations accrued before the 
frustrating event occurred remained binding.127  This was because frustration 
discharged future obligations under a contract only.128  Hence in Chandler v Webster 
the plaintiff had already paid £100 to view the scheduled coronation procession of 
King Edward VII.  The total contract price was £141.  When the contract in this case 
(like the other Coronation cases) was frustrated by the illness of the King, not only 
was he not able to recover this amount upon cancellation of the procession, but he 
was held liable for the outstanding balance, since this obligation was held to have 
accrued before the frustrating event.129  The argument that the consideration given 
                                                                                                                                                  
does, however, mention the case of CNA International Reinsurance Co v Phoenix 678 So 2d 378 
(Florida Appeal Court 1996) where the death of an actor by a self-administered dose of drugs did not 
preclude his estate from asserting the impossibility defence.  See Nehf in Perillo op cit note 72 at 98 – 
99. 
123 Treitel op cit note 50 at 844. 
124 Beatson op cit note 25 at 553. 
125 The Super Servant Two supra note 2 at 8. 
126 Appleby v Myers (1867) LR 2 CP 651; Chandler v Webster supra note 37. 
127 Chandler v Webster supra note 37. 
128 McKendrick in Beale op cit note 25 at 1523. 
129 Ibid at 500 – 501. 
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for the rent had failed did not succeed.130  Because the contract was not totally wiped 
out, the argument as to total failure of the consideration could not succeed.131  This 
case can be distinguished from Krell v Henry where the obligation to pay the rent 
had not matured prior to the cancellation of the coronation procession.   
 
This decision was criticised as being one of considerable injustice and the House of 
Lords overruled it in 1943 in The Fibrosa.132  In that case (discussed above) an 
English Company had agreed to sell and deliver machinery to a Polish company 
situated in Poland.  The contract was frustrated by the German occupation of Poland 
in 1939.  In terms of the contract £1 000 had been paid in advance for the machinery 
and this sum was held to be recoverable.  The rule in Chandler v Webster was held 
to be wrong since the consideration given for the money paid was not a promise, but 
the promised performance.133  If the performance became impossible, then there had 
been  a total failure of consideration resulting from the frustration of contract.134 
 
The problem was not entirely solved at common law, however, for the solution 
provided by The Fibrosa applied only where there had been a total failure of 
consideration.  Situations where the failure of consideration was only partial were not 
covered.  As a result the Legislature intervened with the passing of the Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 to prevent the unjustified enrichment of parties 
following frustration of contract.  Section 1(2) of this Act now deals with sums paid “in 
pursuance of the contract” before the time when the parties were discharged by 
frustration.  According to this sub-section: 
(a) Sums already paid under a frustrated contract may be reclaimed. 
(b) Sums payable (but not yet paid) in terms of an obligation which accrued 
under the contract before the frustrating event need not be paid. 
(c) The reliance expenditure incurred before the frustrating event by a party to 
whom such sums were paid or payable, may be retained from amounts 
already received or recovered from the opposing party at the Court’s 
                                               
130 Ibid at 499. 
131 Ibid. 
132 The Fibrosa supra note 33 at 49. 
133 Ibid at 48. 
134 Ibid at 48 – 49. 
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discretion.  The sum recovered may not exceed the reliance expenditure 
(or the sums paid or payable under the contract). 
 
4.2.6.3 Adjustment for performance not sounding in money 
The deficiency of the common law in dealing with performance made under a 
contract prior to a frustrating event did not extend solely to monetary performance, 
however.  In Appleby v Myers135 engineering contractors agreed to erect machinery 
in the defendant’s factory and to maintain this machinery upon completion for a 
period of two years.  While the machinery was only partially erected the factory burnt 
down and the contract was held to be discharged by frustration.  The Court held that 
the contractors were entitled to nothing in respect of the work which they had already 
done.  As with the rule in Chandler v Webster, this was seen as being unjust and 
hence the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act deals also with this type of 
situation. 
 
Section 1(3) of the Act provides that: 
(a) Where one contracting party has received a valuable benefit due to the 
actions of the other in performance of a contract which has subsequently 
been frustrated; the party who has performed may recover from the party 
who has received the benefit an amount subject to the Court’s discretion. 
(b) The amount recovered may not exceed the value of the benefit received 
by the other party. 
(c) The valuable benefit must not be a payment of money (since this is 
covered by s 1(2)). 
 
4.2.7 The difference between frustration and common mistake 
Both frustration and common mistake are grounds on which a contract may come to 
an end in English law.  With common mistake, the parties contract on the basis of a 
false common assumption about a material fact relating to their contract.  When the 
error is discovered the contract can be set aside, provided the mistake is material.  
With frustration there is a change of circumstances after the contract is concluded 
resulting in a radical change in the obligation.   
                                               




McKendrick argues that there is  a connection between these two concepts, citing 
the case of Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v John Walker & Sons 
Ltd.136  In this case a property was sold to the plaintiff, who wished to redevelop it.  
The contract price was £1,7m.  In the negotiations the plaintiff asked the defendant 
whether the building had been proclaimed to be of special historic or architectural 
interest, since this would preclude redevelopment.  Unknown to both parties the 
relevant government department had indeed decided to list this building as being of 
special historic or architectural interest.  The agreement of sale was, however, 
signed on 25 September 1973 with both parties in ignorance of this fact.  On 26 
September, the Secretary of State wrote to the defendant informing it of the listing of 
the building, which occurred officially the next day.  The effect of the listing was to 
reduce the value of the building by £1,5m.   
 
The question which faced the Court was at what point the change in circumstance 
had occurred.  If the building was deemed to have been listed before the contract 
was signed, the plaintiffs could argue that there had been a common mistake.  If the 
listing had occurred only when officially recognised on the 27 September then the 
plaintiff could argue that the contract had been frustrated.  The Court of Appeal held 
that the relevant date was 27 September 1973, precluding the argument of common 
mistake.137  The listing of the building was held not to have been an unforeseen 
event, however, and was within the plaintiff’s consciously assumed sphere of risk.  
Hence the argument for frustration failed as well.138   
 
Thus we see that common mistake and frustration have elements of similarity, but 
arise at different stages of the contracting process.  A common mistake is present at 
the time the contract is concluded and is based on a mistaken assumption common 
                                               
136 Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v John Walker & Sons Ltd supra note 48.  See: 
McKendrick Contract Law (2003) at 299 – 301.  Nehf in Perillo op cit note 72 at 84 – 85 makes the 
important point that a contract will be discharged for common mistake, provided the mistake is 
material, but frustration requires a higher standard of onerosity with regard to the difference between 
the expected outcome and the actual one.  This statement is made with reference to the US 
jurisdiction where discharge for impracticability is more readily permitted, but the point is an important 
one. 
137 Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v John Walker & Sons Ltd supra note 48 at 172. 
138 Ibid at 173 – 174. 
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to both parties.  With frustration there is no common belief, but nevertheless the 
basis on which the contract rests falls away after the conclusion of the contract.  The 
connection between these concepts, as illustrated by the Amalgamated Investment 
& Property Co case, is that the same set of facts could give rise to either a finding of 
common mistake or frustration, simply depending on the date on which an event 
occurs.  If the contract is concluded after the date of the event the law of common 
mistake pertains, if the contract is concluded before the event, frustration is 
applicable.    
 
An interesting question from a South African point of view would be as to the status 
of a common assumption relating to a future state of affairs in English law.139  This 
would have to fall under the frustration banner rather than that of common mistake, 
since the assumption relates to a fact which may change after the conclusion of the 
contract.  If the so-called “supposition in futuro” is to be a ground on which a contract 
is terminated, then a change in circumstance which results in the basis of the 
contract falling away would terminate the contract as well.  This, as noted in chapter 
two, is to be classified as frustration of purpose. 
 
4.2.8 Conclusion 
After the brief description of the parameters of the doctrine of frustration outlined 
above, it is appropriate to reflect briefly on what has been said in sum.  The doctrine 
does indeed offer a certain amount of justice in making discharge available to the 
parties to a contract where frustration is deemed to have occurred.  Discharge is 
limited to cases where there has been a radical change in the obligation of an 
unforeseen nature, however.  Despite the argument that discharge brings justice, the 
prevalence of force majeure clauses in contracts demonstrates that discharge is not 
always the preferred result for the parties in question.  Parties to a contract 
undertake a particular allocation of risk and discharge can upset this balance.  It is 
perhaps for this reason that Bingham LJ described the effects of frustration as 
drastic and stated that the doctrine should thus not be lightly invoked.140  The truth 
remains, however, that the future will always be uncertain and to a large extent 
                                               
139 About the status of the supposition in futuro in South African law see chapter 2 section 2.3.2. 
140 The Super Servant Two supra note 2 at 8.  This passage is reproduced in section 4.2.1. 
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unforeseeable, which necessitates some sort of doctrine to deal with changed 
circumstances. 
 
A study of the English doctrine of frustration reflects the fact that after an initial 
period of growth, the courts became reluctant to invoke the doctrine outside of clear 
cases where the stringent test of a radical change in the obligation was met.  The 
doctrine may at first glance seem permissive to a South African audience, the reason 
for this being that South African contract law recognises only true impossibility as 
terminating a contract, and not a mere change in circumstances, no matter how 
radical.  The differences between English law and South African law in this regard 
are less drastic than they seem, however.  As has been set out in chapter two, apart 
from the doctrine of frustration of purpose, which is not recognised in South African 
law, the categories of physical and legal impossibility, central to English law 
frustration, are known to South African law.   
 
4.3 US Law 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Since the US is a federal country, there is not one unified body of contract law, but 
rather a separate body of law for each state.141  Although American contract law is 
largely uncodified,142 there is the Uniform Commercial Code (1979) (the “UCC”), 
which has been enacted by all the US states except for Louisiana.143  Most of the 
provisions contained in this code are not relevant to basic contract law – Article 2, 
however, which deals with the sale of goods, is relevant.144  In addition, there is the 
Second Restatement of Contracts published by the American Law Institute in 1981 
(“Restatement 2d”).  While the Restatement does not form binding legislation, it 
provides a model or ideal law for all states to follow and is of highly persuasive 
                                               
141 Robert S Summers “The conceptualisation of good faith in American contract law: a general 
account” in Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (eds) Good Faith in European Contract Law 
(2000) at 118.  
142 Joseph M Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts (2009) at 14. 
143 Ibid at 15. 
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authority.145  An examination of US contract law should thus begin with the 
applicable codified rules. 
 
The impracticability defence is dealt with in the UCC at § 2 – 615.  This provision 
reads in part: 
“Except to the extent that a seller may have assumed a greater obligation…  
(a) Delay in performance or non-performance in whole or in part by a seller that complies 
with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of the seller's duty under a contract for sale if 
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency 
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made…” 
 
Perillo identifies two “hurdles” in this section which must be overcome before the 
defence it contains may be invoked.146  The first is that impracticability must be 
proved, the second is that the risk of that impracticability must not have been 
assumed by the contracting party.  “Impracticability” is a word used largely in the US 
jurisdiction and refers to extreme and unreasonable difficulty or expense in 
performing, rather than actual impossibility,147 although true impossibility would be 
captured under the impracticability requirement.  As far as the assumption of risk 
goes, it must not have been made in terms of the contract (“except to the extent that 
the seller may have assumed a greater obligation”) or be allocated to a party by 
operation of law (“the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made”).148   
 
The Second Restatement deals with the issue of frustration at Chapter 11: 
“Impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose”.  Of the provisions which 
appear in this chapter, the most relevant are § 261 (“Discharge by supervening 
impracticability”) and § 265 (“Discharge by supervening frustration”).    § 261 reads 
as follows: 
“Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his 
fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on 
which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the 
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.” 
                                               
145 Ibid at 14. 






This provision largely repeats the UCC text, except that it makes explicit the 
requirement that there must be no fault on the part of the disadvantaged party with 
regard to the occurrence of the supervening event.  The text of § 265 states the 
following: 
“Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without 
his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption 
on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, 
unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.” 
 
This provision deals with the defence of frustration of purpose.  This is essentially the 
converse of impracticability and occurs when the value of performance to the buyer 
has dramatically diminished.149  Apart from this major difference, however, the 
wording of § 265 is largely identical to § 261.  The differences between the two 
defences they create will be dealt with below. 
 
4.3.2 Impracticability 
As noted above, the term “impracticability” implies a lower standard than the term 
“impossibility” would.  Cases of impossibility would also fall under the rules on 
impracticability, however, in terms of the definition of the latter.  The UCC and the 
Second Restatement thus use the term “impracticability” inclusively to refer also to 
cases of impossibility.150  Thus the death or disability of the debtor under a contract 
requiring personal performance; destruction of the subject matter of the contract or 
supervening legal impossibility would all generally be examples of events leading to 
discharge of an obligation under dispute.  These grounds for discharge are the 
specific listed instances of impracticability at §§ 262 – 264 of the Second 
Restatement.  § 261 and the equivalent § 2 – 615 of the UCC are broader 
provisions, however, intended to capture any instance of impracticability.  
 
The doctrine of impracticability is usually traced back to the decision in Mineral Park 
Land Co v Howard.151  In this case the defendants agreed to take all the gravel 
                                               
149 Treitel op cit note 1 at 309. 
150 Perillo op cit note 142 at 458. 
151 156 P 458 (1916).  Cf Treitel op cit note 1 at 263. 
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needed for a particular construction project from the plaintiff’s land, against payment 
of five cents per cubic yard.  After only half the required amount of gravel had been 
removed from the land, however, the water table was reached, so that removing the 
rest of the gravel would have cost 10 to 12 times more.  In addition the gravel would 
have to be dried before use, which increased the time required for performance.  The 
defendant refused to perform further under the contract, arguing that this had 
become prohibitively expensive.  The court held that “a thing is impossible in legal 
contemplation when it is not practicable” and discharged the defendant.152  
 
A later example is the case of Northern Corporation v Chugach Electric 
Association.153  In this case a contractor undertook to perform work on a dam in 
Alaska.  The rock necessary for this project was to be hauled across a frozen lake by 
truck.  This method proved more difficult than expected, however, since the ice kept 
breaking and two of the contractor’s employees were killed.  The contractor was 
discharged from its obligation on the ground that performance was “impossible”.  The 
court held, however, that “legal impossibility does not demand a showing of actual or 
literal impossibility”.154  “Commercial impracticability” would suffice and this standard 
was met due to the difficulty in performance resultant from the thinness of the ice.155 
 
Today the Second Restatement defines “impracticability” as existing where “extreme 
and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss to one of the parties will be 
involved.”156  The Second Restatement gives the following examples of 
impracticability: “A severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to war, 
embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the 
like…”157  Furthermore impracticability will be present where there is a “risk of injury 
                                               
152 Mineral Park supra note 52 at 459. 
153 518 P 2d 76 (1974).  See also Red River Commodities, Inc v Eidsness 459 NW 2d 805 (ND 1990).  
Discharge was refused in Missouri Public Service Co v Peabody Coal Co 583 SW 2d 721 (Mo App 
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to person or to property … that is disproportionate to the ends to be attained by 
performance.”158 
 
While increased expense is in theory a ground for discharge, Treitel notes that such 
an argument rarely succeeds where the increase in expense is due to market 
fluctuations.159  Nehf, writing in Corbin on Contracts, notes that the degree of cost 
increase necessary to invite discharge is uncertain and that increases of up to 300 
per cent have proved insufficient in the past.160  He also notes that an Official 
Comment to UCC § 2 – 615 states that increased cost alone will not discharge 
performance, but that an increase must “alter the essential nature of the 
performance”.161  The suggested rationale for this state of affairs is that market-
related increases or decreases in price are foreseeable.162  Thus in Eastern Airlines 
Inc v Gulf Oil Corp, an agreement by Gulf Oil to supply Eastern Airlines with aviation 
fuel for four and a half years from 1972, was not discharged by impracticability when 
the fuel price rose drastically due to the Middle East “energy crisis” of 1973.163  In its 
judgment the court pointed out that the events which led to the rise in prices were 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of conclusion of the contract.164   
 
Further evidence of the restrictive approach of the American courts to the doctrine of 
impracticability is to be found in the decisions relating to the closure of the Suez 
Canal in the mid 1960s.  The closure of the Suez Canal meant that shipping 
contracts requiring the delivery of goods to the East could only be performed by 
taking the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope.  In Transatlantic Financing 
Corp v United States165 the resultant increase in price was $44 000 (against a total 
contract price of $306 000) and in American Trading & Production Corp v Shell 
International Marine166 the increase was $132 000 against a total of $417 000.  
Neither increase was too drastic in comparison to the overall contract price and in 
                                               
158 Ibid. 
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neither case was discharge permitted.  It would thus seem that increase in cost 
alone is not a common ground for discharge due to impracticability in American 
law.167  In the seminal Mineral Park case, the increase in cost was tenfold and hence 
far exceeded the increases in the subsequent cases listed above.  Perillo suggests 
that the increase in cost should result from the necessity of performing in a manner 
radically different from what was originally contemplated in order to invoke 
discharge.168    
 
4.3.3 Frustration of purpose 
 
Frustration of purpose is not covered by the UCC.  Perillo, however, contends that 
this is because the common law is intended to apply.169  The doctrine is expressly 
included in the Second Restatement, however – the relevant provision has been set 
out above.  The comment to § 265 makes clear what is already stated in the text: it 
must be the principal purpose of a party which is frustrated.170  It is not sufficient that 
there was a private motivating factor which was not disclosed to the other party, the 
object must have been so completely the basis of the contract for both parties, that 
without it the agreement will make little sense.171  The first illustration given in the 
Second Restatement is the English case of Krell v Henry: although this was not 
decided within the American jurisdiction, it appears to be regarded as the locus 
classicus on frustration of purpose in this country as well.172 
 
There are also indigenous examples of frustration of purpose in the US, although 
Nehf notes that these cases are “not wholly consistent in reasoning or outcome” and 
that the defence fails more often than it succeeds.173  For instance the passing of the 
prohibition laws in 1920 made the sale of intoxicating liquor illegal.  There were 
                                               
167 See also Missouri Public Service Co v Peabody Coal Co supra note 153; Iowa Electric Light & 
Power Co v Atlas Corp 467 F Supp 129 (ND Iowa 1978) where discharge for impracticability caused 
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172 Illustration 1 to § 265. 
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several cases where premises had been leased for the sole purpose of running a 
saloon and the beginning of the prohibition frustrated such leases.  In Doherty v 
Monroe Eckstein Brewing Co174 the lease actually stipulated that “the only business 
to be carried on in the said premises is the saloon business”.  This lease was held to 
have been discharged when it became illegal to sell liquor.  The court rejected an 
argument that it was still possible to sell soft drinks and items such as tobacco.175  A 
similar result was reached in Industrial Development and Land Co v Goldschmidt176 
where the lease was to operate a “general winery and/or wholesale and/or retail 
liquor business” and the lessee had agreed not to “permit the said premises to be 
used for any other purposes.”  
 
Another example is the “blackout” legislation passed during the Second World War 
due to the threat of bombing by Japan.  As in the UK and Australia there were 
contracts for illumination which were frustrated when legislation regulated that lights 
were to be extinguished at night.  In 20th Century Lites v Goodman a contract for the 
lease of an “electrical advertising display” for a drive-in restaurant in Los Angeles 
was entered into in September 1941.177  The lease agreement was to run for three 
years.  When the US declared war on Japan in December 1941, black out legislation 
was imposed on the West Coast.  The contract was held to have been discharged by 
“commercial frustration”.178 
 
What is clear from a comparison between the English and the US case law on 
frustration of purpose, is that while the doctrine takes its origin from the English case 
of Krell v Henry, this ground of discharge is not favoured in English law.  US law is 
far more permissive and there are several instances of discharge for frustration of 
purpose, as evidenced by the examples set out above.  Treitel notes that the same is 
true of the courts’ approach to impracticability in these two countries.179  Clearly 
change of circumstances is a stronger ground for discharge in the US jurisdiction 
than within the English. 
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4.3.4 The allocation of risk 
The issue of the prior allocation of risk is central to any question of impracticability or 
frustration.  This is made clear by the proviso in the Second Restatement that there 
should not be a “contrary indication” that the non-occurrence of the event was a 
basic assumption on which the contract was made.  Comment (c) to § 261 spells out 
that in order to invoke the doctrine of impracticability the defendant must not 
expressly or impliedly have assumed a greater risk in terms of the contract to which 
it was party.  Factors relevant in this regard will be the extent to which the contract 
was standardised and the degree to which the other party supplied the terms.180  In 
addition if the disadvantaged party was a middleman, then he may have had more 
opportunity to diversify his supply bases than where he is a producer with a limited 
source of supply.181  Furthermore if the supplier could reasonably have been 
expected to insure against its loss, this will be a factor to be considered in the 
allocation of risk.182  It will be noted that the last two considerations mentioned are 
largely economic in nature and there is a significant body of writing in the specialised 
field of law and economics dealing with the allocation of risks following discharge for 
impracticability or frustration.  This will be dealt with in the following section. 
 
The illustration given in comment (c) is of an experienced salvage company which 
undertakes to raise the plaintiff’s boat which has run aground on some rocks.183  The 
salvage company signs a contract which makes no provision for unfavourable 
weather or unforeseen circumstances.  During the operation the boat slips off the 
rocks, sinks in deep water and then fills up with mud.  Salvage at this point becomes 
impossible.  The illustration suggests that the obligation to raise the boat is not 
discharged by impracticability, since the salvage company assumed the risk of this 
event by the omission of any qualifying risks from its contract.  This illustration is 
based on the actual case of Wills v Shockley.184  In that case the defendant was held 
liable to the plaintiff for damages arising out of an absolute commitment to raise a 
boat under the same circumstances as set out in the illustration.185 
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An example of a case where a court refused to discharge a middleman who failed to 
supply goods under a contract was Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co v Dunbar 
Molasses Co.186  There, the defendant had contracted to supply 1,5 million gallons of 
molasses to the plaintiff company.  The molasses factory which was the intended 
source of the molasses produced less output than expected that year, however, and 
the defendant was only allocated 344 000 gallons, which he supplied to the plaintiff 
buyer.  The plaintiff bought the shortfall on the open market and charged the 
defendant for the difference.  The Court of Appeals of New York refused to discharge 
the defendant: the impossibility of performance was subjective and he had failed to 
make adequate provision for risk of the failure of his source of supply.187  
 
4.3.5 Law and economics 
In a seminal article in 1977, Posner and Rosenfield claimed that the proper criterion 
for evaluating the rules of contract law is economic efficiency.188  The ideal set of 
rules would maximise the value created by the transaction and the more efficiently 
the exchange is structured, the greater the potential profit for the parties.189 The 
authors noted the inconsistency in the court decisions regarding what they broadly 
termed “the impossibility defence”.190  This they argued was due to a lack of concrete 
criteria assigning the risk of impossibility to a particular party.191  The authors 
proposed to find such criteria by means of an economic analysis of law.192  The 
solution which Posner and Rosenfield proposed was based on a consideration of 
who was the superior risk bearer.193  This was determined by means of asking first, 
who is better able to prevent the risk from materialising and second, who is better 
able to manage that risk by means of insurance?194  Where these factors suggested 
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the promisor was the better risk bearer, the contract should be upheld.  Where the 
promisee was the better risk bearer the contract should be discharged.195   
 
The article goes on to apply this analysis to several leading cases of impracticability 
in an attempt to prove the author’s hypothesis.  One of the cases analysed was 
Transatlantic Financing Corp v United States,196 which was dealt with above and 
which concerned a claim for impracticability by a shipping company arising out of the 
closure of the Suez Canal.  It will be recalled that discharge was refused in this 
case.197  Posner and Rosenfield quote from the judgment of Judge Wright in this 
case where he ruled that it was more reasonable to expect a shipping company to 
insure against the hazard of war than to expect this of the government charterer.198  
The authors commend this approach and underline its rationale: the shipowner is the 
superior risk bearer since it is better able to estimate the magnitude of potential loss 
and the probability of the unexpected event.199  Furthermore the shipowner owns 
several ships, which operate along several routes and hence it can insure against 
the risk of delay without purchasing market insurance.200  If it were to purchase 
market insurance, however, then it could purchase insurance in a single transaction 
for multiple contracts.201    
 
Posner and Rosenfield do admit, however, that their “empirical hunch” is proved 
using methods which are casual and crude.202  Another important limitation to their 
hypothesis is that it should only be used to allocate risk where the contract does not 
expressly do so.203  It should be noted that there has been significant criticism of the 
approach of these authors.  Trimarchi criticised their analysis on the basis that it fails 
to take account of the nature of the typical event giving rise to hardship, namely that 
it was general and extraordinary, as well as unforeseeable.204 This author’s 
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argument is that insurers base their claim on the statistical probability of a particular 
event.205  Events such as wars, international crises and national political crises were 
too “spasmodic” to be readily calculable risks and insurers will hence not be able to 
readily fix a premium on providing cover.206  In addition if an insurer were to 
underwrite such a risk in multiple contracts, the losses would be likely to be 
correlated and heavy were the event to occur.207  Hence it was not reasonable to 
expect parties to a transaction to insure against hardship ex ante.  The argument of 
Posner and Rosenfield with regard to insurance has also been doubted by Wagner, 
since it does not take account of further factors such as whether the parties to a 
contract are risk preferring or risk averse, or whether they have equal access to 
market insurance.208 
 
Both Trimarchi and Wagner argue in favour of determining the availability of the 
impossibility defence ex post.  Trimarchi argues that to require performance in a 
case of impracticability where a market shift has increased expense of performance 
could provide a windfall gain to the promisee, which is not in the interests of 
economic efficiency.209  In this type of case discharge would be better.210  Wagner 
reaches a similar conclusion, but by means of a different argument.  He argues that 
the possibility of discharge for impracticability forces promisees to make socially 
efficient reliance decisions.211  The essence of this argument is that a promisee 
should not spend too heavily in reliance on an uncertain outcome, but should rather 
take into account the probability of default by the promisor.  Over-investing in 
reliance is a waste of resources, since it could place unnecessary costs on the 
promisor should he default.212  
 
                                               
205 Ibid at 66. 
206 Ibid at 67. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Gerhard Wagner “In defense of the impossibility defense” (1995 – 1996) 27 Loyola University of 
Chicago Law Journal 55 at 88.  See also: Mark P Gergen “A defense of judicial reconstruction of 
contracts” (1995 – 1996) 71 Indiana Law Journal 45 at 54, who argues that discharge for 
impracticability is too unpredictable to positively influence the parties’ behaviour in taking risks. 
209 Trimarchi op cit note 204 at 82. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Wagner op cit note 208 at 63. 
212 Ibid at 68 – 69. 
130 
 
The economic analysis of law provides a fascinating approach to normative 
questions such as the apportionment of risk.  It is also essentially an American 
invention, which is why it is dealt with in the present chapter.  The principles 
enunciated above with regard to determining whether discharge should be awarded 
in cases of impracticability and frustration are universal, however, and can be 
applied to the analysis of this issue in any legal system.  A further normative 
question could be asked in the context of allocation of risk in frustration cases, 
however, and that is what does good faith require?213  This question will be 
addressed in chapter seven. 
 
4.3.6 Effect of a finding of impracticability or frustration 
In the US the effect of a finding that total impracticability or frustration has struck a 
contract will be discharge of the obligation.214  American courts then generally hold 
that the parties must make restitution for the benefits which have been conferred on 
them under the contract.215  It may however be that redress of profits and losses 
beyond mere unjustified enrichment is required, in which case § 272(2) of the 
Second Restatement can be applied, which provides that a court may grant relief “as 
justice requires including protection of the parties reliance interests.”216  Thus it is 
possible for a court to adapt obligations under a frustrated contract.  Generally this 
power is exercised within carefully prescribed limits, but there is one case example 
where a US trial court attempted to reformulate the contract under dispute.217  In 
Aluminum Co of America v Essex Group, Inc218 a contract required Alcoa to deliver 
aluminium to Essex in specified quantities for a period of 16 years.  The contract 
price was tied to various indices.  There was a profit over the first seven years, but a 
rise in production costs caused a significant loss thereafter, which was set to be 
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magnified by the passage of time.  The court rejected the argument that it should not 
make a new contract for the parties and replaced their complex pricing mechanism 
with one of its own.219  This decision was taken on appeal, but before the appeal 
court could rule, the parties settled.220  Dawson describes the trial court’s finding in 
this case as “grotesque”221 and notes that while this is the only US instance of an 
attempt to revise a contract by a direct order, it should not pave the way for the 
American courts to follow the German approach to adaptation of contracts.222   
 
Thus while some measure of redress of profits and losses may be ordered by a US 
court in terms of the Second Restatement, it does not appear that the US has gone 
as far down the path of adaptation of contracts as Germany has.  The fact that the 
Alcoa v Essex decision is the only reported instance of undisguised revision of a 
contract seems to indicate that greater value is attached to the principle of pacta sunt 




A juxtaposition of the English and American doctrines of discharge for supervening 
events shows that while one is the parent legal system of the other, developments in 
these two countries have moved in different directions.  In English law strong weight 
is given to the concept of the sanctity of contracts.  Hence while the test for 
discharge remains as to whether there has been a “radical change in the obligation” 
– focussing on change of circumstances – there are very few actual instances where 
a change in circumstances short of impossibility has led to discharge.  Indeed the 
true elements of hardship – impracticability and frustration of purpose – are largely 
absent from English law.  Krell v Henry is an isolated judgment where discharge was 
permitted.  For the far larger part obligations have been enforced.  Normative 
questions as to the allocation of risks are thus either dealt by agreement, such as in 
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a force majeure clause, or are decided by the courts with a strong policy orientation 
toward the value of pacta sunt servanda. 
 
In the US by contrast, although it is also a common law country, the introduction of 
the Restatements of Contract have led to a system of law which is reminiscent of a 
codified civil law system.  It is noteworthy too that the international model rules on 
contract, such as the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts are 
arguably based (at least in terms of structure) on the Restatements.223  This implies 
a certain amount of progress in the US, away from the strict English doctrine of 
frustration and in the direction of an indigenous doctrine of discharge for change of 
circumstances.  It is noteworthy in this regard that the US doctrine is not an all-or-
nothing doctrine of discharge, but that (minor) adjustments are permitted under the 
Second Restatement.  There is even evidence of a flirtation with a civil law type of 
contract revision by the courts.224  
 
As far as adjudicating the allocation of risks goes in American contracts, the analysis 
provided by the law and economics school of thought provides an insightful 
explanation of the normative factors at play.  While there is not unanimity among the 
writers, their analysis provides a useful tool when considering whether judicial policy 
should favour discharge for changed circumstances and when. 
 
From a South African point of view, common law case studies provide an interesting 
standard of comparison.  While our own law of discharge for supervening 
impossibility is firmly based in the Roman-Dutch civil law, the South African 
emphasis is on pacta sunt servanda, not unlike the English approach.  Indeed as 
noted in chapter two, the English and South African systems are not that different.  
At least in theory, however, discharge for changed circumstances is permitted in 
certain (albeit limited) instances in English law and thus the doctrine proceeds from a 
fundamentally different basis.  The Second Restatement as well as the common law 
of the USA make their law on discharge for supervening events vastly different from 
our own, as the reader will establish from a comparison with the South African law 
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set out in chapter two.  The US is of interest as a more progressive common law 
system.  Ultimately, whether lessons can be learned from either of these jurisdictions 
is a question which will be dealt with in chapter eight.    
 
Since South Africa is a mixed legal system, however, the position in civil law 
jurisdictions remains of interest to our courts.  In order to get the fuller picture this 
thesis now turns to the position in certain leading civil law countries. 
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A full, detailed survey of all – or even most – of the civil law countries in Europe is 
beyond the scope of this work.1  In chapter three the historic sources of the ius 
commune were considered with reference to the clausula rebus sic stantibus.  
French law was also briefly canvassed in that chapter.  Here the major focus will be 
on Germany, with a brief look also at Dutch law.  These two countries have been 
selected, both because secondary sources are available in English from which to 
access their rules on changed circumstances, and also because they are leaders in 
this field.  Both Germany and the Netherlands have recently codified their existing 
rules on changed circumstances in contract law, the former in 2002 and the latter in 
1992.  This means that the codifications of both countries now reflect the latest 
developments in hardship jurisprudence.   
 
The history of recognition of the hardship problem predates the relatively recent 
inclusion of provisions on hardship in both countries, however.  Adopting the stance 
that good faith could not countenance the injustice which resulted from a change in 
circumstances, both had adopted judge-made law in advance of the ultimate 
legislative enactments to address this problem.  Historic factors are thus also 
relevant to the study of law in this area, since they explain the need for the 
developments which took place.  The twentieth century history of Germany in 
particular will be examined here. 
 
What follows is thus not only an account of the gradual development of doctrines to 
deal with changed circumstances in two countries, but also an attempt to show the 
ways in which such a doctrine can be indigenously created by use of the good faith 
concept.    
 
 
                                               
1 For a very brief comparative survey see: Ole Lando & Hugh Beale Principles of European Contract 
Law – Parts I & II (2000) at 327 – 328. 
135 
 
5.2 German Law 
 
German contract law provides an essential case study for an examination of change 
of circumstances doctrine.  The German doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage 
(collapse of the underlying basis of the transaction) has been developed by 
academics and applied by the courts to address a gap in the law with regard to the 
regulation of contracts affected by a change of circumstances.  Since the 
promulgation of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“BGB”) in 1900, Germany has lost two 
World Wars, which has had wide-ranging consequences, both economically and 
socially, for its nation.  Thus while the BGB initially did not recognise change of 
circumstances doctrine, the drastic upheavals which Germany has faced since it 
came into being have necessitated the development of such a doctrine.   
 
5.2.1 The present position under § 313 BGB 
Today the law developed under the banner of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage has 
finally been incorporated into the BGB as § 313 Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage 
(interference with the basis of the transaction2).  This change, effected in 2002 
during a major reform of the German civil code, aims to capture the uncodified law of 
Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage applied in practice in a statutory provision.3  
 
The heading of the new § 313  has been broadened to “Störung der 
Geschäftsgrundlage”, no doubt to more accurately reflect the wide variety of cases to 
which this provision may be applied.  The section reads as follows: 
“§ 313 Interference with the basis of the transaction 
(1) If circumstances which became the basis of a contract have significantly changed since the 
contract was entered into and if the parties would not have entered into the contract or would 
have entered into it with different contents if they had foreseen this change, adaptation of the 
contract may be demanded to the extent that, taking account of all the circumstances of the 
                                               
2 This translation is taken from the Bundesministerium der Justiz website available at  
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb (last accessed 5 February 2010). 
3 Basil S Markesinis, Hannes Unberath & Angus Johnston The German Law of Contract (2006) at 
324.  For a general discussion of the impact of the 2002 revision of the BGB on the German law of 
contract, see Peter Schlechtriem “The German Act to modernize the law of obligations in the context 
of common principles and structures of the law of obligations in Europe” (2002) Oxford U Comparative 




specific case, in particular the contractual or statutory distribution of risk, one of the parties 
cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the contract without alteration. 
(2) It is equivalent to a change of circumstances if material conceptions that have become the 
basis of the contract are found to be incorrect. 
(3) If adaptation of the contract is not possible or one party cannot reasonably be expected to 
accept it, the disadvantaged party may withdraw from the contract. In the case of continuing 
obligations, the right to terminate takes the place of the right to withdraw.”4   
 
A distinction is thus drawn between objective and subjective foundations of 
contracts.5  § 313(1) refers to an objective foundation of a contract (“circumstances 
upon which a contract was based”).  Should there be a change in this objective 
foundation, the contract must be adjusted.  The wording of the subsection, which 
indicates that a change of circumstances will be sufficiently fundamental to invoke 
adjustment if the parties would not have promised had they foreseen the change, 
harks back directly to the formula used by many authors who dealt with the clausula 
rebus sic stantibus.6  The fact that actual judicial adjustment of the contract itself is 
permitted is a defining characteristic of German law in this regard.  The international 
recognition of the value of this power is reflected in the incorporation of a similar 
power into the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and the Unidroit 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC).7  In both these sets of 
principles adjustment is similarly allowed of a contract struck by an unforeseen 
change of circumstances which was not within the sphere of risk adopted by either 
party.  
 
§ 313(2) sets out the subjective foundation of a contract: the “material conceptions 
that have become the basis of the contract”.  The subsection does not spell this out, 
but presumably the “material conceptions” have to be commonly held by both 
parties, which would be described as a “common assumption” or a “supposition” in 
South African law.8  The alternative would be to make a unilateral motive the ground 
                                               
4 Translation taken from the website for the Bundesministerium der Justiz: www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb. 
5 See the discussion by Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 324 – 325. 
6 See chapter 3. 
7 Art 6:111 PECL and Art 6.2.2 – 6.2.3 Unidroit PICC.  See Schlechtriem op cit note 3 text attached to 
note 49.   
8 Cf Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 325.  See also Anne Janzen “Unforeseen circumstances and the 
balance of contract: A comparison of the approach to hardship in the Unidroit Principles and the 
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for terminating a contract, a position for which Windscheid, the nineteenth century 
German pandectist, had been criticised.9   
 
§ 313(3) provides for termination of a contract where imposing adjustment would be 
unreasonable.  This sub-section makes clear that adjustment is the default solution 
to a contract struck by a fundamental change of circumstances: termination is an 
exceptional remedy only.  
 
§ 313(1) makes it clear that the “contractual or statutory allocation of risk” is a central 
feature in the application of this provision.  According to Markesinis et al this 
allocation of risk is determined first from the terms of the contract itself, then from the 
general principles of contract law.10  The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda remains 
highly important and a contract will only be adjusted or discharged where it is 
intolerable (unzumutbar) to expect performance following a change of 
circumstances.11  There are three main groups of cases, to which the doctrine 
described in § 313 has been held to apply.   Markesinis et al describe these as “an 
imbalance between performance and counter-performance, the frustration of the 
purpose of the contract and common mistake.”12 
 
The modern doctrine of Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage has only existed in codified 
form since 2002, as has been seen.  The genesis of the doctrine from a historical 
perspective needs to be examined to understand the full import of its provisions.  
The earlier history of change of circumstance doctrine in Germany was set out in 
chapter three.  This chapter will pick up the historical development of this doctrine 
from the time of the promulgation of the BGB and trace it through to its arrival in 
developed form after the Second World War.  The chapter will conclude with an 
examination of the various classes of cases dealt with under the modern doctrine of 
                                                                                                                                                  
German law of obligations” 2006 Journal of Contract Law 156 at 167.  Janzen notes that a major 
difference between the Unidroit PICC’s approach to hardship and that of German law is that the PICC 
require a change in circumstances, but in German law relief may be available where the foundation 
itself is faulty due to a failed common assumption.  On the supposition in South African law see 
chapter 2 above. 
9 See chapter 3. 





Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage and attempt, in sum, to pin down a theoretical basis 
for the doctrine. 
 
5.2.2 The original position after promulgation of the BGB 
Any history of the doctrine of Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage should, for the sake of 
completeness, begin with the clausula rebus sic stantibus of medieval Europe.  For a 
historical description of the rise and fall of this doctrine, the reader is referred to the 
preceding chapter three of this work.  It will be recalled that despite being included in 
the early codifications of Bavaria (1756) and Prussia (1794), the clausula doctrine 
was not included in the ultimate text of unified Germany’s BGB (1900).  This was 
notwithstanding the influence of Windscheid, who was involved in the initial drafting 
commission of that code, and who was famous for his own doctrine of the tacit 
presupposition (Voraussetzung), which dealt with the effect of changed 
circumstances on contracts.    
 
Originally change of circumstances was thus not dealt with in the provisions on 
contract in the BGB.  The code made provision for impossibility of performance to 
terminate a contract under § 275, while illegality and legal impossibility were covered 
by § 134.13  At the time of promulgation, § 275 contained no definition of what was 
intended by the term “impossibility”.  The issue was clouded further by the enigmatic 
§ 275(2) which provided that the “inability” of the debtor to perform after the creation 
of the obligation was equivalent to impossibility, seemingly to include subjective 
impossibility along with the objective impossibility of § 275(1).   
 
The BGB had been promulgated in a time of peace, however.  World War I brought 
upheaval to the German economy, with dire inflationary consequences.  The 
suspension of commercial relations with enemy powers was reflected in the 
interruptions suffered by many contracting parties.  All this led to litigation by parties 
seeking discharge from their contracts.  The Reichsgericht responded by expanding 
                                               
13 Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 323. 
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the definition of impossibility to include “economic” impossibility: performance need 
not be strictly speaking impossible, but only economically impracticable.14   
 
This shift did not occur immediately, however.  In a case which arose before the war, 
the debtor had promised delivery of a quantity of flour, of a kind produced only at his 
mill.  Before delivery could occur, the mill was destroyed by fire.  Shortly before the 
fire, however, 2000 tons of this particular type of flour was sent from the mill to 
another customer.  The Reichsgericht held that the contract was not terminated due 
to impossibility since there was 2000 tons of flour in existence somewhere: the 
debtor should buy back this produce to supply the creditor!15 
 
The Reichsgericht continued to stick to this position following the outbreak of World 
War One.  In one case a debtor had undertaken to supply tin at a fixed price 
between August and December 1914.  The outbreak of war, however, saw an 
increase in the price of tin by 200 to 300 per cent.  After honouring the contract in the 
first two months, the debtor repudiated his obligation due to the increases in cost.  
The creditor was forced to buy tin from other suppliers at a higher price and claimed 
damages.  The Court found for the creditor, despite the debtor’s contentions for an 
expanded concept of impossibility and an appeal to the good faith provision (§ 
242).16 
 
As the war progressed, however, the Courts became more willing to release debtors 
from contracts struck by economic impossibility.  A case where a party had 
undertaken to deliver bark from Madagascar to Hamburg by ship was interrupted by 
hostilities between France and Germany.  The Reichsgericht held that should the 
debtor have to wait until after the war to perform his obligation, it would be something 
                                               
14 See John P Dawson “Effects of inflation on private contracts: Germany, 1914 – 1924” 33 Michigan 
L Rev 171 (1934 – 1935) 178 – 190 for cases to this effect.  It should be noted at this point that the 
2002 amendment of § 275 reflects this development with the inclusion in the new § 275(2) of a ground 
of withdrawal for “impossibility” where the expense of performance by the debtor is out of all 
proportion to the expected benefit to the creditor.  The subsection also invokes an application of the 
principle of good faith in this regard.   
15 RGZ 57, 116 as cited by Dawson op cit note 14 at 181. 
16 RGZ 88, 172 as cited by Dawson op cit note 14 at 180.  For an earlier WWI case in which 
discharge was similarly disallowed see RGZ 86, 397 (decided  in 1915). 
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significantly different from what he had initially undertaken.  The contract was thus 
discharged.17 
 
Following the end of World War One the inflation rate in Germany continued to climb.  
A new defence to a claim for performance was instituted by the Reichsgericht: a 
debtor would be released from an obligation where insistence on the performance 
thereof would result in his economic ruin.  Thus in a case involving the sole 
distributor of Opel motor cars for Southern Germany, a seller which had entered into 
a large number of contracts for the sale of motor cars at the February 1919 prices 
was discharged in April 1919 from the obligation to deliver these vehicles.  The 
reason for this was that due to the rapid rise in car prices, performance at the fixed 
price would have led to its economic ruin.18  This decision was criticised for 
distinguishing between debtors based on their economic means, however, and was 
abandoned by the Reichsgericht at the end of 1921.19 
 
None of these judicial expansions of the Code were to equip the Courts to deal with 
the drastic inflation which was to follow, however.  German theorists turned to the 
task of addressing disparities between performance and counter-performance which 
were constantly arising from inflation.  In particular the discharge of contracts for 
impossibility was seen to be an inadequate remedy: what was needed was 
adjustment of the terms.20  
 
5.2.3 The 1920s 
Defeat in World War One had dire consequences for Germany.  Not only was its 
economy already afflicted, following four years of war, but the victors demanded 
huge economic reparations.  As a guarantee of payment, France occupied the Ruhr, 
Germany’s major industrial area.  The result was a downward spiral by Germany’s 
economy: inflation became more and more rampant as time progressed.  Markesinis 
et al describe this descent into hyper-inflation as follows: 
                                               
17 RGZ 88, 71 as cited in Dawson op cit note 14 at 182.  See also RGZ 90, 102 and the discussion in 
Dawson op cit note 14 at 181 – 182. 
18 RGZ 100, 134 as cited in Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 327. 
19 RGZ 103, 177 as cited in Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 328. 
20 Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 328. 
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 “[I]n Germany, at the beginning of the First World War, one gold mark had an internal 
purchasing power of RM1.05.  By the end of the war, the figure was RM2.62 (somewhat 
higher than the rise that occurred in the US but lower than that found in France); and it had 
risen to 36.7 RM by 1922.  But one year later – 1923 – the rise became steep: 2,785 RM had 
the purchasing power of 1 RM of 1914.  Then in May of that year prices literally went berserk, 
so that by the end of that year the mark had a trillionth of its 1914 value (1,200,400,000,000 
RM equalled one 1914 RM).”21 
 
Naturally this hyper-inflation had a profound effect on reciprocal contracts involving a 
payment of money.  In many cases the balance between performance and counter-
performance was upset and there was a need to revise such contracts.  Legal 
theorists thus began to suggest new ways in which the crisis could be addressed.  
One writer, Krückmann, writing as early as 1918, suggested a reintroduction of the 
medieval concept of the clausula rebus sic stantibus.22  Certain court decisions 
indeed accepted the clausula doctrine as one of the reasons for their decision, but 
the doctrine was never fully revived.23  In the end the courts seized on the solution 
proferred by Oertmann with his doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage.24   
 
Oertmann’s theory provided that the basis of the transaction was the “assumption 
made by one party, which has become obvious to and acquiesced in by the other,” 
that certain circumstances, important to both parties, are extant or will come about, 
even though such an assumption was not an express term of the contract.25  
Oertmann’s theory was different from that of his father-in-law, Windscheid, in that the 
assumption could not merely have been privately entertained by one party, but must 
have been manifested to the other party and acquiesced in by him.26  The major 
innovation of Oertmann’s approach was to shift from subjective inquiry into the 
motives of a contracting party to the manifested effects on the transaction itself of the 
                                               
21 Ibid 329. 
22 John P Dawson “Judicial revision of contracts: Germany” (1983) 63 Boston U Law Rev 1039 at 
1045. 
23 Ibid.  Dawson cites RGZ 100, 129 (1920) as an example of such a case. 
24 This doctrine appeared in a publication titled “Die Geschäftsgrundlage – Ein neuer Rechtsbegriff” 
(The basis of the transaction – a new legal concept) (1921).  See Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 322; 
Werner Lorenz “Contract modification as a result of changed circumstances” in Jack Beatson and 
Daniel Friedmann (eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) 369. 
25 Oertmann op cit note 24 at 37.  Cited in Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 322. 
26 Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 322. 
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change in circumstances.27  Whether performance could be enforced was to be 
evaluated against a standard of good faith, as set out in § 242 of the BGB.28  
 
The Reichsgericht adopted Oertmann’s theory as the basis of a decision soon after 
in 1922.29  In that case a partner in an enterprise had concluded a complicated 
agreement with a party external to the partnership.  The contract envisaged a fixed 
price for the purchase of the real property of the partnership upon dissolution thereof.  
The price agreed upon reflected the market value of that property at the time of 
agreement.  Dissolution of the partnership was delayed, however: by the time the 
partner was ready to transfer ownership of the real property, its value had increased 
markedly due to inflation.  The defendant partner refused to honour his obligation.  
The Reichsgericht held that a change in the value of money could undermine “the 
foundations of the transaction” (the Court referred to Oertmann as the origin of this 
concept).  Since the equivalence of performance and counter-performance had been 
shattered, the Court refused to enforce the contract.  Rather it was referred back to 
the lower court to investigate whether the price should be adjusted.  Only if the 
plaintiff was not prepared to accept the revised price should rescission occur.30  This 
decision proved the starting point for a long line of cases which cited a disturbance in 
the foundations of the contract as the basis for their decision.31 
 
The disruption of the equivalence between performance and counter-performance 
due to inflation was reflected in the refusal of many creditors to accept the paper 
money which the government kept printing.  The problem for cases dealing with the 
value of the paper Reichsmarks, however, was that legislation had in 1909 declared 
this paper money to be a legal medium of payment.32  By the end of 1923, however, 
these paper notes were fast becoming worthless due to inflation.  In order for the 
German courts to intervene and restore equality of exchange to contractual 
                                               
27 Dawson op cit note 22 at 1046. 
28 § 242 reads as follows: “An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good 
faith, taking customary practice into consideration.”  Translation found at the website for the 
Bundesministerium der Justiz: www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb. 
29 RGZ 103, 328 as cited in Dawson op cit note 14 at 193. 
30 See Dawson op cit note 14 at 193 – 194; Lorenz op cit note 24 at 370. 
31 For a discussion of further cases see Dawson op cit note 14 at 193 – 201.  See for further 
authorities Dawson op cit note 22 at 1046n19. 
32 Dawson op cit note 22 at 1048. 
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relationships, this legislation would have to be invalidated.  In a decision handed 
down in November 1923, the Reichsgericht did just that.33  The case involved a loan 
of money secured by a mortgage bond.  The loan had originally been granted in 
1913 and was due to be repaid in 1920.  The debtor did indeed tender performance 
in 1920, but in paper marks, which inflation had rendered of little value.  The creditor 
refused to accept performance.  The Court upheld the creditor’s refusal: he was not 
bound to accept the paper Reichsmarks at the value printed on their face.  This 
decision was based on good faith: it would not be in good faith to settle a debt using 
worthless money.  The earlier legislation was in conflict with § 242 and was hence 
invalid.34 
 
This decision was confirmed by the legislature a little while after.  On 15 July 1925, 
the Law of Revalorization (Aufwertungsgesetz) came into effect.35  The effect of this 
law was to prescribe specific rates at which certain classes of debt could be repaid.  
Thus mortgages secured by land could be extinguished by a payment of 25 per cent 
of the original loan in gold marks.  For negotiable bonds the rate was 15 per cent.36  
Debts which did not fall into one of the categories listed in the Act were not 
revalorized, rather these were left to be dealt with under the “general provisions of 
the law”.37  Dawson suggests that these more idiosyncratic forms of debt would have 
required “individualized solutions” and hence their omission by the legislature.38 
 
The measures introduced by the courts and the legislature proved largely successful 
in Germany.  The currency had been stabilised from 1924 onwards by the actions of 
the government and most of the country’s problems resulting from the war had been 
solved.  Indeed the country seemed to be well on its way to recovery.  Even the legal 
disputes arising from changed circumstances had been solved by the new doctrine 
invented by the courts and members of the legal fraternity.39    This legal doctrine 
                                               
33 RGZ 107, 78 as cited in Dawson op cit note 14 at 205. 
34 Dawson op cit note 22 at 1049. 
35 This law replaced temporary legislation dealing with revalorization, which had been passed on 14 
February 1924.  Dawson op cit note 22 at 1050n26.  Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 330. 
36 Revalorization Act 1925, §§ 10 and 63 listed most of the types of transaction for which repayment 
would be revalorized.  Dawson op cit note 22 at 1051n28.  Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 330 – 331. 
37 Revalorization Act 1925, § 62. 
38 Dawson op cit note 22 at 1051. 
39 Ibid 1070. 
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developed during this period as a response to the upheaval of changed 
circumstances was to prove a useful creation and the concomitant process of 
adjustment of contracts was by then entrenched. 
 
5.2.4 World War II and its aftermath 
The Wall Street Crash in 1929 threw the Western World into a depression which was 
to last into the early 1930s.  In Germany this depression was felt particularly 
severely.40  The effect on contractual obligations was the converse of that 
experienced during the hyper-inflation of the 1920s: whereas before performance 
had been made easier due to the fact that money was worth less, during the 
depression economic hardship due to a shortage of money meant performance 
became more difficult.  In 1931 the British currency was taken off the gold standard 
and allowed to sway with the market and then in 1933 the US currency was 
devalued.  The resultant fall in the value of both currencies led, in Germany, to a call 
for adjustment of contract prices based on these foreign measures.  Although the 
plaintiffs argued in these cases that the value of these foreign currencies was the 
foundation of their transactions, no decisive action was taken by the Reichsgericht.41  
Indeed in several cases relief was not allowed on the grounds that the devaluation 
had been foreseeable.42 
 
The depression of the early 1930s made conditions rife for the rise of National 
Socialism in Germany from 1933 and the totalitarian state which emerged under the 
Nazis was largely to blame for World War Two.43  The effect of Nazi policies on the 
doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage was that the courts were now forced to 
apply it according to the prevailing ideology.44  This meant that the doctrine was used 
during the 1930s to dissolve contracts, particularly the pension agreements of Jews 
and other victims of Nazi discrimination.45  The Nazi government passed “contract 
assistance” legislation in November 1939 which conferred wide powers on tribunals 
                                               
40 Ibid. 
41 See the cases discussed by Dawson op cit note 22 at 1071 – 1073.  
42 Ibid at 1072. 
43 Ibid at 1070. 
44 Ibid at 1070.  EJ Cohn “Frustration of Contract in German Law” (1946) 28 Journal of Comparative 




tasked with resolving contractual disputes.46  These tribunals applied the “law” 
according to largely undefined standards, although the procedure was said to be 
governed by good faith (§ 242).47  
 
Following the war, the German civilian leadership, which replaced Hitler and the 
Nazis, sought to stabilise the economy and to undo the efforts of the former leaders.  
In June 1948 a new currency was introduced, into which the old currency could be 
converted at the rate of ten to one.  The reason for this decision was that distrust of 
the old currency had set in, due to its association with the defeated former 
government.48  At the same time the wage and price controls, which were still in 
force, were abandoned.  Both measures proved successful.49  In May 1949 a new 
West German Constitution was passed, which provided for a new High Court, the 
Bundesgerichtshof, to replace the Reichsgericht.  The result of all these measures 
was a new Germany which soon returned to the position of being one of the world’s 
leading economies.        
 
The positive economic results following the end of the war did not mean that it was 
without negative consequences, however.  There had been widespread destruction 
during the war and many people were rendered refugees.  The problem of changed 
circumstances persisted.  The new government passed the Vertragshilfegesetz in 
March 1952 to deal with contracts concluded before the monetary reform in 1948.  
Under this legislation, a court could declare that complete performance by a debtor 
was unjust, given the circumstances of both parties, and hence revise the 
obligation.50 
 
The rise and fall of Nazi Germany thus proved to be yet another upheaval in the 
twentieth century history of that country.  Again special measures were needed to 
deal with the effects of that upheaval on contracts.  The doctrine of judicial revision 
of frustrated contracts was firmly entrenched in Germany by the beginning of World 
War Two; the subsequent dislocation of contracts served merely to reinforce it.  The 
                                               
46 Vertragshilfeverordnung 1939.  See Dawson op cit note 22 at 1076; Cohn op cit note 44 at 24. 
47 Dawson op cit note 22 at 1076. 
48 Ibid 1077. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Lorenz op cit note 24 at 373. 
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history of Germany’s contract law remains written in its provisions, however.  As 
Cohn noted in 1946: “[i]t is a truism that the fate of a nation is mirrored in its law.”51  
Today change of circumstances doctrine has been codified in § 313 Störung der 
Geschäftsgrundlage, as we have seen.  What remains is to examine specific 
theoretical issues in the implementation of the doctrine, to facilitate comparison with 
other jurisdictions. 
 
5.2.5 Specific issues in the application of the doctrine 
 
5.2.5.1 Adjustment of contracts 
As has been shown, adjustment was by no means the solution to changed 
circumstances from the outset in Germany.  The starting point was rather that pure 
impossibility would terminate a contract.  This was then stretched during the period 
of economic impossibility around the time of World War One when the courts 
experimented with the definition of “impossibility” in § 275.  The early 1920s saw the 
introduction of Oertmann’s theory and the courts began to address inflationary 
problems on the basis that the “foundation” of the transaction had disappeared.  In 
the eventual move toward revalorization, this ultimately saw the courts revising 
monetary obligations, an approach which was confirmed by the legislature in the 
1925 Law of Revalorization.  It should be noted, however, that the judicial adjustment 
of contracts was not a measure advocated by Oertmann in his treatise on 
Geschäftsgrundlage.  Indeed he thought it “nothing less than unthinkable” that a 
court should revise a party’s obligations under a contract – he preferred the all or 
nothing approach of discharge for collapse of the foundation of the contract.52   
 
This proves that the process of judicial revision of contracts struck by changed 
circumstances – so entrenched in German law today – has become law by judicial 
precedent.  One case in particular since World War Two indicates the tenacity with 
which the German courts have clung to this approach.  This case, commonly 
referred to as “the Volkswagen case” was decided in October 1951 by the newly 
                                               
51 Cohn op cit note 44 at 15. 
52 Oertmann op cit note 24 at 168 – 170, cited in Dawson op cit note 22 at 1052. 
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created Bundesgerichtshof.53  The case concerned a scheme, set up under the Nazi 
government, whereby buyers could save for the purchase of a Volkswagen motor 
car.  These prospective buyers would purchase stamps to be pasted into a savings 
book and when the requisite number of stamps had been acquired, the book could 
be exchanged for a motor car.  The administrator of the scheme was the German 
Labour Front (DAF), a Nazi institution which represented workers as a replacement 
for trade unions.  The DAF had deposited the money, obtained from 336 000 
purchasers and amounting to 268 million marks, in a Berlin bank account.  The 
plaintiffs in the Volkswagen case were two such buyers, who had made payments to 
the DAF in 1938 and 1939 before the outbreak of World War Two. 
 
The problem was that the war had intervened in the purchasing process: the 
Volkswagen factory had been turned to war purposes from the start of World War 
Two and had then been bombed by the Allies.  The money which had been 
deposited in Berlin had been seized by the Russians when they entered that city.  In 
addition, 13 years had passed between the plaintiff’s claim and the initial payment, 
during which time the price of a Volkswagen motor car had risen from 990 marks to 4 
400 marks.  Rather than simply discharge Volkswagen of liability, however, the 
Bundesgerichtshof stressed the concept of pacta sunt servanda.  The Court 
reiterated that it had the power to adjust contracts under § 242.  Instead of simply 
ruling for the plaintiffs, the Court (no doubt mindful of the vast number of other 
potential claimants) referred the matter back to the lower court.  The trial judge was 
given the task of determining which of the 336 000 other purchasers were still 
interested in obtaining a Volkswagen, along with a host of other related questions. 
 
This enormous burden placed on the trial judge prompted the American 
commentator, Dawson, to ask the “basic” question: “why should such a monumental, 
unmanageable task be undertaken at all?”54  Dawson notes in his criticism of this 
case that revision of contracts has become so entrenched in the German system that 
                                               
53 BGH JZ 1952, 145 as cited in Dawson op cit note 22 at 1086. 
54 Dawson op cit note 22 at 1086. 
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even this type of finding elicits only minimal German criticism.55  In comparison with 
his own legal system Dawson concludes: 
 “It is on such grounds [difficulty of compliance] that in Anglo-American law, courts empowered 
to give equitable relief can deny it, especially specific performance of contract; it would be on 
such grounds that most of the specific relief that the high court approved in the Volkswagen 
case surely would have been denied by an American court.  But one would have to look far to 
find a German case (I have found none) in which the difficulties, uncertainties or costs of 
manufacturing new terms for frustrated contracts are mentioned as reasons for refusing to 
undertake the task.”56     
 
5.2.5.2 Frustration of purpose  
“Frustration of purpose” is a concept employed by the English courts to refer to the 
position where a motive for entering into a contract is known to both parties and 
forms the basis of their transaction.  In English law it has been held that should such 
a commonly held purpose disappear, contractual performance is discharged.57  
Markesinis et al note that analogous situations in German law where the contractual 
purpose has disappeared lead to judicial revision of the contract under the doctrine 
of Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage.58  These authors base their discussion on 
certain German cases, two of which will be discussed below.59 
 
In the “pneumatic drill case” (Bohrhammerfall) the defendant who was engaged in 
business in West Berlin ordered 600 pneumatic drills.60  It was known to both parties 
that these drills were to be used in mines in East Germany.  The plaintiff had already 
accepted the offer and begun work on producing these drills, when the Berlin 
blockade intervened, making delivery of the drills to East Germany impossible.  The 
defendant then tried to resile from the contract on the grounds that he could no 
longer dispose of the drills in the intended manner.  In addition he would have had 
difficulty in disposing of these drills in West Germany as well, since they were of an 
outdated model.  The plaintiff sued for the contract price.  The Bundesgerichtshof 
held that the assumption that these drills would be resold in the East had been the 
                                               
55 Ibid 1086 – 1087. 
56 Ibid 1088. 
57 Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740.  See chapter 4 for a discussion of this case. 
58 Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 342 – 346. 
59 Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 343 also refer to the discussion of the similarity between these 
cases and Krell v Henry in Larenz Schuldrecht 14th ed (1987) at § 21 II 1. 
60 BGH MDR 1953, 282 as cited in Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 343. 
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basis of the transaction for both parties and hence the agreement fell to be revised 
under § 242.  The Court held the defendant liable to pay for the drills already 
produced, but discharged its liability for those which had not yet been made. 
 
Lorenz cites this case as an example illustrating the point that: “[a] critical review of 
the large number of pertinent cases decided by German courts after 1945 permits 
the generalization that, at least at the beginning, there was some inclination to make 
a rather liberal use of Oertmann’s theory of the Geschäftsgrundlage.”61  He goes on 
to illustrate that in more recent times the courts have shifted to an approach which 
focuses more closely on the allocation of risk between the parties.62  This is also the 
view of Zweigert and Kötz63 and Markesinis et al echo this argument in their 
discussion of frustration of purpose.64  
 
A more recent revision for frustration of purpose occurred in a case decided by the 
Bundesgerichtshof in 1984.65  The plaintiff, situated in Iran, put in an order for a 
consignment of German beer.  This beer arrived in a damaged state.  In settlement 
with the defendant supplier it was agreed that the plaintiff would receive his next 
order of beer at two thirds of the original price per case and that he would receive a 
discount of DM 20 000 when he placed his next order.  The settlement agreement 
thus rested on the assumption that future orders of beer would be possible.  When 
the Islamic fundamentalist regime took over in Iran in January 1979, all future orders 
of beer became impossible.  The plaintiff failed to reach a compromise with the 
defendant following this change of circumstances and sued for the full loss which he 
had sustained as a result of the original damaged shipment.   
 
The Bundesgerichtshof held that since the frustrated contract was not the original 
sale agreement, but the subsequent settlement agreement, the usual rules 
governing the passing of risk in sale contracts did not apply and revision had to take 
place.  There was nothing in the settlement agreement which indicated that the risk 
of non-fulfilment was to be borne by the plaintiff alone.  The Court ordered the 
                                               
61 Lorenz op cit note 24 at 373. 
62 Ibid 374, citing BGH JZ 1978, 235. 
63 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law (1998) at 522. 
64 Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 344 – 346. 
65 BGH NJW 1984, 1746 as cited in Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 344. 
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defendant to pay half the profit which the plaintiff would have made had the 
settlement agreement been acted upon. 
 
Markesinis et al note the shift in the approach of the Court evident in this decision: 
 “This case … represents a good example of a decision applying the more legalistic approach 
which currently prevails among German courts.  This … pays more attention to the allocation 
of risk which the contract and the surrounding circumstances dictate than to the vaguer, 
equitable grounds which figured so prominently in the earlier case law.”66  
 
5.2.5.3 Common mistake  
“Common mistake” is another legal concept which falls to be dealt with under 
Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage.  Common mistake refers to the situation where 
both parties to a contract labour under the same misapprehension as to the facts on 
which the contract is based.  In English law for example, the test for discharge due to 
common mistake is whether the mistake is sufficiently fundamental.67  The mistake 
must thus exist in the minds of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract.  A distinction is drawn between frustration and common mistake in the 
English jurisdiction as follows: if a change in circumstances occurs which alters the 
facts on which a contract is based before the contract is entered into, a common 
mistake will result; frustration occurs where a change in circumstances occurs after 
the conclusion of the contract and radically changes the nature of the obligation.68   
 
The BGB makes provision for rescission of a contract for unilateral error under § 
119.  The common mistake type scenario does not fall under this section, however, 
and hence must be dealt with under § 313.  For an example of a German case 
dealing with this problem, consider the dispute concerning the transfer of a 
professional football player from one club to another, decided in 1976.69  This player 
had, unbeknown to both clubs involved, accepted a bribe to lose a game before the 
time of transfer.  This type of dishonesty on the part of a player was fundamental to 
the transaction, since it rendered him “worthless” to the transferee club, undermining 
                                               
66 Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 344 – 345.   
67 See chapter 4.  In South African law a common mistake discharges a contract if the mistake meets 
the test of materiality: see chapter 2. 
68 See chapter 4 for a fuller discussion. 
69 BGH NJW 1976, 565 as cited by Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 347. 
151 
 
the assumption on which he had been purchased.  The Bundesgerichtshof held that  
the actions of the player had made him “worthless” to both clubs, and upset the 
fundamental basis of the transaction.  The case thus invited discharge under the 
doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage.  Due to the circumstances of the case, 
revision of the contract was not possible and hence the agreement was discharged 
and the return of the transfer fee was ordered.  
 
5.2.5.4 Theoretical basis 
For comparative purposes, it is necessary finally to discuss the theoretical basis 
which underpins the doctrine of Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage.  It seems obvious 
to state that the theory behind § 313 is Oertmann’s conception of the “foundation of 
the contract” which necessitates judicial intervention when it is undermined.  This 
theory in turn is said to rest on the more fundamental notion of good faith, as 
encapsulated in § 242.  Lorenz is critical of such an invocation of Oertmann, 
however: 
“Oertmann’s theory has become famous because the Supreme Court adopted it and cited it in 
numerous leading cases.  However, a perusal of these cases leaves the reader with the 
impression that these citations are mere ornaments.  It thus appears that the decisions in cases 
where performance has unexpectedly been rendered more onerous for one of the parties depend 
very much on their own particular facts.  Moreover, the weight to be attached to such supervening 
events is not the same in all types of contract.  The allocation of risk inherent in each type of 
contract seems to be the most important element in these crucial cases, turning on the ‘collapse 
of the underlying basis of the transaction’.”70 
 
If Lorenz is to be believed, the approach of the courts is rather then to attempt to 
interpret the contract, while considering the surrounding circumstances to determine 
what is the predetermined (or proper) allocation of risk between the parties.  Having 
determined this, the court may then revise the contract in accordance with the 
dictates of good faith.  Lorenz defends his position with the following (fairly recent) 
case, which he argues illustrates the return of the Bundesgerichtshof from the liberal 
use of Geschäftsgrundlage theory to a more conservative, pacta sunt servanda 
approach.71 
 
                                               
70 Lorenz op cit note 24 at 370.  See also Zweigert & Kötz op cit note 63 at 522 & 524. 
71 Ibid 373 – 374. 
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This 1978 decision of the Bundesgerichtshof concerned a contract to supply oil.72  In 
1972 an oil importer agreed to supply the plaintiff with oil at a fixed price.  At the time 
of conclusion of the agreement, the market price of oil was DM 100 per ton.  
Following the Yom Kippur war in 1973, the market price of oil reached DM 600 per 
ton.  Given the rise in prices the supplier refused to provide any more oil to the 
plaintiff unless the price was adjusted.  The plaintiff was forced to obtain oil at a 
higher price from a different source and claimed the difference from the defendant 
supplier.  In its decision the court restated the principle that performance and 
counter-performance should be of comparable value, but it went on to state that the 
contract and its surrounding circumstances might indicate an implied assumption of 
risk by one party.  The court held that the inclusion of a fixed price in the agreement 
was indicative of an intention to assume the risk of price fluctuations and hence the 
defendant supplier was liable to compensate the plaintiff for its losses.  In reaching 
its decision the Court noted that the principle of pacta sunt servanda was of 
paramount importance and that the defence of collapse of the underlying basis of the 
transaction could only be invoked where it was “indispensable for avoiding 
intolerable results, irreconcilable with law and justice.”73  
 
This statement by the Bundesgerichtshof seems to lead us back to the principle of 
good faith, the original starting point for intervention.  Whether intervention occurs in 
the manner set out by Oertmann, or in order to give effect to a preconceived 
allocation of risk, the basis for that intervention remains good faith.  The ultimate 
manner in which intervention occurs seems largely to be left to the discretion of the 
courts, as reflected in the permissive wording of § 313 and the open-ended way in 
which the role of the judge in applying the BGB is conceived in the German legal 
system. 
 
5.2.6 Conclusion on German law 
This account of the doctrine of Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage may appear to the 
reader to be somewhat historical in its focus.  This type of approach appears to be 
necessary, however.  The doctrine has developed due to the catastrophic events 
                                               
72 BGH JZ 1978, 235 as cited in Lorenz op cit note 24 at 374. 
73 Markesinis et al op cit note 3 at 345. 
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which struck Germany in the first half of the twentieth century.  In addition the 
doctrine retains a connection to the earlier medieval concept of clausula rebus sic 
stantibus by means of the wording used in § 313.  This connection does not mean 
that the two doctrines are equivalent in their application and effects, but rather shows 
that a concern for fair dealing in contract, based on the acknowledgement that 
circumstances do change, is a necessary feature of any legal system.   
 
The specific features of the German approach have been outlined above.  Perhaps 
the most notable of these is that rather than discharge, the typical remedy for 
changed circumstances is judicial adjustment of the contractual obligation.  The 
proven success of this approach is mirrored in its adoption in the general European 
principles of contract law, the PECL, and the Unidroit PICC.74   
 
While viewed in comparison with foreign jurisdictions the doctrine of Störung der 
Geschäftsgrundlage may appear permissive, the recent trends in the relevant 
German case law seems to be toward stressing the concept of pacta sunt 
servanda.75   Loose invocations of § 313 to deal with just any change in 
circumstances are avoided.  The modern approach, which focuses on the allocation 
of risks between the parties seems to be a feature of a mature legal doctrine.  The 
good sense behind such a development cannot be doubted, particularly since it 
balances contractual certainty with considerations of equity, while allowing the 
doctrine of good faith to play an informing role in German contract law. 
 
5.3 Dutch law 
 
5.3.1 Codification in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands is a typical “civil law” country in that its law was originally derived 
from the Roman law and is today encapsulated in a code.76  The first Burgerlijk 
                                               
74 See above: section 5.2.1. 
75 Hugh Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (2002) at 637 notes that “[c]ontrary to 
fears expressed, particularly by French academic writers, judicial revision in the event of 
disappearance of the contractual basis is not a threat to security of contract because the German 
courts use it conscientiously and with moderation.” 
76 Arthur S Hartkamp “Judicial discretion under the new civil code of the Netherlands” (1992) 40 
American Journal of Comparative Law 551 at 551. 
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Wetboek (“BW”) was promulgated in 1838.  This civil code was based largely (and 
often quite literally) upon the French Code Civil (or Code Napoleon) of 1804.77  By 
the mid twentieth century the BW was thus largely outdated.78  Revision was 
necessary to maintain the status of the law of the Netherlands as code-based, rather 
than resting on case decisions.  Thus in 1947 the Dutch government asked Prof 
Meijers to draft a new civil code.79  The aim of this Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek 
(“NBW”) was to incorporate existing case law into a new code.  This recodification 
took longer than expected, however, and extended long after the death of Prof 
Meijers.80  The main part of the codification, on patrimonial law, came into effect only 
in 1992.  Certain parts of this codification project remain uncompleted to this day.81  
The net result of this process is that today the Netherlands is governed by a modern 
codification, which reflects current legal trends and is part of no recognised family of 
codifications.82 
 
What this means for the present inquiry is that although, like the Code Civil, the old 
BW contained no provision on changed circumstances in contract, the subsequent 
recognition of this defence by the Courts has led to the incorporation of a hardship 
defence in the NBW. 
 
5.3.2 The problem of changed circumstances 
The old BW was promulgated early in the nineteenth century during a period of 
laissez-faire capitalist growth in Europe and as such it is not surprising that it 
stresses the concept of pacta sunt servanda.83  This principle was encapsulated in 
article 1374(1) BW, which was basically a translation of the equivalent article 1134(1) 
of the Code Civil.  As a result of increased international trade, technological 
                                               
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Martijn W Hesselink “The ideal of codification and the dynamics of Europeanisation: the Dutch 
experience” in Stefan Vogenauer and Stephen Weatherill (eds) The Harmonisation of European 
Contract Law (2006) at 39. 
80 Ibid at 40.  Prof Meijers died in 1954. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Christoph Brunner Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles (2009) at 16.  
Brunner describes (ibid) the French Code Civil of 1804 as a first generation codification, 
representative of the Romanistic legal family; the Swiss Code of Obligations of 1911 as a second 
generation codification, representative of the Germanistic legal family and the Dutch NBW as a third 
generation codification, representative of no particular legal family. 
83 HM Scholtz “Pacta sunt servanda en verandering van omstandighede na kontraksluiting” (1976) 
Responsa Meridiana 153 at 153. 
155 
 
advancements and two devastating World Wars, however, strict contractual 
autonomy and individualism began to be tempered in the twentieth century by 
competing altruist ideals.84  As a result the competing principle of good faith, 
contained in article 1374(3) came increasingly to the fore.85  This process did not 
happen immediately, however. 
 
To illustrate the need for an inference of good faith into the law on changed 
circumstances, Hartkamp posits a general situation where a contract of sale has 
been entered into, but a war intervenes before payment or delivery can take place.  
Performance can only take place years later, and rampant inflation has intervened in 
the meantime.86  In cases decided after World War I, the Hoge Raad took the 
position that even such events cannot discharge a party’s obligations.87  It appeared 
at first as if the Hoge Raad would support a new approach with good faith providing 
an independent ground for intervention in contracts,88 but in 1926 it expressly 
refused to limit the principle of pacta sunt servanda on this ground.89  Writing in 
1976, Scholtz noted that there was beginning to be evidence of a shift towards 
recognising such a good faith limitation.90  In the years preceding the promulgation of 
the NBW, the good faith defence was expressly recognised by the Hoge Raad, 
creating a far greater role for this equitable doctrine in Dutch law.91  The doctrine of 
changed circumstances likewise was recognised by the Dutch courts in the years 
preceding the promulgation of the NBW in 1992.92   
 
Under the NBW good faith (“redelijkheid en billijkheid”) is referred to in multiple 
places, especially at article 6:2 and article 6:248.93  Change of circumstances is 
likewise dealt with at article 6:258: 
                                               
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid at 156 – 157. 
86 Arthur S Hartkamp “The binding force of contract in Dutch law” in Attila Harmathy (ed) Binding 
Force of Contract (1991) at 46. 
87 Ibid. 
88 HR 9 February 1923, NJ 1923, 676.  Cited in Scholtz op cit note 83 at 157. 
89 HR 8 January 1926, NJ 1926, 203.  Scholtz op cit note 83 at 157. 
90 Ibid at 158.  Scholtz cites the following decision: HR 19 May 1967, NJ 1967, 261.  In this case the 
Hoge Raad limited the application of an exemption clause based on good faith. 
91 Hartkamp op cit note 86 at 46 – 47. 
92 Ibid at 46. 
93 Compare the discussion of good faith in chapter 7. 
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“1. Upon the demand of one of the parties, the court may modify the effects of a contract or 
it may set it aside, in whole or in part, on the basis of unforeseen circumstances of such 
a nature that the other party, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, 
may not expect the contract to be maintained in unmodified form.  The modification or 
setting aside may be given retroactive effect.    
 
2. The modification or the setting aside shall not be pronounced to the extent that it is 
common ground that the person invoking the circumstances should be accountable for 
them or if this follows from the nature of the contract. 
 
3. For the purposes of this article, a party to whom a contractual right or obligation has 
been transmitted, is treated as a contracting party.”94 
 
Article 6:258(1) thus contains the essence of the new provision on changed 
circumstances.  The threshold test for the operation of the article requires, first, that 
the change in circumstances be unforeseen.  Busch et al state that this requirement 
is not to be taken literally, but depends rather on an interpretation of the contract.95 
Second, the test requires that good faith (“reasonableness and fairness”) prevents 
the other party from relying on the contract in unmodified form.  Since a primary 
requirement of good faith in Dutch law is that parties observe the sanctity of 
contracts, this standard will not easily be met.96  There is no attempt to pin down the 
exact nature of the change in circumstances needed to invoke the provision, other 
than by means of a good faith requirement.  Perillo interprets this article as applying 
to impossibility, frustration of purpose and impracticability.97  Busch et al add that 
certain classes of common mistake will also be dealt with by this provision.  The 
example given is of a miscalculation of circumstances based on past or present facts 
upon which future facts, significant for the legal relationship, depended.98  Hartkamp 
and Tillema note that the hardship complained of need not only be of a general 
character such as war or a natural disaster, but may be of specific concern to a 
                                               
94 Hans Warendorf, Richard Thomas & Ian Curry-Sumner The Civil Code of the Netherlands (2009) 
714. 
95 Danny Busch, Harriet Schelhaas et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch 
Law (2002) at 288. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Joseph M Perillo “Force majeure and hardship under the Unidroit principles of International 
Commercial Contracts” (1997) 5 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 5 at 10. 
98 Busch et al op cit note 95 at 288. 
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particular contract alone.99  Furthermore the provision does not require that the 
unforeseen circumstances concern a basic assumption on which the contract was 
made, they may be of a secondary character, such as the time and place of 
delivery.100 
 
With regard to the powers of a court, article 6:258(1) provides that a contract may be 
modified or terminated if the test for hardship is met.  This power is also granted with 
retroactive effect.  Article 6:258(2) places an important limitation upon the operation 
of this hardship provision, however: if the contract allocates the risk of a particular 
event to a party, the courts should not upset this contractual balance.  Likewise if it is 
common opinion between the parties that the risk of the occurrence of a particular 
event should be borne by one of them, the court should not interfere in this allocation 
of risk. 
 
The provisions of article 6:258 may not be excluded by prior agreement, due to the 
operation of article 6:250.  Due to the general nature of the language used in article 
6:258 there may be some overlap with the doctrines of mistake and force majeure.  
Hartkamp and Tillema note that while in theory the distinctions between these 
doctrines should be maintained, from a practical point of view these distinctions are 
today less important within the sphere of application of article 6:258, due to the 
general possibility of discharge or modification due to changed circumstances.101   
 
5.3.3 Conclusion on Dutch law 
Dutch law provides an interesting study with regard to the problem of change in 
circumstances.  At first the courts followed the French approach to hardship, refusing 
to allow discharge.  This was understandable given the origins of the BW in the Code 
Civil.  As in Germany, however, there was a move towards recognising a defence 
based on change of circumstances under the influence of good faith doctrine.  
Although this movement took far longer to gain momentum in the Netherlands than it 
did in Germany, the end result was the same and the modern approach to changed 
circumstances is fairly similar to that of the Germans, particularly with regard to the 
                                               
99 Arthur S Hartkamp & Marianne M Tillema Contract Law in the Netherlands (1995) at 125. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid at 125 – 126. 
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threshold test and the available remedies, as the discussion of the modern article 




A comparative study of the German and Dutch law on change of circumstances 
reveals many similarities.  First, although both systems now have explicit recognition 
of such a defence in their codes, in both countries this defence had to be developed 
by the Courts due to an omission of such a provision from the initial codification.  
Both German and Dutch courts relied on the general good faith provision of their 
prior codifications as a peg on which to hang a doctrine of change of circumstances.  
Good faith thus played a creative and supplementing function in these legal systems 
in order to justify the creation of a new doctrine to fill a gap in the original code.  A 
difference between the relevant code provisions, however, is that while Dutch law 
invokes “reasonableness and fairness” directly in the threshold test for the 
application of the provision, there is no such reference in German law. 
 
Second, although today the wording of the Dutch and German provisions on 
changed circumstances is different, the effect is largely the same.  Both provisions 
cover any change of circumstances including impracticability, frustration of purpose, 
impossibility and even extend under certain circumstances to the doctrine of 
common mistake.  Again there is a difference in wording in the provisions here 
though, in that the Dutch article refers to changes in circumstances generally, 
whereas the German § 313 distinguishes objective alteration in the equilibrium of the 
contract from subjective frustration of purpose.  Both doctrines have further reach 
than the English doctrine of frustration, however.  A purposive reading of both the 
German and Dutch provisions in the context of their respective codes and case law 
would probably iron out most of the discrepancies between them, leaving the 
differences largely in the realm of semantics.   
 
In terms of powers of a court upon a finding that circumstances have changed, both 
permit variation or discharge of a contract, which may be ordered with retroactive 
effect.  It will be seen in chapter six that these features of these leading European 
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codes have been replicated in the soft law codifications which have been published, 
such as the PECL and the PICC. 
 
At the same time, particularly in Germany, it was seen that there remains 
considerable concern for the concept of pacta sunt servanda, as evidenced in the 
reluctance to lightly invoke discharge for changed circumstances.  While these laws 
may be formulated in general terms and thus afford a measure of discretion to the 
interpreting judge, this is merely evidence of the civil law style and has not 
overthrown contractual certainty entirely.  Courts are guided by past judicial 
decisions in the exercise of their discretion under these provisions.  The net result of 
this is that the modern German and Dutch codifications stand at the forefront of the 
law on the problem of change of circumstances in contract law.  
 
Examples of laws on change of circumstances have now been considered from both 
common law and civil law jurisdictions.  Another important comparative analysis is 
still required, however, and that is of certain supra-national model rules as well as 




Chapter 6: International model rules and the UN Convention on 




Contracts are not only concluded within the borders of a particular country – 
international trade necessitates that contracts be concluded between parties from 
different countries.  The consequent question will then be which country’s law will 
govern the transaction.  This is a matter for private international law.  In the modern 
world, however, there is a movement towards unification of the laws governing 
international trade.  This has seen the promulgation of international conventions, 
such as the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980 
(CISG), as well as  supra-national model rules such as the Unidroit Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC), first published in 1994.  Within the 
European context there are the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), 
published between 1995 and 2003, as well as a very recent development, the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference of 2009. 
 
There is considerable overlap between the rules of the PICC, the PECL and the 
DCFR, since each intends to provide a complete set of principles of contract law.  
Each originates from a different source and hence its sphere of application is slightly 
different.  Since the realm in which this type of transnational contract law operates is 
typically that of international trade, its application is often left to arbitration tribunals.  
As far as a choice of a general – rather than a particular national – system of 
contract law to govern a particular contractual transaction goes, this is determined by 
agreement between the parties.1  As Brunner notes, the choice of general principles 
does not have to be to the exclusion of national law.2  General contract principles 
can be used to supplement and interpret a chosen system of national law.3  Given 
                                               
1 The application of the CISG to a transaction is determined differently.  In terms of article 1(1) of this 
treaty, it applies when the contracting parties come from states which are signatory to the CISG, or 
where the rules of private international law require that the law of a signatory state should apply. 
2 Cristoph Brunner Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles – Exemption for 
Non-performance in International Arbitration (2009) at 24. 
3 Ibid.  Brunner notes in this regard that this is the most common use to which general contract 
principles are put. 
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that international trade transactions happen in a transnational context, it is fitting that 
a particular municipal system of law be applied “with a broader brush” to reflect the 
international nature of the contract.4  That is not to say that general principles cannot 
be used to the exclusion of national law, but this approach is limited by the lack of 
case law applying the various transnational codifications.5  General contract 
principles thus have a role to play in supplementing and interpreting municipal law 
and arguably – at least in the context of arbitration proceedings – could be used to 
develop it.   
 
Since these model rules are abstracted from leading legal systems around the world, 
they provide a good picture of what an ideal system of law would be like.  They are 
thus useful in an analysis of what is the best way of dealing with a particular contract 
problem, such as that of changed circumstances.  In this context this problem is 
more commonly referred to under the heading of “hardship”.  While most 
international contracts would include a hardship clause, and thus obviate the need 
for reference to general principles to determine the outcome of a dispute, this is not 
always the case.  Kessedjian makes the practical point that it may be more difficult or 
more expensive for parties to obtain insurance when they include a hardship clause 
in their contracts.6  The fact that most of the transnational codifications to be 
considered below include a hardship provision is highly relevant to the question of 
whether such a rule should form part of an ideal system of contract law.  Knowledge 
of international practice would be valuable to South Africa if it were to decide to 
adopt rules on hardship.  The questions to be investigated in this chapter are thus 
twofold: first, whether transnational contract law contains an ideal model for dealing 
with the problem of hardship and second, whether lessons learnt in this regard in the 
arena of international trade can be applied within South Africa to develop our own 
contract law.     
 
                                               
4 Ibid at 29. 
5 Ibid at 25.  It should be noted that there is, however, a considerable body of case law dealing with 
the CISG in particular.  Brunner seems here to be referring to the soft law rules of (for example) the 
PICC or the PECL.  For a case database on the CISG see http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu (last 
accessed 8 February 2010). 
6 Catherine Kessedjian “Competing approaches to force majeure and hardship” (2005) International 
Review of Law and Economics 415 at 421. 
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6.2 A note on terminology 
 
The subject matter of this thesis has been set out by use of the phrase, “change of 
circumstances”.  While this phrase is preserved in, for instance, the PECL, the 
Unidroit PICC prefers the term “hardship”.  These two appear to be synonymous 
concepts and will be used interchangeably.  A concept which overlaps with hardship, 
but which is slightly different is that of “force majeure”.7  The literal meaning of this 
phrase is “higher power” and it is typically used in international contracts to refer to 
situations of impossibility.  The Latin equivalent of force majeure is vis maior.   
 
Thus a change in circumstances may result in a fundamental alteration in the 
equilibrium of the contract (to use the language of PICC).  Under certain 
circumstances which are defined in the various codifications (and which will be 
examined below) this shift in the equilibrium may result in hardship.  When, however, 
the change of circumstances results in an impediment beyond the control of a party, 
which in turn causes it to default under the contract, force majeure is present.  (This 
formulation is borrowed from article 79 of the CISG.)  Thus whether a change of 
circumstances has resulted in hardship or force majeure will be a question of the 
degree of difficulty of performance.  Is performance actually impossible, or is it 
merely unfair to expect a party to perform given a change in circumstances?  Given 
this degree of overlap in the applicable rules, both concepts will be considered 
below. 
 
6.3 The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
 
This Convention (the “CISG”) was adopted by the United Nations in 1980 in Vienna 
and came into force on 1 January 1988.8  To date 74 states have ratified the CISG.9  
                                               
7 Joern Rimke “Force majeure and hardship: application in international trade practice with specific 
regard to the CISG and the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts” (1999 – 2000) 
Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 193 at 241 
notes that while the “classical concept of force majeure is primarily directed at settling the problems 
resulting from non-performance… [t]he concept of hardship … is mainly directed at the adaptation of 
the contract.”  
8 Karin Lehmann “The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
should South Africa accede?” (2006) SA Merc LJ 317 at 317. 
9 www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (accessed 7 September 2009).  
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South Africa, however, is not among these.10  One of the stated underlying aims in 
the preamble of the CISG is that:  
“[T]he adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for the international sale of goods and 
take into account the different social, economic and legal systems would contribute to the 
removal of legal barriers in international trade and promote the development of international 
trade…” 
 
This creation of a uniform law of international sale is thus intended to overcome 
difficulties encountered where States operate under different legal systems and 
thereby remove uncertainty and disagreement over legal issues from the 
international trading arena.11   
 
The provision in the CISG which is relevant to this discussion is article 79.  Article 79 
is a force majeure provision, although this term was not favoured by its drafters.  The 
essence of the article is captured in article 79(1): 
“A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure 
was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected 
to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to 
have avoided or overcome it or its consequences.” 
 
The drafters of this provision chose to express the impossibility concept by use of the 
word “impediment”.  The relevant requirements of the sub-article are: (1) an 
impediment; (2) beyond the control of the contracting party; (3) which the party could 
not reasonably have been expected to take into account at the time of contracting 
and (4) that the party could not have avoided or overcome the impediment.12  
Although the word “impediment” implies some obstacle to performance, rather than 
increased hardship in performance, academic opinion remains divided over whether 
the CISG can be interpreted to admit discharge on this ground.13  On the one hand it 
                                               
10 Ibid. 
11 Sieg Eiselen “Adoption of the Vienna Convention for the International Sale of Goods (the CISG) in 
South Africa” (1999) SALJ 323 at 324. 
12 For a comparable analysis, see: Hannes Rösler “Hardship in German codified private law – in 
comparative perspective to English, French and international contract law” (2007) European Review 
of Private Law 483 at 502.  
13 Alejandro M Garro “Exemption of liability for damages: comparison between provisions of the CISG 
(Art 79) and the counterpart provisions of the Unidroit Principles (Art 7.1.7)” in John Felemegas (ed) 
An international approach to the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (1980) as uniform sales law (2007) 236 at 242. 
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can be argued that the omission of a hardship provision from the CISG was 
deliberate and on the other it can be argued that the word “impediment” is sufficiently 
flexible to admit extreme cases of hardship.14  Garro notes that the judicial decisions 
on this provision are too scant at the moment to sufficiently back up the argument of 
either side.15    Since Garro wrote, however, the Belgian Supreme Court has decided 
that the PICC can be used to supplement article 79 of the CISG to impose a duty on 
the buyer under an international contract of sale to renegotiate following an 
unforeseen price rise of 70 per cent.16  
 
The argument in favour of allowing hardship under the CISG rests on the 
interpretation provision of the Convention, found at article 7.  Article 7(1) notes the 
need to “promote [international] uniformity” in the application of this treaty, as well as 
the observance of “good faith in international trade”.  Article 7(2) provides as follows: 
“Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled 
in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the 
absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of 
private international law.” 
 
Since hardship could arguably be said to fall under the purview of article 7(2) as a 
matter not “expressly settled” by the rules of the CISG, there is scope for the 
suggestion that the Unidroit provisions on hardship could be used to augment article 
79(1) in an appropriate case.17  This was the approach adopted by the court in the 
Belgian Scaform International case referred to above.  This would promote 
international uniformity of law and also would further the principle of good faith, as 
per article 7(1).  Alternatively, municipal doctrines such as frustration or Wegfall der 
Geschäftsgrundlage could come into play.  The counter argument to this type of 
interpretation of article 79, however, could be that the exclusion of a hardship 
                                               
14 Ibid.  Rimke op cit note 7 at 226 argues that “in the absence of an ‘acquired patina of legal 
meaning’, it is probable that elastic terms like ‘due to an impediment’ will be read in the context of 
each system’s view of the limits within which an excuse of that kind should be admitted.” 
15 Ibid. 
16 19 June 2009 Belgian Court of Cassation [Supreme Court] (Scaform International BV v Lorraine 
Tubes SAS).  Translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090619b1.html (last accessed 
8 February 2010).  
17 Garro op cit note 13 at 243.  Although Garro does not refer to the PICC by name, he does suggest 
that the gap-filling technique of art 7(2) can allow for some underlying principle to augment art 79.  A 
further alternative would be to refer to a particular municipal legal system which recognises hardship, 
as Garro notes.  This was the reasoning adopted by the court in Scaform International supra note 16. 
165 
 
exemption was deliberate and should not be circumvented by interpretation.  Garro 
has traced the travaux préparatoires of the CISG in this regard, however, and finds 
no conclusive evidence of this.18  Since this question is not entirely settled in law, 
Kessedjian makes the eminently practical solution that parties should include a 
hardship clause in their contract to avoid a lengthy dispute as to whether this is 
covered by the CISG.19  This is possible, since article 6 of the CISG provides that 
parties may exclude or vary its provisions by agreement. 
 
6.4 The Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
 
“Unidroit” is the acronym referring to the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law, which is an independent intergovernmental organisation, based in 
Rome and functioning under an international convention.20  The purpose of this 
organisation is to harmonise international private and particularly commercial law.21  
To this end, Unidroit had published the Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts in 1994, which were revised ten years later in 2004.  These principles (the 
“PICC”) are “soft” law, since they are non-binding, yet have the intention of 
influencing “hard” law as a set of model rules for international trade.22  “Hard” law 
would be relevant national law or international agreements such as the CISG and 
typically this influence would be exerted in arbitration proceedings.23   
 
The PICC deal with hardship at articles 6.2.1 to 6.2.3.24  These provisions are set out 
in chapter six, which deals with “performance”, in their own section headed 
“hardship”.  In chapter seven, headed “non-performance”, force majeure is dealt with 
separately under article 7.1.7.  The hardship provisions begin with a general 
statement in article 6.2.1 that:  
                                               
18 Ibid at 244 – 245. 
19 Kessedjian op cit note 6 at 419. 
20 The Unidroit Statute (1940).  See www.unidroit.org and Sieg Eiselen & Sebastian K Bergenthal 
“The battle of forms: a comparative analysis” (2006) Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa 214 at 227.  
21 www.unidroit.org  
22 Stefan Vogenauer “Introduction” in Stefan Vogenauer & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary 
on the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) (2009) at 4 – 6.  See also 
Eiselen & Bergenthal op cit note 20 at 227. 
23 Eiselen & Bergenthal op cit note 20 at 228. 
24 See generally Michael Joachim Bonell An International Restatement of Contract Law: The Unidroit 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004) at 117 – 124. 
166 
 
“Where the performance of a contract becomes more onerous for one of the parties, that 
party is nevertheless bound to perform its obligations subject to the following provisions on 
hardship.” 
 
This makes it clear that pacta sunt servanda is still a founding principle under the 
PICC and that discharge for hardship will only be permitted in exceptional 
circumstances.  These circumstances are set out in article 6.2.2: 
 “There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the 
contract either because the cost of a party’s performance has increased or because the value 
of the performance a party receives has diminished, and 
(a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion of the 
contract; 
(b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by the disadvantaged 
party at the time of the conclusion of the contract; 
(c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and  
(d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party.”  
 
McKendrick notes that the above definition of hardship can be broken down into two 
elements, firstly the requirement of fundamental alteration of the equilibrium of the 
contract and second the considerations listed as items (a) to (d).25  The shift in the 
equilibrium of the contract may be due to an increase in the cost of performance 
under the contract, due (for example) to an increase in the cost of raw materials 
necessary for the production of the contract goods.26  This would encompass the 
impracticability defence known to US law.  Alternatively the equilibrium may be upset 
by a diminishing of the value of performance to be received by one party, due (for 
example) to inflation or frustration of the purpose of the contract.27  An example of 
the latter would be the Krell v Henry28 type scenario, where the value of the use of a 
flat leased by the defendant decreased drastically after the cancellation of the 
coronation procession which was to pass by that flat.   
 
                                               
25 Ewan McKendrick “Section 2: Hardship” in Stefan Vogenauer & Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds) 
Commentary on the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) (2009) 709 at 
717.  Compare the structure of the analysis in the official comment to the PICC.  
26 Official comment 2a to the PICC text.  
27 Official comment 2b to the PICC text. 
28 [1903] 2 KB 740 – discussed in Chapter 4 above. 
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As McKendrick notes, the important word used in this construction is 
“fundamental”.29  This reinforces the stress placed upon the concept of pacta sunt 
servanda by article 6.2.1.30  A question which has been asked in this regard is what 
degree of shift in the equilibrium is required?  Maskow, who was a member of the 
drafting committee of the PICC, noted in an early article that he felt the shift should 
be of at least 50 per cent of the contract price.31  This opinion was reflected in the 
1994 edition of the PICC.32  This figure was dropped from the 2004 revised version 
of the PICC, however, following criticism that it was too low and was arbitrary.33  
Brunner argues that in a situation of frustration of purpose (where the potential for 
loss is limited to the contract price) the shift should be in the order of 80 to 100 per 
cent of the contract price.34  In a situation of impracticability, where the cost of 
performance has increased, the margin should be 100 to 125 per cent of the contract 
price.35       
  
The first additional requirement at article 6.2.2 (a) is that “the events occur or 
become known to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion of the contract”.  This 
provision is inserted because generally if the relevant event occurs before the 
conclusion of the contract, the result is a situation of mistake rather than hardship.  
This provision is “generous”, however, since the hardship defence will still apply, 
even in a case which is truly one of mistake, provided the relevant event only 
becomes known to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion of the contract.36  A 
US case example where the frustrating event only became known after the 
conclusion of the contract, although it was a pre-existing state of affairs, is Mineral 
Park Land Co v Howard.37  Despite the fact that this was strictly speaking a case of 
                                               
29 McKendrick op cit note 25 at 718. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Dietrich Maskow “Hardship and force majeure” (1992) American Journal of Comparative Law 657 at 
662. 
32 McKendrick op cit note 25 at 719. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Brunner op cit note 2 at 432. 
35 Ibid.  In the Scaform International case (discussed above) an unforeseen rise in the cost of 
supplying goods under an international contract of sale in the order of 70 per cent was held to 
“fundamentally disturb the contractual balance” and renegotiation was enforced on the buyer.  See 
the text of this case at the Pace Law School website (supra note 16). 
36 McKendrick op cit note 25 at 720. 
37 156 P 458 (1916). 
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common mistake, the court in that case discharged the defendant on the ground of 
impracticability.38   
 
Article 6.2.2 (b) requires that the event “could not reasonably have been taken into 
account by the disadvantaged party at the time of conclusion of the contract”.  This is 
a test of foreseeability.  The test is an objective one, as indicated by the inclusion of 
the word “reasonably”.  The official comments to this provision note that if the 
change in circumstances is a gradual one, and the change had already begun at the 
time of conclusion of the contract, the resultant disadvantage will not discharge a 
party’s obligations unless there was a dramatic increase in the pace of the change.39 
 
The requirement in article 6.2.2 (c) is that the event be “beyond the control of the 
disadvantaged party”.  Hardship resulting from acts of God, such as unusual weather 
patterns will be clear examples under this provision.  The same would be true of 
events resulting from war or change in political regime.  McKendrick suggests a 
more problematic example: what about delays resulting from industrial action?40  
Where the employer is a third party, McKendrick suggests the provision will be 
satisfied, but it could become more difficult to show that requirement (c) has been 
complied with if the disadvantaged party is itself the employer of the striking workers.  
The industrial action could potentially then have been ended earlier by submitting to 
the workers’ demands. 
 
The final requirement at article 6.2.2 (d) states that the disadvantaged party must not 
have assumed the risk of the occurrence of the ultimate event.  This will obviously 
exclude speculative transactions where risks are calculated as part of the contract 
price, such as insurance agreements or trading in financial instruments.41   
 
Once it has been determined that hardship exists, article 6.2.3 – which deals with the 
effects of hardship – comes into play.  There are a number of steps to be followed in 
terms of this article.  The first is that the disadvantaged party is entitled to request 
                                               
38 Ibid at 459. 
39 Official comment 3(b) to article 6.2.2. 
40 McKendrick op cit note 25 at 721. 
41 See Illustration 4 to article 6.2.2. 
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renegotiations from its counterpart.  Such request is to be made without “undue 
delay”.  McKendrick notes that no express duty is placed on the opposing party to 
enter into such renegotiations, but this may be implied, especially given the 
existence of a good faith provision at article 1.7 and the duty to co-operate in terms 
of article 5.1.3.42  These duties of good faith and co-operation apply also to the 
disadvantaged party, so that it should only request renegotiation in a genuine case of 
hardship and not merely as a matter of strategy.43    
 
A request to renegotiate does not entitle the disadvantaged party to withhold 
performance in terms of article 6.2.3 (2).  Should the renegotiations fail, article 6.2.3 
(3) directs that their dispute be referred to a court.  Under article 6.2.3 (4), a court 
may either terminate the contract “at a date and on terms to be fixed” or adapt the 
contract.  This will only occur, however, if the court finds hardship is present and if 
such a ruling is “reasonable”.  Termination of the contract would probably only be a 
measure of last resort.44  Whether such termination operates e tunc or ex nunc will 
be determined by the court.  The alternative of adaptation is to be preferred.  The 
official comment to this article notes the inclusion of the word “reasonable” in article 
6.2.3 (4) – if the court is of the opinion that neither termination nor adaptation is 
appropriate, it may decline to make any such award and either order that the parties 
resume negotiations or that the contract stands as is.45 
 
Compared to other municipal systems of law it can be seen from the brief analysis 
above that the regulation of hardship in the PICC is extremely progressive.  
Compared to the CISG, which does not expressly incorporate hardship, or even the 
English law of frustration, which recognises frustration of purpose, but not 
impracticability – and only allows discharge for hardship under very limited 
circumstances – the PICC cut huge inroads into the concept of pacta sunt servanda.  
Indeed their regulation of hardship reminds one of the position under German law, 
which is at the forefront in this area of the law.  In this regard the analysis of Rösler 
that the PICC do not merely “restate” the law and search for a common core, but 
                                               
42 McKendrick op cit note 25 at 722. 
43 Official comment 5 to article 6.2.3. 
44 McKendrick op cit note 25 at 723. 
45 Official comment 7 to article 6.2.3. 
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seek to find the best possible version of it, is pertinent.46  The concern shown in the 
PICC for keeping a contract alive, rather than terminating it, and for settling matters 
out of court by renegotiation where possible is admirable and evidences a very 
practical manner of dealing with contractual disputes concerning hardship.  The 
financial realities of high level international trade clearly call for a realistic approach 
to the problem of hardship and the PICC seem eminently fair and reasonable in this 
regard. 
 
6.5 The Principles of European Contract Law  
 
The PECL were the product of the labours of a Commission on European Contract 
Law.47  This commission was headed by Professor Lando of the Copenhagen 
Business School (and is hence often referred to as the “Lando Commission”) and 
featured academics from all member states of the European Union.48  The PECL 
consist of three parts, published between 1995 and 2003 and are inspired by the 
American Restatements in their style and structure.49 They compete with the Unidroit 
PICC in the international arena and both bodies of rules are very similar, both in their 
layout and content.  The major difference is that Unidroit’s rules are aimed at 
international commercial contracts, whereas the Lando Commission’s PECL are a 
body of general contract law rules.50  
 
The PECL contain both a force majeure and a hardship provision.  Like the PICC 
and the CISG, the force majeure provision is not referred to by conventional 
terminology, but under the heading: “excuse due to an impediment”.51  Hardship is 
dealt with under the heading of “change of circumstances” at article 6:111: 
“(1) A party is bound to fulfil its obligations even if performance has become more onerous, 
whether because the cost of performance has increased or because the value of the 
performance it receives has diminished. 
                                               
46 Rösler op cit note 12 at 505. 
47 Reinhard Zimmermann “Ius commune and the Principles of European Contract Law: contemporary 
renewal of an old idea?” in Hector MacQueen & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law 
– Scots and South African Perspectives (2005) 1 at 4. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid at 6. 
50 Ibid at 7. 
51 Article 8:108. 
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(2) If, however, performance of the contract becomes excessively onerous because of a 
change of circumstances, the parties are bound to enter into negotiations with a view to 
adapting the contract or ending it, provided that: 
(a) the change of circumstances occurred after the time of conclusion of the contract, 
(b) the possibility of a change of circumstances was not one which could reasonably 
have been taken into account at the time of conclusion of the contract, and  
(c) the risk of the change of circumstances is not one which, according to the contract, 
the party affected should be required to bear. 
(3) If the parties fail to reach agreement within a reasonable period, the court may: 
(a) end the contract at a date and on terms to be determined by the court; or 
(b) adapt the contract in order to distribute between the parties in a just and equitable 
manner the losses and gains resulting from the change in circumstances. 
In either case, the court may award damages for the loss suffered through a party 
refusing to negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary to good faith and fair 
dealing.” 
 
The similarity of this provision to its counterpart in the PICC is striking.  There are 
differences, however, which need to be taken into consideration.  Like the hardship 
provision in the PICC, article 6:111 begins by reaffirming the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda.  Again, this default position is qualified by an exception for hardship.  The 
threshold which will have to be met in order to trigger the application of the article is 
then set out in sub-article (2).  This provision is slightly different from the PICC, since 
the standard required is one of “excessive onerosity”, rather than a “fundamental 
alteration in the equilibrium of the contract”.  The formulation used in the PECL is 
based on the equivalent provision in the Italian Civil Code at article 1467, which uses 
the formula “eccessivamente onerosa”.  The ultimate meaning of both provisions is 
essentially the same, however: the comment to the PECL notes that excessive 
onerosity may be due to increased cost of performance or diminished value of 
performance.  In other words: frustration of purpose, or impracticability of sufficient 
measure will give rise to an application of the provision.  The requirements as to time 
(frustrating event to have occurred after the conclusion of the contract); foreseeability 
and risk are essentially the same those of the PICC, as the comments and 
illustrations in the text of the PECL demonstrate.  Notably the requirement in the 
PICC at 6.2.2(c) that the (frustrating) event be beyond the control of the 
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disadvantaged party is not included in article 6:111, but one could argue that it is 
implied by sub-articles (2)(b) and (c). 
 
The impact of sub-articles (3)(a) and (b) is essentially also the same as article 6.2.3 
of the PICC, giving a court the power to terminate the contract from a date to be 
determined, or to adapt the contract to effect a fair distribution of losses and gains 
under the contract.  The major difference between the two provisions is the power to 
award damages, which is given to a court by article 6:111(3), for failure to 
(re)negotiate under the hardship provision in good faith.  This arguably provides this 
provision with more mettle than its PICC equivalent, although a duty of good faith 
applies to the latter as well. 
 
The comment to article 6:111 ends with the following statement: 
 “So the mechanism adopted by Article 6:111 gives the court wide powers.  These must be 
used in moderation, to avoid any reduction in the vital stability of contractual relations.  This 
moderation is shown by the experience of countries which have already a similar rule.”52  
 
This statement reaffirms the importance of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
asserted from the outset in article 6:111.  The provisions on hardship in the PECL 
reflect the common practice of the majority of states comprising the European 
Community, however, which include a similar rule in their municipal legal systems.53  
The PECL are thus in conformity with the majority of their member states when it 
comes to the provisions on hardship, and given the similarity to the PICC, can largely 
be said to conform to international trends as well.  Whether contracting parties will 
choose to adopt the PECL or the PICC will be a matter of individual preference, 
given that neither codification is “hard” law.  The PECL is clearly intended to be of 
regional application, however, and they may be the natural choice for European 
parties.  Again, as with the PICC, the provision on hardship holds up to scrutiny and 
seems to reflect a good solution to the problem of changed circumstances and to 
stand as a synthesis of European municipal law in this regard. 
 
 
                                               
52 Official comment D to article 6:111. 
53 Official comment A to article 6:111. 
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6.6 The Draft Common Frame of Reference 
 
The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) is an academic initiative undertaken 
in 2005 under the auspices of the European Commission.54  It stands as “soft” law 
and as a possible draft for an ultimate Common Frame of Reference (CFR).  A CFR 
was called for in the European Commission’s “Action Plan on a More Coherent 
European Contract Law” of February 2003.  The DCFR is thus a move in the 
direction of an ultimate “political” CFR, which will have to be ratified by member 
states and will then become “hard” law.55  Thus, like the PECL, the DCFR is merely a 
set of non-binding model rules. 
 
The DCFR deals with hardship in Book III at article 1:110 “Variation or termination by 
court on a change of circumstances”: 
“(1) An obligation must be performed even if performance has become more onerous, 
whether because the cost of performance has increased or because the value of what is 
to be received has diminished. 
(2) If, however, performance of a contractual obligation or of an obligation arising from a 
unilateral juridical act becomes so onerous because of an exceptional change of 
circumstances that it would be manifestly unjust to hold the debtor to the obligation a 
court may: 
(a) vary the obligation in order to make it reasonable and equitable in the new 
circumstances; or 
(b) terminate the obligation at a date and on terms to be determined by the court. 
(3) Paragraph (2) applies only if: 
(a) the change of circumstances occurred after the time when the obligation was 
incurred; 
(b) the debtor did not at that time take into account, and could not reasonably be 
expected to have taken into account, the possibility or scale of that change of 
circumstances; 
(c) the debtor did not assume, and cannot reasonably be regarded as having assumed, 
the risk of that change of circumstances; and 
(d) the debtor has attempted, reasonably and in good faith, to achieve by negotiation a 
reasonable and equitable adjustment of the terms regulating the obligation.”   
  
                                               
54 Christian von Bar et al (eds) Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law 
(2009) “Introduction 1” at 3 – 4. 
55 Ibid: “Introduction 6” at 7. 
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While it is clear that there has been a reshuffle of the formula used in the PECL and 
the PICC, essentially the same elements of those two previous hardship clauses are 
restated here.  At the outset the principle of pacta sunt servanda is reaffirmed.  Then 
the hardship exception is set out.  The formula used here is similar to that of the 
PECL: performance must have become “so onerous because of an exceptional 
change in circumstances that it would be manifestly unjust to hold the debtor to the 
obligation”.  Notable additions here are the inclusion of the requirement that the 
change must be “exceptional” and that the change must have resulted in “manifest 
injustice”.  These inclusions render the threshold requirement more specific than that 
of the PECL, spelling out what was only implied in that formulation.  The DCFR 
provision also demands that further requirements must be met, as to the time of 
occurrence of the frustrating event; the foreseeability of the event and that the risk of 
it had not been assumed by the debtor.  An additional requirement is added here, 
that the debtor must have attempted to renegotiate the contract to achieve the 
necessary adjustment.  This is different to the format used in the PICC and the 
PECL, although arguably the same result is achieved by equivalent provisions in 
those sections.56  In all three sets of model rules an attempt at renegotiation is 
expressly or impliedly a condition precedent for an award of relief.  A notable 
exclusion here is the power to award damages for a failure to renegotiate in good 
faith (as appears at art 6:111(3) of the PECL).  This lack of a damages provision 
takes account of the criticism levelled at the equivalent PECL rule that a creditor 
might be acting in a fiduciary capacity and forcing it to comply with a request for 
renegotiation could potentially result in a conflict of interest.57  As far as remedies 
under the DCFR go, the powers of the court are also the same: the contract may be 
varied to make it “reasonable and equitable” or terminated “at a date and on terms to 
be determined by the court”. 
 
                                               
56 The PECL provides at art 6:111(3) that relief is to be provided “if the parties fail to reach agreement 
within a reasonable period” and that damages may be awarded following a change of circumstances 
“for the loss suffered through a party refusing to negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary to 
good faith and fair dealing”.  The PICC state at 6.2.3(1) – (2) that in case of hardship the 
disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations, but that such a request does not entitle it to 
withhold performance.  
57 Official comment C to DCFR III 1:110. 
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Thus it can be seen that the DCFR provisions on hardship are largely based on the 
PICC and PECL, but take into account criticism levelled at these earlier rules.  Like 
the PECL and the PICC, the DCFR contains a separate force majeure provision, 
which retains the language of the CISG by use of the formula, “excuse due to an 
impediment”.58  What is abundantly clear from a simultaneous study of these various 
texts is that the formulations are repeated from one set of rules to the next and a 
purposive interpretation of the different sets of rules would probably proffer largely 
the same result.59  The DCFR is thus largely unremarkable with regard to hardship – 
the provision will increase in importance, however, should it make the necessary 
leap from the realm of “soft” law to “hard” law and be included in an ultimate 
“political” CFR.  To do so would be unproblematic for the majority of European 
countries, which as noted under the previous heading, already incorporate such a 
rule.  Countries such as France and England, which have more restrictive rules on 
hardship than those of the DCFR, might not be so quick to accede, however.  
England has, in addition, not yet acceded to the CISG either at present date.60  
Clearly the move into the more concrete realm of a CFR will not be an easy one.   
 
6.7 Relevance of the above model laws to South African law 
 
To argue that the “soft” law codifications on hardship should guide the development 
of municipal law within a particular country is harder in practice than in theory.  In 
theory, provisions such as those found in the PICC, the PECL and the DCFR present 
an ideal model as to what contract law should be.  In practice, however, two major 
difficulties present themselves in such an argument.  First, since the principles are 
relatively new, there is a lack of case law and academic writing to give meaning to 
these provisions.61  Second, the argument has been raised by Christie that for a 
municipal court to adopt the provisions of a soft law codification would be to 
encroach onto the territory of the legislature.62  This second argument seems to 
                                               
58 DCFR Book III – 3:104. 
59 Von Bar op cit note 54 “Introduction 49” at 30.  The DCFR was prepared by the Study Group on a 
European Civil Code, which was the successor group to the Lando Commission which produced the 
PECL (ibid). 
60 www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html 
61 Brunner op cit note 2 at 26 – 27. 
62 RH Christie “Our law of contract and the modern lex mercatoria” in Graham Glover (ed) Essays in 
Honour of AJ Kerr (2006) 59 at 73. 
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ignore the inherent power of the South African courts to develop the common law, 
however, and the necessity for the common law to be developed in accordance with 
the value of fairness in contracting.63 
 
The principles of “general” contract law examined in this chapter are evidence of a 
trend in international contracting which should influence the development of the 
South African common law.  While our municipal courts would be wary to adopt the 
text of any of the codifications examined above verbatim, the fact that most of them 
(with the exception of the CISG) recognise hardship should encourage our courts to 
follow suit and do likewise.  In this regard the common features of the soft law model 
rules as to what constitutes hardship and what remedies should follow a finding that 
hardship is present in a particular case, should be indicative of the type of features 
which should find their way into South African law.64  Ideally South Africa should 
formulate its own rules on hardship, which should draw on the learning displayed in 
the various models studied here.   
 
Although the differences between the available models are slight, there is different 
emphasis placed on the various elements of the hardship defence by the separate 
bodies of rules examined here.  The common elements are the stress placed on the 
concept of pacta sunt servanda; the establishment of a threshold test for hardship in 
order to invoke the provision in the first place and the setting out of remedies once 
hardship has been found to be present in a contract.  As stated above, on a 
purposive reading of these different models the effects of the individual rules are 
largely the same.  Since South Africa need not adopt one model verbatim, but may 
draw on all three, this allows for the best elements of each provision to be chosen. 
 
The PICC threshold test for hardship is, however, the most expressive, setting out 
the necessity of a “fundamental alteration in the equilibrium of the contract”.  This 
best captures the effect of a change of circumstances on the mechanics of a 
reciprocal obligation.  In interpreting this provision, one might well want to ask, 
                                               
63 Constitution, s 173.  See also Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) and the arguments 
developed in chapters 7 & 8 below. 
64 Suggestions as to the appropriate means for South Africa to fill this gap in its municipal law will be 
considered below in chapter 8.  
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however, whether the obligation has become “excessively onerous” so as to cause 
“manifest injustice”.  Clearly also the change in circumstances must be “exceptional”.  
As far as the additional guidelines go, the requirements of the PICC – that the 
frustrating event occurs – or becomes known to the parties – after the conclusion of 
the contract, is reasonably unforeseeable, is beyond the control of the 
disadvantaged party and that the risk of such an event has not been assumed by it – 
are the most thorough of the guidelines on offer and are hence the best guide to 
interpretation. 
   
Based on the above considerations, the PICC seem to contain the best model rules 
on change of circumstances.  Again it must be stressed, however, that each of the 
models discussed above has its merits and all three should be taken into account 
when attempting to derive an ideal method of dealing with this problem.  It is hard to 
justify the choice of one set of rules over the other when one is simply trying to 
choose the best model and hence a pragmatic approach is advisable.   
 
A foreseeable problem with the “soft” law codifications is that they are based on 
having an enforceable duty of good faith in contracting.  Although South Africa is 
moving in this direction, such a duty remains at present at variance with our 
municipal law.65  South African courts do have the power to develop the common law 
in terms of s 39(2) and s 173 of the Constitution, but it is notable that there has been, 
to date, no reported reference to any of the “soft” law codifications in our reported 
case law.  A point worth noting in this regard, however, is that the South African Law 
Commission proposed a draft Bill in 1998 which included provisions on change of 
circumstances not too far removed from those of the model laws discussed in this 




                                               
65 See below: chapter 7.  The provisions on hardship in the Bill appear to be based closely on art 
6:111 of the PECL. 
66 Bill on the Control of Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or 
Terms, Clause 4.  Published as Annexure A to  Report on Unreasonable Stipulation in Contracts and 
the Rectification of Contracts, South African Law Commission, Project 47, April 1998.  These 
provisions were discussed above in chapter 2.  
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6.8 Conclusion  
 
What can be learned from the study of supranational rules of contract law is what 
international panels of experts think contract law should be like.  Indeed in the realm 
of international trade these model rules have enjoyed a fair measure of success and 
the ongoing trend towards a Common Frame of Reference in Europe provides 
evidence that this type of body of model rules does have a use.  What our municipal 
courts can glean from a study of these transnational provisions on hardship is that 
South Africa is out of line with international practice and that steps need to be taken 
to address the problem of changed circumstances in our law.        
 
The question as to how South Africa will seek to fill this gap remains, however.  From 
the analysis of this and previous chapters, it becomes apparent that the doctrine of 
good faith has an important role to play in formulating an approach to the problem of 
changed circumstances.  This doctrine will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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In an article published in 1990, two South African academics, Van Huyssteen and 
Van der Merwe, argued that: 
 “In a system of contracts based on bona fides, a contractant should be entitled to proper 
conduct on the part of his co-contractant.”1 
 
This claim was based on the notion that bona fides should play a greater role in the 
law of contract, following on the Appellate Division decision in Bank of Lisbon and 
South African Ltd v De Ornelas,2 which had eradicated the exceptio doli generalis 
from South African law.  This statement was used as a stepping stone to make 
another claim which is relevant to the present discussion: 
 “A change in circumstances surrounding a contract could then result in a refusal to enforce 
the contract or a specific term if insistence on its enforcement in spite of the changed 
circumstances is objectively not in good faith when the relationship between the contractants 
is considered.”3 
 
While the authors of the above proposition were unable to cite any South African 
authority for this view, they do mention that this is the German approach to the 
problem.4  In chapter five the German doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage 
was described.  With the introduction of this doctrine in the early 1920s, the German 
courts used § 242 of the German Civil Code (the good faith provision) as a peg on 
which to hang the new doctrine of changed circumstances.  A simplified view of the 
German law at the time would have been similar to Van Huyssteen and Van der 
Merwe’s argument as set out above: after a change of circumstances a contract will 
cease to bind when it is no longer in good faith to rely on it. 
 
                                               
1 LF Van Huyssteen & Schalk Van der Merwe “Good faith in contract: proper behaviour amidst 
changing circumstances” (1990) Stell LR 244 at 248. 
2 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
3 Van Huyssteen & Van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 249. 
4 Ibid at 250n33. 
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The use of a good faith standard is more controversial in the common law world, 
however.  In the English jurisdiction, a fairly recent dictum of Lord Hoffmann states 
that: 
 “The existence of an undefined discretion to refuse to enforce the contract on the ground that 
this would be ‘unconscionable’ is sufficient to create uncertainty.  Even if it is most unlikely 
that a discretion to grant relief will be exercised, its mere existence enables litigation to be 
employed as a negotiating tactic.  The realities of commercial life are that this may cause 
injustice which cannot be fully compensated by the ultimate decision in the case.”5  
 
Yet, while this may be the position in English law, the doctrine of frustration is still 
acknowledged to be an exception to the doctrine of absolute contracts, which is 
intended to achieve a “just and reasonable result” and “to do what is reasonable and 
fair”.6  Writing on the topic of good faith in Australian law, Carter and Peden note the 
following: 
 “‘Frustration’, as a concept, is a judicial construct designed to prevent injustice.  Expressed in 
terms of good faith, good faith requires each party to respect the substance of the bargain 
struck and neither can call upon the other to perform in circumstances which are ‘radically 
different’ from those contemplated by the parties in their bargain.”7  
 
In the United States, while the exact role to be played by good faith is debated 
amongst the writers on this topic,8 good faith as a general concept is recognised by 
the Uniform Commercial Code and the American Law Institute’s Second 
Restatement of Contracts.9  It is thus perhaps not surprising that both the UCC and 
the Second Restatement contain well defined rules on change of circumstances, 
which go beyond the confines of English law and recognise both frustration of 
purpose and impracticability as grounds of discharge.  It has been shown already in 
                                               
5 Union Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] 2 All ER 215 (PC) at 218 – 219.  (This was a 
unanimous decision of the Privy Council).  See Roger Brownsword “Positive, negative, neutral: the 
reception of good faith in English contract law” in Roger Brownsword, Norma J Hird and Geraint 
Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract – Concept and Context (1999) 13.  Brownsword identifies 
positive, negative and neutral views in respect of the role of good faith in English law, but notes that 
the majority of English lawyers favour the negative or neutral view (at 25). 
6 J Lauritzen AS v Wijsmuller BV (“The Super Servant Two”) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 at 8.   
7 JW Carter & Elisabeth Peden “Good faith in Australian contract law” (2003) Journal of Contract Law 
155 at 161 – 162. 
8 Compare the different conceptions described in Robert S Summers “The conceptualisation of good 
faith in American contract law: a general account” in Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker 
(eds) Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000) 118. 
9 E Allan Farnsworth “Good faith in contract performance” in Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann (eds) 
Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) at 155.  The UCC recognises good faith at § 1 – 203 
and the Restatement 2d at § 205. 
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chapter four that American law is more permissive when it comes to contracts struck 
by changed circumstances than the other common law jurisdictions. 
 
What does this mean for South Africa’s mixed legal system, when leading legal 
systems of both the common law and the civil law world recognise good faith as the 
underlying justification for discharge of contracts struck by changed 
circumstances?10  At the outset, this brief glance at the international context provides 
the backdrop against which Van Huyssteen and Van der Merwe’s article was written 
and shows that all these authors were claiming is that South Africa be brought into 
line with international practice.  The weakness of their argument of course is that 
good faith as a “free-floating”, independent ground for intervention in contracts has 
been declared dead in South Africa.11  It has always been recognised, however, that 
good faith is an underlying concept, with indirect influence on the development of the 
law.12  While arguments for good faith to stand as an independent ground of 
intervention in contracts appear to be on the wane, the notion of fairness in 
contracting is alive and well, living on under the banner of public policy.13  In the 
recent Barkhuizen judgment, the Constitutional Court demonstrated that 
constitutional values demand that fairness be given a role to play in the South 
African law of contract.14  While the court was careful to stress that the Constitution 
also valued the sanctity of contracts,15 s 39(2) required the development of the 
common law to give effect to considerations of fairness which underpin the Bill of 
Rights.16   
 
                                               
10 For civil law examples see section 7.2.1 below as well as article 6:258 of the Dutch BW and the 
discussion of the German doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage in chapter 5.  For the common 
law context see section 7.2.2 below generally as well as The Super Servant Two supra note 6 at 8 
and § 1 – 203 read with § 2 – 615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which applies in the US. 
11 Bank of Lisbon supra note 2 – see the discussion of this case below.  Compare the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at [22] – [24].  See also 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) at [79] – [82] where the majority of the Constitutional Court 
declined to revisit the question as to the status of good faith in South African contract law. 
12 Compare Brisley v Drotsky supra note 11 at [22] where the majority judgment quotes Dale 
Hutchison to the effect that good faith has a “creative, a controlling and a legitimating or explanatory 
function.” 
13 See Sasfin v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) and more recently Barkhuizen v Napier supra note 11. 
14 Barkhuizen supra note 11 at [28] – [30]. 
15 Ibid at [57]. 
16 Ibid at [70]. 
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This trend toward fairness in contracting has been furthered (in addition) by the 
Legislature through the promulgation of the Consumer Protection Act.17  Precisely 
what this means for the concept of good faith, or  public policy, which requires the 
furtherance of good faith conduct, remains to be resolved through the interpretation 
of this statute by the courts. 
 
Whether this concern for fairness will extend into the realm of discharge for changed 
circumstances based on good faith remains to be seen in South Africa.  The notion 
advanced by Van Huyssteen and Van der Merwe needs to be explored, particularly 
given the recent trends in constitutional law with regard to contracts.  If for no other 
reason, then because a general survey of the various “parent” legal systems shows 
that good faith requires that a solution to the problem of changed circumstances be 
found.  Even in medieval times, the problem of changed circumstances was viewed 
as a morally defensible exception to the binding force of contracts through the 
clausula rebus sic stantibus.18  In this regard this chapter has several aims:  First, to 
explore the meaning of good faith as an international legal concept and to evaluate 
the role which it plays in foreign countries, particularly in the context of changed 
circumstances.  (This has already been partly demonstrated in the various case 
studies in preceding chapters).  Second, to explore the meaning and role of good 
faith in the South African jurisdiction, with particular regard to the latest 
developments in constitutional law and the imperative that the common law be 
developed to give effect to fairness in contracting.  Finally the aim of this chapter is 
to flesh out the contentions of Van Huyssteen and Van der Merwe highlighted above.  
Their article was published in a pre-constitutional South Africa and much has 
changed in our common law of contract since then.  Furthermore the article suggests 
a solution without really giving content to its ideas.  To progress a more concrete 
proposal is required.19  Hence, in sum, the aim of this chapter is to evaluate the 
possibility of the development of a solution to the problem of changed circumstances 
in South African contract law which relies on good faith (or some analogous concept) 
as the peg on which to hang the doctrine. 
 
                                               
17 See in particular sections 40, 48 and 52 of the Consumer Protection Act. 
18 See chapter 3 in this regard. 
19 This will be considered fully in chapter 8. 
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7.2 Good faith in other countries 
 
Aside from the role which it has played in shaping the law of changed circumstances 
in contract in several countries, good faith appears as a more general concept in 
many leading Western legal systems.  Either the doctrine underlies and legitimates 
the established rules of contract law as a mere principle or value, or serves as an 
independent standard or rule that parties must act in good faith in their contractual 
relations.20  Thus while we see that most authors deny good faith any sort of 
independent role in English law, in countries like Germany and the Netherlands good 
faith provides a direct basis on which the conduct of a party under a contract may be 
challenged.  In order to answer the questions, “What is good faith?” or, “How can 
good faith be used to address the problem of changed circumstances in South 
African law?” it is useful to see the role which this concept plays in foreign 
jurisdictions.  This section will focus on the legal systems which have received 
particular attention in this thesis, particularly German and Dutch law, as well as the 
law of several Common law countries, such as England, the USA and Australia.   
 
7.2.1 Civil law examples 
The German civil code (BGB) imposes a duty to act in good faith on contracting 
parties at § 242.  A translation of this section reads as follows, “An obligor has a duty 
to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice 
into consideration.”21  The concept of good faith is reflected in the original German by 
the phrase, “Treu und Glauben”.  Whittaker and Zimmermann note that this phrase, 
which literally means “fidelity and faith”, is a traditional German concept taken from 
medieval law, which came to be used as the equivalent of the Roman concept of 
bona fides.22  This type of provision in a code is often referred to as a “general 
                                               
20 For a succint, jurisprudential account of the difference between rules and principles, see: Ronald  
Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977) at 14 – 46.  The author gives the examples of a principle “that 
no one should profit from his own wrongdoing” and a rule “that a will is invalid unless signed by three 
witnesses”.  See also Duncan Kennedy “Form and substance in private law adjudication” 89 Harvard 
Law Review (1975 – 1976) 1685 who distinguishes a rule (“clearly defined and highly administrable”) 
from a standard (“equitable … producing ad hoc decisions with relatively little precedential value”) at 
1685.    
21 Translation found at the website for the Bundesministerium der Justiz: www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb (last accessed 9 November 2009). 
22 Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zimmermann “Good faith in European contract law: surveying the 
legal landscape” in Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker (eds) Good Faith in European Contract 
Law (2000) at 18. 
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clause”, which can be put to several different uses as the situation requires.23  In this 
regard, Ebke and Steinhauer argue that the German good faith provision has the 
following uses: 
 “In German contract law, the doctrine of good faith fulfils three basic functions: it serves as the 
legal basis of interstitial law-making by the judiciary, it forms the basis of legal defences in 
private law suits, and it provides a statutory basis for reallocating risks in private contracts.”24 
 
This is clearly the use of a general good faith clause, but what does “Treu und 
Glauben” actually mean?  Whittaker and Zimmermann note that this concept entails 
more than the sum of its component parts and implies an objective standard of good 
faith.25  Rather than dealing with the subjective intentions of the parties to a contract, 
§ 242 holds them up to an objective standard of conduct, against which their actions 
may be compared.  For this reason these authors argue, good faith cannot be given 
an abstract meaning, but takes its shape from the cases in which it is applied.26  
Thus a body of case law is able to grow, which is based on § 242 and which gives 
meaning to it. 
 
Thus to take the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage as an example, it was 
developed by the courts to address a lacuna in the BGB regarding the problem of 
changed circumstances.  Judges who had been trained in the civil law tradition which 
prevented them (in theory) from making law, used § 242 as a peg on which to hang 
the new doctrine.  In time a body of case law grew up around the concept of Wegfall 
der Geschäftsgrundlage, so that reference to the doctrine of good faith became 
unnecessary.  Finally the concept received its own place amongst the provisions of 
the BGB when the code was amended in 2002.27   
 
The widespread examples of this type of use of general clauses, particularly in 
German law, but also in Dutch law, led Hesselink to argue that good faith is not 
                                               
23 Peter Schlechtriem “The functions of general clauses, exemplified by regarding Germanic laws and 
Dutch law” in Stefan Grundmann & Denis Mazeaud (eds) General Clauses and Standards in 
European Contract Law (2006) at 41. 
24 Werner F Ebke & Bettina M Steinhauer “The doctrine of good faith in German contract law” in Jack 
Beatson & Daniel Friemann (eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) at 171. 
25 Whittaker & Zimmermann op cit note 22 at 30 – 31. 
26 Ibid. 
27 This doctrine is now captured under § 313 “Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage”.  See chapter 5 for a 
fuller account.  
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merely a “norm” in these systems, but is rather a “mouthpiece … for new rules”, 
disguising the role of the judge in making law.28  Rather than good faith being a rule 
on which new decisions are based, Hesselink argues, judges should formulate the 
new rule as explicitly as possible.29  Thus Hesselink sees good faith as merely an 
underlying principle in the Netherlands.  He sums up: 
 “Good faith is not the highest norm of contract law or even of private law, but no norm at all, 
and merely the mouthpiece through which new rules speak, or the cradle where new rules are 
born.  What the judge really does when he applies good faith is to create new rules.”30   
  
The new Dutch civil code (Burgelijk Wetboek – “BW”), promulgated in 1992, gives 
effect to good faith in articles 6:2 and 6:248.  The formula used to express the 
concept of good faith is “redelijkheid en billijkheid”, which translates roughly to 
“reasonableness and fairness”.  In ascribing meaning to this phrase, a court must 
refer to “generally accepted principles of law, to the current legal convictions in the 
Netherlands, and to the societal and personal interests involved in the given case” 
(art 3:12 BW).31  The concept is an objective one and plays a role in supplementing 
duties, limiting rights and in the interpretation of contracts.32  As in Germany it is thus 
a clause of general application, used in shaping the law of contract and can thus be 
seen either as an “open norm”33 or alternatively, as in Hesselink’s view above, good 
faith is an underlying principle which justifies the creation of new rules.  
 
7.2.2 Common law examples 
In English law there is no duty of good faith, in the sense of a separate doctrine 
which can be used at judicial discretion in the resolution of appropriate problems.  
The denial of the existence of such a doctrine in Union Eagle34 has already been 
cited in the introduction to this chapter.  This does not mean, however, that 
considerations of fairness do not play a role in English contract law.  In Interfoto 
Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd, Bingham LJ said the following: 
                                               
28 Martijn Hesselink “Good faith” in Arthur Hartkamp et al (eds) Towards a European Civil Code 
(1998) at 302 – 304. 
Ibid. 
30 Ibid at 307. 
31 Whittaker & Zimmermann op cit note 22 at 54n287. 
32 Hesselink op cit note 28 at 287, 291. 
33 Ibid at 287 – 289. 
34 Supra note 5. 
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 “English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle [of good 
faith] but has developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of 
unfairness.  Many examples could be given.  Thus equity has intervened to strike down 
unconscionable bargains.  Parliament has stepped in to regulate the imposition of exemption 
clauses and the form of certain hire-purchase agreements.  The common law has also made 
its contribution, by holding that certain classes of contract require the utmost good faith … 
and in many other ways.”35 
 
Writing in the context of Australian law, Carter and Peden give a few more relevant 
examples: implied terms (the test for the inclusion of an implied term takes account 
of what the parties acting in good faith would have intended); interpretation of 
contracts (this is an objective process, which assumes that the parties negotiated the 
terms in good faith); misrepresentation (in the sense that the law corrects bad faith) 
and frustration (the ultimate rationale of this doctrine is good faith).36  The central 
argument of the contribution of these authors is that good faith is the “essence of 
contract” – in other words that it already is encapsulated in the specific rules of 
contract law – and does not need to stand as an independent doctrine or implied 
term to a transaction.37  Differences between Australian and English law aside, Kötz 
makes a relevant point in his defence of the affinity of English law for good faith 
principles: 
 “Indeed, instead of saying, as an English judge would, that implied terms should be read into 
a contract in accordance with the dictates of business efficacy, one could as easily say, as the 
German judge does, that a certain implied obligation should be imposed on a party because 
good faith requires it.”38 
 
As an uncodified system, English law has no such thing as a “general clause” in the 
sense that civil law systems do.  There are certain statutory protections available to 
consumers, based on the ideal of fairness in contracting.  The foremost of these is 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which (inter alia) restricts the extent to which an 
exemption clause may exclude liability for negligence or breach of contract.  In 
addition there are the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, which 
                                               
35 [1988] 2 WLR 615 at 621. 
36 Carter & Peden op cit note 7 at 158 – 162.  This is a selection from the full list of examples given by 
these authors. 
37 Ibid at 158. 
38 Hein Kötz “Towards a European civil code: the duty of good faith” in Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton 
(eds) The Law of Obligations – Essays in honour of John Fleming (1998) at 250. 
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apply to terms “which have not been individually negotiated”.39  Such a contract will 
be considered “unfair” (and therefore not binding on the consumer40) if “contrary to 
the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights 
and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”41 
 
Thus it is perhaps the methods and institutions of civil law systems which are alien to 
English law, rather than ideas of fairness or equity.  Granted, the good faith principle 
manifests itself differently in the English legal system and civilian systems like 
German law, but this does not mean that English law is unjust or inequitable.  Rather 
the lack of a general doctrine of good faith reflects the lack of a codified legal system 
and a different role being ascribed to judges, who in the English system go 
cautiously from one case to the next, rather than exercising a more general 
discretion within a broadly worded code.42   
 
Australia, by contrast, seems to be moving in the direction of recognising an explicit 
general duty to act in good faith.  In Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for 
Public Works43 the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that a good faith 
obligation should be accepted in Australia, in the same way that such an obligation 
was recognised in Europe and the United States.44  Mason argues that this 
obligation should thus extend only to the performance and enforcement of the 
contract, rather than its making, since this is the limit placed on the doctrine of good 
faith in the US.45  Subsequently it has been held that there is an implied term in all 
contracts that parties must act in good faith.46  This has remained the view of the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal.47  These cases led Mason to argue that good 
faith and fair dealing are “already substantially in place under [Australian] law” and 
that this inclusion would bring “greater coherence” to the existing rules governing 
                                               
39 Section 5(1). 
40 Section 8(1). 
41 Section 5(1). 
42 Kötz op cit note 38 at 245 – 247. 
43 (1992) 26 NSWLR 234.  
44 Ibid at 263 – 269 (per Priestley JA).  See the discussions of this case in Carter & Peden op cit note 
7 and in Anthony Mason “Contract, good faith and equitable standards in fair dealing” (2000) LQR 66 
at 67 – 69. 
45 Mason op cit note 44 at 67. 
46 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1 at 36 – 37. 
47 See authority cited in Mason op cit note 44 at 68. 
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contract performance.48  Carter and Peden, in their contribution, do not doubt that 
Australian law recognises a principle of good faith.  Rather they disagree with the 
mechanism of an implied term, arguing that an “inherent principle” of good faith 
already exists, “underlying and informing the whole framework of contract law.”49  
Thus whether as an enforceable rule, as per Renard, or as an inherent feature of 
contract law – as arguably is the case in its parent, English law – it would appear that 
good faith is alive and well in Australia. 
 
Good faith in the United States is entrenched via legislation and appears to be a 
fairly well-developed concept in that country.  Thus in the Uniform Commercial Code, 
introduced in the US during the 1960s, good faith is enforced by § 1 – 203, which 
provides:  
“Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance 
or enforcement.” 
 
The meaning of the term “good faith” is defined in § 1 – 201(20) as “honesty in fact 
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”  This is a 
revised definition, which incorporates the objective standard of fair dealing, and has 
been enacted in over two thirds of the American states.50  This new definition 
replaces the previous § 1 – 201(19), which defined good faith as “honesty in fact in 
the conduct or transaction concerned,” and required the subjective notion of honesty, 
rather than a more general notion of objective reasonableness in conduct.51 
 
The concept of good faith contained in the American Law Institute’s Restatement of 
Contracts Second, promulgated in 1979, is more far reaching: 
 “§ 205 Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.  Every contract imposes upon each party a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” 
 
This is a far broader notion of good faith.  Comment (a) to § 205 defines “good faith 
and fair dealing” as: (i) “faithfulness to an agreed common purpose”; (ii) “consistency 
with the justified expectations of the other party” and (iii) excluding conduct 
                                               
48 Mason op cit note 44 at 94. 
49 Carter & Peden op cit note 7 at 171. 
50 Joseph M Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts (2009) at 414.   
51 Summers op cit note 8 at 122 – 123.  See also Perillo op cit note 50 at 414. 
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characterised as being in “bad faith” because it violates “community standards of 
decency, fairness or reasonableness.”52  Thus we see that good faith is defined as 
being an “excluder” of bad faith behaviour, which is how it had initially been 
characterised in the writing of Summers.53  According to Mason, this simple 
technique is used to counter arguments that good faith is an “obscure and uncertain 
concept.”54   
 
According to Summers, § 205 does not apply to the negotiation stage of a contract, 
but only to the performance and enforcement of it.55  In addition, the Second 
Restatement is not legislation, but only a body of model rules.  It does appear that 
good faith has a fairly tangible existence in the United States, however, with the 
protection it provides being reminiscent of the European codes.   
 
A common feature of both the civil and common law is that good faith is an 
underlying rationale for the development of equitable rules.  In England this 
development takes a rather ad hoc form and the view that good faith is a separate 
legitimating factor is not favoured.  In Germany the courts draw directly on the 
principle of good faith in developing the law and § 242 has played an important role 
in developing a doctrine of changed circumstances.  These two countries represent 
perhaps the poles of good faith with other legal systems fitting somewhere in 
between.  Notably the US and, to an extent, Australia also recognise a doctrine of 
good faith, although the conceptualisation of this doctrine seems to be a bit vaguer 
than in Germany.  US contract law is based on a system of model rules, however, 
and thus does not have to rely on ad hoc development to create new equitable 
doctrines. 
 
What this brief survey has shown is that developing an equitable doctrine to deal 
with changed circumstances could easily be legitimated by reference to a doctrine of 
                                               
52 See the discussion in Summers op cit note 8 at 123 – 125. 
53 Ibid at 125 – 129.  This “excluder” concept was first formulated by Summers in 1968.  See: Robert 
S Summers “Good faith in general contract law and the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code” (1968) 54 Virginia Law Review 195.  Summers op cit note 8 gives a general synthesis of the 
leading American views on good faith, comprising his own, as well as those of Burton and 
Farnsworth. 
54 Mason op cit note 44 at 69.  Further authority is cited there in support of this contention. 
55 Ibid at 125. 
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good faith, provided such a role for good faith is recognised in a country’s legal 
system.  Since South Africa is a mixed legal system and thus its contract law 
displays features of both the common law and civil law regimes, it will be interesting 
to plot where the South African system fits on this continuum.  Ultimately the 
question must be asked: if we are to have a doctrine to deal with changed 
circumstances and it appears that the existing technical rules of contract law are 
deficient, could South Africa not introduce a new rule of changed circumstances 
based on good faith?    
 
7.3 Good faith in South African law 
 
Good faith, as encapsulated in the traditional Roman phrase “bona fides,” is one of 
the founding principles of South African contract law.56  This principle comes to us 
directly from the Roman law notion of a negotia bonae fidei, in the sense of a 
consensual contract.57  A Roman judge could decide a case concerning a contract of 
this type by use of a discretionary standard of good faith, rather than according to the 
strict, formulaic rules applicable to the negotia stricti iuris.58  In medieval times 
Roman law was received in Holland and blended to form the traditional Roman-
Dutch law.  In classical Roman-Dutch law, all contracts were considered to be bonae 
fidei, so that good faith became a universal contractual requirement.59  Since 
Roman-Dutch law forms the backbone of our present day South African law of 
contract, the assertion of the courts that good faith is a cornerstone of our modern 
law of contract is understandable.  Exactly how this ideal is to be achieved has been 
the subject of some contention in the case law, however.  The first resort of the 
courts was to a Roman law device, which had good faith as its goal.   
 
                                               
56 This principle has been asserted on several occasions by the Appellate Division (and subsequently 
the Supreme Court of Appeal).  See for example: Paddock Motors (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 1976 (3) SA 16 
(A); Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 (1) SA 645 (A); Brisley v 
Drotsky supra note 11 at [22].  See also Reinhard Zimmermann “Good faith and equity” in Reinhard 
Zimmermann & Daniel Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) at 240 and AJ Barnard-Naudé “‘Oh what a 
tangled web we weave…’ Hegemony, freedom of contract, good faith and transformation – towards a 
politics of friendship in the politics of contract” (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 155 at 176. 
57 Compare (generally) Zimmermann op cit note 58 at 217 – 220 and Dale Hutchison “Good faith in 
the South African law of contract” in Roger Brownsword, Norma J Hird & Geraint Howells (eds) Good 
Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (1999) at 215. 
58 See Hutchison op cit note 57. 
59 Zimmermann op cit note 56 at 220. 
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7.3.1 Exceptio doli generalis 
The exceptio doli was an equitable defence introduced by the Roman administration 
to curb the injustice under a second class of contracts, known as negotia stricti 
iuris.60  The most famous example of this class of contracts was the stipulatio, which 
was binding because a particular verbal formula had been used in its conclusion.61  
Good faith initially played no role in the stipulatio.62  The aim of the exceptio doli was 
to give a defence to the innocent party where fraud had been perpetrated under a 
stricti iuris contract.63  The defence had two forms: the exceptio doli specialis, where 
the plaintiff’s fraud had induced the contract and the exceptio doli generalis, where 
the plaintiff’s conduct in bringing the action in the first place constituted bad faith.64  
As noted above, however, by the time of classical Roman-Dutch law, all contracts 
were bonae fidei.  Since the stricti iuris class of contracts had ceased to exist, the 
justification for the exceptio doli had likewise terminated.  Nevertheless the exceptio 
doli generalis was to enjoy a “surprising afterlife”65 in South African law.  
 
In South Africa the exceptio doli generalis was dredged up from the annals of history 
toward the end of the nineteenth century.  While it seldom served its traditional 
function as an independent ground for intervention in contracts, it was used in a 
justificatory fashion.  The English law doctrines of estoppel, rectification as well as 
the concept of an innocent misrepresentation were all incorporated into South 
African law on the basis of the exceptio doli generalis.66  Or in the words of Trollip J:   
 “The English doctrine of estoppel by representation migrated to this country on the authority 
of a passport that it approximated the exceptio doli mali of Roman Law.  However doubtful the 
validity of that passport might originally have been … the doctrine has become naturalised 
and domiciled here as part of our law…”67 
 
                                               
60 For the source of this historical account (except where otherwise indicated) see Zimmermann op cit 
note 56 at 218 – 220 and Hutchison op cit note 57 at 215 – 217. 
61 Reinhard Zimmermann The Law of Obligations (1990) at 546. 
62 Zimmermann op cit note 61 at 546 – 549 traces adaptation of the stricti iuris contract over time.  
Under Justinian the traditional oral (stipulatio) contract was reconciled with the contemporary practice 
of writing contractual obligations down.  The resultant hybrid was a contractus litteris, but also an 
example of a negotia stricti iuris.  With the extension of enforceable contracts to include consensual 
(bona fides) contracts in medieval times, the negotia stricti iuris died out. 
63 Zimmermann op cit note 56 at 218 – 219. 
64 Hutchison op cit note 57 at 216. 
65 Zimmermann op cit note 56 at 236. 
66 Hutchison op cit note 57 at 218. 
67 Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike Ko-operatiewe Maatskappy Bpk 1964 (2) SA 47 
(T) at 49A. 
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Apart from this justificatory function, however, the exceptio doli generalis remained a 
residual defence.    It was considered by the courts to be a mere “surplusage” which 
was only employed when the more technical rules of contract law proved deficient.68  
And thus while the defence was referred to by the Appellate Division in establishing 
other rules,69 or assumed obiter to apply,70 it did not form the actual ratio of any 
decision.  Indeed Zimmermann notes that the only case in which the exceptio doli 
was held to have been successfully invoked as an independent ground for 
intervention in contracts was Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein.71  This case involved a 
standard form deed of suretyship concluded by the defendant with the plaintiff 
bank.72  The defendant did not familiarise himself with the contents of the deed of 
cession, which was sufficiently widely worded to hold him liable for a separate debt, 
which neither party had initially intended to be covered by the agreement.73  The 
defendant’s arguments that such reliance was precluded by the doctrines of 
rectification, misrepresentation or estoppel all failed.74  The final resort of the 
defendant was to the exceptio doli generalis, arguing that the plaintiff’s reliance on 
the suretyship agreement was in bad faith under the circumstances.75  Botha J 
concurred with this final argument and the action failed on this ground.76  
 
The precedent set by the Rand Bank case seemed to provide a measure of 
legitimacy to the exceptio doli defence, and to provide authority for good faith to 
serve as an independent ground for intervention in contracts.  This did not last long, 
however.  In the Bank of Lisbon case77 the majority of the Appellate Division 
declared the exceptio doli defence to be dead.  Joubert JA traced the historical roots 
of the defence (as set out above) and came to the conclusion that it had never 
formed part of Roman-Dutch law and was in consequence no part of South African 
law.78  In his words: 
                                               
68 North Vaal Mineral Co Ltd v Lovasz 1961 (3) SA 604 (T) at 607. 
69 Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 (which accepted rectification into SA law). 
70 Paddock Motors (Pty) Ltd v Igesund supra note 56. 
71 1981 (2) SA 207 (W).  See Zimmermann op cit note 56 at 234. 
72 Ibid at 209. 
73 Ibid at 209, 213. 
74 Ibid at 213C – 214A. 
75 Ibid at 214. 
76 Ibid at 215B-H. 
77 Supra note 2. 
78 Ibid at 605H – 607A. 
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 “All things considered, the time has now arrived, in my judgment, once and for all, to bury the 
exceptio doli generalis as a superfluous, defunct anachronism.  Requiescat in pace.”79 
 
This judgment thus spelt the end for the exceptio doli as an independent ground for 
intervention in contracts.  The device had played another role too, however.  This (it 
will be remembered) was to legitimate the introduction of equitable remedies into 
South African law.  Had good faith lost its creative function in South African law?  In 
the words of Zimmermann: 
 “Has the crucial device for introducing equitable elements been abandoned and have the 
South African courts thus lost that flexibility in the evaluation of contractual rights and duties 
which has enabled them to adapt the law of contract to the demands of changing times by 
developing new or productively incorporating seemingly foreign strands of legal tradition?”80 
 
The end of the exceptio doli was not the end of the line for good faith in South 
African law, however.  As noted above, the role of good faith was debated further in 
subsequent cases, to which this chapter must now turn. 
 
7.3.2 Bona fides 
As noted above, all contracts in Roman-Dutch law were regarded as being bonae 
fidei.  As a result good faith was an informing value in the law of contract and played 
a role in ensuring fair performance and in interpretation.  As early as 1923, the 
Appellate Division had relied on good faith to set aside the outcome of a rigged 
auction.81  Certain types of contracts, such as those for insurance, had always been 
recognised as requiring good faith of the parties.82  It was thus not outrageous for 
Jansen JA to base the incorporation of the doctrine of repudiation for anticipatory 
breach from English law on the notion that in South Africa all contracts were 
regarded as being bonae fidei: 
 “It could be said that it is now, and has been for some time, felt in our domain, no doubt under 
the influence of the English law, that in all fairness there should be a duty upon a promisor not 
to commit an anticipatory breach of contract, and such a duty has in fact often been enforced 
by our Courts.  It would be consonant with the history of our law, and also legal principle, to 
construe this as an application of the wide jurisdiction to imply terms conferred upon a court 
                                               
79 Ibid at 607A-B. 
80 Zimmermann op cit note 56 at 236. 
81 Neugebauer & Co v Herman 1923 AD 564. 
82 These were referred to as involving a relationship uberrimae fidei (“the utmost good faith”) under 
the influence of English law. 
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by the Roman law in respect of the judicia bonae fidei.  It would not then be inapt to say, 
elliptically, that the duty flows from the requirement of bona fides to which our contracts are 
subject, and that such duty is implied in law and not in fact.”83 
 
Soon after a separate concurring judgment from the Appellate Division affirmed the 
notion that an objective concept of good faith had been used since Roman times to 
develop new naturalia for contracts.84  These terms implied by law did not constitute 
a numerus clausus, it was held, and could be added to where changing 
circumstances and new requirements necessitated this.85  Thus again, good faith 
was used to import new terms implied by law into modern South African contract 
doctrine. 
 
While the view that the concept of bona fides underlies our law of contract may have 
held sway in the Appellate Division, it was another thing entirely for it to stand as an 
independent ground for intervention in contracts.  Thus while Jansen’s judgment in 
Tuckers Land and Development Corporation v Hovis (from which the above extract 
was taken) may have been a unanimous decision of the Appellate Division, his 
defence of the exceptio doli in Bank of Lisbon was less successful.  As noted above, 
the majority of the court laid this defence to rest in that case.  Jansen JA, however 
dissented.  He was of the opinion that there needed to be some enforceable 
expression of good faith in South African law: 
 “In our law the requisite of good faith has not as yet absorbed the principles of the exceptio 
doli nor has the concept of contra bonos mores as yet been specifically applied in this field.  
To deny the exceptio right of place would leave a vacuum.”86  
 
The application of public policy, or its component, the boni mores,87 to ensure good 
faith performance under contracts was a fairly new idea, as Jansen JA himself states 
in the above extract.  Public policy as a ground for setting aside a contract had come 
to the fore with the decision of the Appellate Division in Magna Alloys and Research 
                                               
83 Tuckers Land and Development Corporation v Hovis supra note 56 at 652D-E.  This was a 
unanimous decision.  
84 A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 (3) SA 406 (A) per Van Heerden AJA at 419.  The formula 
used for objective good faith in the original Afrikaans is “redelikheid en billikheid”.  
85 Ibid. 
86 Bank of Lisbon supra note 2 at 616C. 
87 See the judgment of Ncgobo J in Barkhuizen at [28], [51] & [73] where he states that public policy 
comprises inter alia the legal convictions of the community or the boni mores.  See also Dale 
Hutchison and Chris-James Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa (2009) at 31. 
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(SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis.88  This was a watershed case in South African law concerning 
restraint of trade provisions, in that it reversed the onus of proving a restraint 
provision was unreasonable from the employer to the employee.89  The relevance of 
this case to the present discussion lies in the lengthy discussion of public policy 
undertaken by Rabie JA.  The Appellate Division expressed the opinion in this case 
that restraint provisions were binding and enforceable unless the enforcement 
thereof would be against public policy.90  Agreements which were against public 
policy were unenforceable.91  Public policy was, moreover, a variable concept, which 
could change from time to time.92  Public policy favoured the concept of pacta sunt 
servanda, but could be limited by other considerations, such as a party’s right to earn 
a living.93 
 
This new limitation on freedom of contract was conservatively applied by the courts, 
however, as Lubbe points out.94  Indeed Magna Alloys was ultimately a decision in 
favour of pacta sunt servanda, rather than against it.95  This application of public 
policy was built upon soon after, however, to create the defence of contracts being 
illegal at common law due to their unconscionable nature.  Indeed, within one year of 
the Bank of Lisbon case the Appellate Division did develop the public policy defence 
to address a situation of bad faith in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes.96  In that case, an 
anaesthetist had ceded all his present and future rights to receive income from his 
profession as security to the appellant finance company.97  In the words of the court, 
he was reduced to the “position of a slave, working for the benefit of Sasfin”.98  
Although public policy generally favoured the “utmost freedom of contract”, it also 
                                               
88 1984 (4) SA 874 (A).  See the discussion in Zimmermann op cit note 56 at 258 – 259. 
89 Ibid at 897 – 898. 
90 Ibid at 897I. 
91 Ibid at 891G. 
92 Ibid at 891H. 
93 Ibid at 893H – 894C. 
94 Gerhard Lubbe “Bona fides, billikheid en die openbare belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse kontraktereg” 
(1990) Stellenbosch Law Review 7 at 12 – 13. 
95 A restraint of trade agreement was now valid, as any other form of contract would be.  It was only 
the enforceability thereof which depended on public policy, and the onus of proving a restraint 
provision was unenforceable was placed squarely on the party attempting to escape the provision.  
This was thus a decision in favour of legal certainty, since restraint agreements which had been 
concluded were now more reliable. 
96 Supra note 13. 
97 Ibid at 5 – 6.  
98 Ibid at 13H. 
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required considerations of “simple justice between man and man”.99  The agreement 
between Beukes and Sasfin was, in the words of the court:  
 “…clearly unconscionable and incompatible with the public interest, and therefore contrary to 
public policy.”100 
 
Again the court was careful to state, however, that: 
 “The power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should, however, be exercised 
sparingly and only in the clearest of cases, lest uncertainty as to the validity of contracts result 
from an arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the power.”101 
 
While Lubbe criticised the Sasfin principle as being too simplistic for its use of the 
“simple justice between man and man” formula,102 this approach to unconscionability 
in contracts was confirmed by the Appellate Division in Botha (now Griessel) v 
Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd.103  Lubbe argued that the application of public policy in Sasfin 
was simply an expression of the good faith requirement.104  Thus hope for good faith 
as an independent ground for intervention in contracts survived Bank of Lisbon.  
Although the idea of fairness in contracting had been resurrected under the banner 
of public policy, the same considerations seemed to underlie this approach. 
 
The link between good faith and public policy was further developed in a minority 
judgment in Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO.105  In 
this case, the Supreme Court of Appeal was called to pronounce upon the validity of 
a suretyship agreement.  This agreement had been signed by a frail 85 year old 
woman in favour of the appellant bank.106  The principal debtor in this case was her 
favourite son, who had prevailed upon her to sign the document.107  The majority of 
the court held that the aged surety had lacked the capacity to understand the nature 
and consequences of her actions at the time of signature and thus dismissed the 
appeal.108  Olivier JA dissented from this view.  He held that the surety had indeed 
                                               
99 Ibid at 9E-G. 
100 Ibid at 13J – 14A. 
101 Ibid at 9B. 
102 Lubbe op cit note 94 at 24. 
103 1989 (3) SA 773 (A) at 782J – 783A. 
104 Lubbe op cit note 94 at 20 – 21.  
105 1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA). 
106 Ibid at 309. 
107 Ibid at 331. 
108 Ibid at 315A-B. 
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been of sound mind at the time of signature, but that it had been in bad faith for the 
appellant bank to rely upon the consensus of an old woman who could hardly see or 
hear, was often confused and was clearly under the influence of her son.  The fact 
that bank had not even explained the import of the contract to her, meant that its 
reliance on her consensus was in bad faith and she was accordingly not bound.109 
 
Olivier JA demonstrated through an analysis of past cases that bona fides had 
always been an underlying element of the South African law of contract.110  He then 
noted that since the decision in Sasfin v Beukes there had been a resurgence of 
values of fairness under the heading of public policy.111  Olivier JA then went on to 
link these two developments: 
 “Dit kan na my mening tereg gesê word dat die bona fide-begrip in die kontraktereg ’n 
onderdeel van die algemeen-geldende openbare belang-beginsel is.  Die bona fides word 
toegepas omdat die openbare belang dit vereis.”112 
 
Olivier JA then turned to the status of the exceptio doli and demonstrated that while it 
had been buried by the Bank of Lisbon case, the bona fide principle remained alive, 
along with the principle of public policy.113  This led the judge of appeal to the 
following conclusion: 
 “Ek voel myself dus vry om die beginsels van openbare belang, wat die bona fide-beginsel 
insluit op die onderhawige feitestelsel toe te pas net soos wat dit in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 
en Botha (now Griessel) v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd en die ander genoemde uitsprake gedoen 
is.”114 
 
This was a bold finding indeed.  It remained the minority view of a single judge in that 
case, however, and was thus not binding precedent.  When a unanimous Supreme 
Court of Appeal seemed to endorse this view in an obiter dictum, however, the good 
faith movement really started to gain some momentum.115  In Mort NO v Henry 
Shields-Chiat,116 Davis J held that constitutional values demanded that contracts not 
                                               
109 Ibid at 330I – 331H. 
110 Ibid at 320 – 321. 
111 Ibid at 321H – 322D. 
112 Ibid at 322D. 
113 Ibid at 323H. 
114 Ibid at 324A-B. 
115 NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC; Deeb and Another v Absa Bank Ltd; Friedman v 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) at [28]. 
116 2001 (1) SA 464 (C). 
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be “oppressive, unreasonable or unconscionable”.117  To ensure they met this 
standard, contracts could be tested against the boni mores, or the legal convictions 
of the community as found in the law of delict.118  In another decision from the Cape 
Provincial Division, Ntsebeza AJ held in Miller and Another NNO v Dannecker that it 
would not be in good faith to enforce a contract containing a non-variation clause 
strictly as to its terms when an oral waiver of those terms had been proved.119 
 
This was thus the backdrop against which Brisley v Drotsky120 was decided by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.  This case involved another non-variation clause in a 
lease agreement.  The terms of the lease required payment of the rent on the first of 
every month and a cancellation clause gave the lessor the right to cancel for late 
payment.121  From the outset, the lessee paid late every month for the first six 
months.122  Finally, in the seventh month, the lessor invoked her right to cancel the 
agreement.123  In the subsequent ejectment proceedings, the lessee argued that an 
oral agreement had been reached, giving her the right to pay late for the first six 
months.124  She asserted that to rely on the strict wording of the contract in the face 
of this was not in good faith.125  This defence did not succeed.   
 
The majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal stressed that good faith is not an 
independent ground for intervening in contracts.126  Good faith was set up in 
opposition to principle of contractual certainty, as encapsulated in the phrase “pacta 
sunt servanda.”127  The majority of the SCA had the following to say: 
 “Goeie trou is ’n grondbeginsel wat in die algemeen onderliggend is aan die kontraktereg en 
wat uiting vind in die besondere reëls en beginsels daarvan.”128 
 
                                               
117 Ibid at 475E. 
118 Ibid. 
119 2001 (1) SA 928 (C) at [19]. 
120 Supra note 11. 
121 Ibid at 22 – 23. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid at 10. 
125 Ibid at 12. 
126 Ibid at [22].  Olivier JA argued in a separate concurring judgment for the inclusion of a justiciable 
good faith standard in South African law (at [75]), but felt that Drotsky’s reliance on the non-variation 
clause was justified in this case (at [79]). 
127 Ibid at [22] – [23]. 
128 Ibid at [22]. 
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To this they added the following quote from an article by Dale Hutchison: 
 “…[G]ood faith may be regarded as an ethical value or controlling principle based on 
community standards of decency and fairness that underlies and informs the substantive law 
of contract.  It finds expression in various technical rules and doctrines, defines their form, 
content and field of application and provides them with a moral and theoretical foundation.  
Good faith thus has a creative, a controlling and a legitimating or explanatory function.  It is 
not, however, the only value or principle that underlies the law of contract; nor, perhaps, even 
the most important one.”129 
 
As far as the judgment of Olivier JA in Saayman went, this was the view of a single 
judge and was thus not binding precedent.130  The unanimous statement in One 
Berg River Drive was clearly obiter and thus also not binding.131  The view of the 
majority in Brisley was that Olivier JA was attempting to breathe life into the exceptio 
doli generalis and give it application under a new banner of bona fides.132 
 
This finding was reiterated soon after, this time by a unanimous Supreme Court of 
Appeal, in the case of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom.133  In Afrox, an argument 
that the enforcement of an exemption clause was not in good faith was met by the 
statement that good faith was not an independent ground for intervention in contracts 
and hence that the court was not persuaded by this approach.134  The findings as to 
the status of good faith in Brisley and Afrox were confirmed yet again in South 
African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timber Ltd.135   
 
Safcol v York involved a long term contract in terms of which Safcol, the owner of a 
plantation, was to provide York Timber with logs.136  A price increase mechanism 
was included in the contract, but due to York’s manoeuvring, it managed to avoid 
such increases in price.137  Safcol argued that York’s avoidance of legitimate 
bargaining attempts was in breach of an implied term requiring them to act in good 
                                               
129 Ibid.  This quotation is taken from Dale Hutchison “Non-variation clauses in contract: any escape 
from the Shifren straitjacket?” (2001) SALJ 720 at 743 – 744. 
130 Ibid at [14] – [15]. 
131 Ibid at [16]. 
132 Ibid at [17]. 
133 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
134 Ibid at [31] – [32]. 
135 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at [27]. 
136 Ibid at 330. 
137 Ibid at 332 – 335. 
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faith.138  York’s reply was that this argument was against the precedent which had 
been established in the Brisley and Afrox cases.139   
 
As noted above, the Court agreed that good faith was not an independent 
substantive rule on which it could rely to intervene in the contract.140  Good faith did, 
however, have a creative role to play in formulating new ex lege implied terms141 and 
in the interpretation of contracts.142  When a contract was ambiguous, the ambiguity 
would be resolved on the basis that the parties had negotiated with one another in 
good faith.143  Safcol’s rights under the price increase clauses in the contract 
imposed a corollary duty on York not to frustrate Safcol in the exercise of these 
rights.144  This interpretation of the contract was strengthened by the underlying 
notion of good faith.145  York had thus been in breach of the agreement when they 
frustrated Safcol’s attempts to achieve price adjustment in terms of the contract146 
and hence Safcol had been entitled to cancel the agreement.147 
 
What the Supreme Court of Appeal has made abundantly clear in the line of cases 
starting with Brisley v Drotsky, is that the exceptio doli is dead and any attempt to 
resurrect the concept of good faith as an independent ground of intervention in 
contracts will not be accepted.148  It does not thus appear that there is scope for any 
form of argument that bona fides stands as a rule which requires a certain standard 
of performance from a contracting party.149  Good faith underlies the rules of contract 
law and that is all, although it may have a creative and controlling function to play, as 
was aptly demonstrated in the Safcol case.   
                                               
138 Ibid at [26]. 
139 Ibid at [27]. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid at [28]. 
142 Ibid at [30] – [32]. 
143 Ibid at [32]. 
144 Ibid at [33]. 
145 Ibid at [34]. 
146 Ibid at [33]. 
147 Ibid at [38]. 
148 See Crown Restaurant CC v Gold Reef City Theme Park (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) SA 16 (CC) where the 
Constitutional Court rejected an argument that the exceptio doli generalis be reinstated.  The 
Constitutional Court refused to entertain this argument as a court of first instance, arguing that the 
High Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal should have heard the matter first (at [6]).  Leave to 
appeal to the SCA had been denied to the applicant (at [3]). 
149 The question as to the exact status of good faith was, however, left open in Barkhuizen supra note 
11 at [82]. 
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The possibility that equitable considerations could limit the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda still remained open to parties due to the defence of unconscionability 
established in Sasfin v Beukes and the subsequent line of cases.  Good faith had 
been limited to the role of an underlying principle, but this did not mean that a 
sufficiently unfair contract might not still be considered to be against public policy.  It 
is this last bastion of objective reasonableness to which this chapter now turns. 
 
7.3.3 Public policy 
The development of the public policy principle from Sasfin v Beukes has  been set 
out above, with Olivier JA holding in his minority judgment in Saayman that public 
policy encompasses good faith and that good faith could thus be applied through the 
medium of the public policy test.  While the development of the good faith principle 
was cut short in Brisley v Drotsky, Cameron JA had the following to say in that case 
in a separate concurring judgment:  
 “The jurisprudence of this Court has already established that, in addition to the fraud 
exception, there may be circumstances in which an agreement, unobjectionable in itself, will 
not be enforced because the object it seeks to achieve is contrary to public policy.  Public 
policy in any event nullifies agreements offensive in themselves – a doctrine of very 
considerable antiquity.  In its modern guise, ‘public policy’ is now rooted in our Constitution 
and the fundamental values it enshrines.  These include human dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-
sexism.”150 
 
Christie summed up this new development as follows: 
 “In the result the Supreme Court of Appeal has rejected the concept of good faith and 
reaffirmed the concept of public policy as an instrument for handling cases of contractual 
unfairness that cannot satisfactorily be handled by existing rules.”151 
 
Of course the other major legal development alluded to in the extract from Cameron 
JA’s judgment was the introduction of a justiciable Constitution in South Africa.  The 
Final Constitution contains the following provision at s 39(2): 
                                               
150 Supra note 11 at [91]. 
151 RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa (2006) at 16. 
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 “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.” 
 
Also relevant is s 173: 
 “The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power 
to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into 
account the interests of justice.” 
 
The Constitutional Court summarily resolved any doubt about the impact of the 
Constitution on the Roman-Dutch principles of the common law in the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case:  
 “I cannot accept this contention, which treats the common law as a body of law separate and 
distinct from the Constitution. There are not two systems of law, each dealing with the same 
subject-matter, each having similar requirements, each operating in its own field with its own 
highest Court. There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the 
supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution 
and is subject to constitutional control.”152 
 
Thus public policy rather than good faith was to serve as the entry point for 
constitutional values of fairness into South African contract law.153  Good faith as a 
free-floating concept had been so effectively buried by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in the line of cases starting with Brisley v Drotsky that it would have been a major 
step in any event to resurrect it.154  Thus an alternative path was found, in the form of 
the public policy requirement, which had served as an inlet for values of fairness 
                                               
152 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at [44]. 
153 Gerhard Lubbe “Taking fundamental rights seriously: the Bill of Rights and its implications for the 
development of contract law” (2004) SALJ 395 at 421 identifies the major constitutional rights involved 
in the contracting process as “equality, freedom and dignity”.  Lubbe notes, however, that these 
values can pull in opposite directions, either favouring contractual autonomy (the “empowerment 
aspect of the right to dignity”) or favouring a limitation on the parties’ autonomy (“dignity as 
constraint”). 
154 While good faith may have been buried by the SCA, the Constitutional Court left the question as to 
its status open in Barkhuizen.  The new defence suggested by the majority judgment in Barkhuizen 
prompted Kerr to declare that the exceptio doli generalis had been revived.  See AJ Kerr “The 
defence of unfair conduct on the part of the plaintiff at the time action is brought: the exceptio doli 
generalis and the replicatio doli in modern law” (2008) SALJ 241.  This is also the view expressed in 
Barnard-Naudé op cit note 56 at 200.  See also Graham Glover “Lazarus in the Constitutional Court: 
an exhumation of the exceptio doli generalis?” (2007) SALJ 449.  Glover argues that while the 
defence raised in Barkhuizen was more or less identical in effect to the exceptio doli, the deliberate 
choice of the Constitutional Court to base this defence in public policy must spell the end for the old 
Roman law device. 
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since the Sasfin v Beukes decision.  The issue of fairness in contracting was thus 
ripe for address by the Constitutional Court and this followed fairly soon after. 
 
In Barkhuizen v Napier155 the Constitutional Court was called upon to pronounce 
upon the validity of a time limitation clause in a short term insurance contract.156  The 
applicant had been involved in a motor vehicle accident.  When he claimed from his 
insurers the claim was repudiated.157  Barkhuizen, however, only instituted action for 
payment after two years had passed.  His standard form insurance contract stated 
that such a claim had to be brought within 90 days of the repudiation.158  Barkhuizen 
challenged the sanctity of this contract under his constitutional right of access to the 
courts (s 34).159   
 
The Constitutional Court was thus called upon to balance a right in the Bill of Rights 
against the principle of pacta sunt servanda.  The majority judgment per Ncgobo J 
noted that such a challenge to a term in a contract had to be brought under the 
banner of public policy.160  The court had the following to say on the content of public 
policy:   
“What public policy is and whether a term in a contract is contrary to public policy must now 
be determined by reference to the values that underlie our constitutional democracy as given 
expression by the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thus a term in a contract that is inimical to 
the values enshrined in our Constitution is contrary to public policy and is, therefore, 
unenforceable.”161 
 
Ncgobo J embellished on this point at a later point: 
 “Notions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness cannot be separated from public 
policy.  Public policy takes into account the necessity to do simple justice between individuals.  
Public policy is informed by the concept of ubuntu.”162   
 
A central element of this approach seems to be a desire to achieve the ideal of 
fairness in contracting.  This seems to be an adequate summary of the above 
                                               
155 Supra note 11. 
156 Ibid at 327. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid at 328. 
160 Ibid at [28]. 
161 Ibid at [29]. 
162 Ibid at [51]. 
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exposition and will be used further below as the major value advocated in 
Barkhuizen.  Indeed there appears to be a trend toward “fairness in contracting” in 
South African law as evidenced by the Barkhuizen case and this concept will be 
used below as a motivator for change.  The opposing value of pacta sunt servanda 
remained important, however: 
“The first question involves the weighing-up of two considerations. On the one hand public 
policy, as informed by the Constitution, requires in general that parties should comply with 
contractual obligations that have been freely and voluntarily undertaken. This consideration is 
expressed in the maxim pacta sunt servanda, which, as the Supreme Court of Appeal has 
repeatedly noted, gives effect to the central constitutional values of freedom and dignity. Self-
autonomy, or the ability to regulate one's own affairs, even to one's own detriment, is the very 
essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity.”163  
 
Ncgobo J finally came to the conclusion that the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
could be limited by considerations of fairness.  This would necessarily involve an 
exercise of discretion on the part of the judge, a process which was to be informed 
by constitutional values: 
“While it is necessary to recognise the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, courts should be able 
to decline the enforcement of a time-limitation clause if it would result in unfairness or would 
be unreasonable. This approach requires a person in the applicant's position to demonstrate 
that in the particular circumstances it would be unfair to insist on compliance with the clause. 
It ensures that courts, as the Supreme Court of Appeal put it, 'employ [the Constitution and] 
its values to achieve a balance that strikes down the unacceptable excesses of ''freedom of 
contract'' while seeking to permit individuals the dignity and autonomy of regulating their own 
lives'.”164 
 
The ultimate decision of the majority, however, was that there was no evidence 
explaining why Barkhuizen had not complied with the time limitation clause.  To 
refuse to enforce it under the circumstances would be contrary to the doctrine of 
pacta sunt servanda.165  The appeal was thus dismissed.  In a dissenting judgment, 
Sachs J undertook a detailed examination of the standard form contract and 
discussed the injustice of holding a consumer bound to such a contract where he 
                                               
163 Ibid at [57]. 
164 Ibid at [70]. 
165 Ibid at [85]. 
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had not fully appreciated its implications at the time of signature.166  Sachs J felt that 
public policy required that the time limitation clause not be enforced.167 
 
Two things seem fairly clear following the decision of the Constitutional Court in 
Barkhuizen.  First, the sanctity of contracts is still an important value in South African 
law.  But, second, public policy requires that values of fairness, as typified by the 
values in the Bill of Rights, be brought to bear on contracts and that courts now have 
an equitable jurisdiction to set aside contract terms which are manifestly unfair.  The 
fact that the majority of the Constitutional Court declined to strike down a contractual 
clause which was one-sided and contained in a lengthy and difficult standard form 
contract is telling, however.  Clearly the degree of unfairness required in order to 
invalidate a contract term will have to be severe.  This is necessitated by the 
balancing which must take place between the implied right to freedom of contract168 
and other implied rights, such as fairness and reasonableness, required by the 
Constitution. 
 
As to the continuing meaning of good faith in South African law, Barkhuizen is less 
clear.  Ncgobo J stated that “the concepts of justice, reasonableness and fairness 
constitute good faith”.169  This echoes his definition of public policy, thus failing to 
adequately distinguish these two concepts.  What is more, O’Regan J distanced 
herself from this part of the judgment.170  Perhaps this issue can be resolved if one 
views good faith as an underlying value, which is part of the public policy rule.171 
 
Mr Justice Brand, a judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal, wrote recently in his 
private capacity on the role of good faith, equity and fairness in the South African law 
                                               
166 See particularly [177] – [183]. 
167 Ibid at [185]. 
168 For authority for the Constitutional right to freedom of contract see (in addition to Barkhuizen) 
Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA) at [15]. 
169 Barkhuizen supra note 11 at [80]. 
170 Ibid at [120]. 
171 These two concepts were distinguished in an earlier article by MacQueen, who argues that good 
faith deals with the relationship between the contracting parties, albeit applying external community 
standards to them, while public policy deals with more general issues in the proper administration of 
justice.  See Hector MacQueen “Good Faith” in Hector MacQueen & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds) 
European Contract Law (2006) at 65. 
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of contract.172  Brand is of the view that the approach to good faith formulated by the 
SCA is not in conflict with the constitutional value system.173  He notes, however, 
that the Constitutional Court declined to rule decisively on this issue.174  Brand 
concludes as follows: 
 “If we have learnt anything from what happened in the past in South African courts, it is this: 
imprecise and nebulous statements about the role of good faith, fairness and equity, which 
would permit idiosyncratic decision-making on the basis of what a particular judge regards as 
fair and equitable are dangerous.  They lead to uncertainty and a dramatic increase in often 
pointless litigation and unnecessary appeals.”175       
 
Brand’s narrow view that too wide a discretion with regard to fairness in contracting 
permits “idiosyncratic decision-making” is to a certain extent borne out by 
subsequent developments in the case law at High Court level.  In Advtech 
Resourcing (Pty) Ltd v Kuhn Davis J declined to enforce an agreement in restraint of 
trade based on considerations of public policy.176  Davis J held that post Barkhuizen 
courts should revisit the issue of onus in restraint of trade cases and revert to the 
position which pertained prior to Magna Alloys.177  The implication of this judgment is 
that this is what the Constitution and fairness in contracting require.178  A different 
outcome was reached by Wallis AJ in Den Braven (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pillay.179  Wallis 
AJ noted the stress which the majority in Barkhuizen had placed on pacta sunt 
servanda and held that there was no need to undo the judgment in Magna Alloys.180  
It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Appeal has steadfastly ignored calls for 
                                               
172 FDJ Brand “The role of good faith, equity and fairness in the South African law of contract: the 
influence of the common law and the Constitution” (2009) SALJ 71. 
173 Ibid at 86. 
174 Ibid.  Brand cites a passage from para 82 of the majority judgment in Barkhuizen in support of this 
contention. 
175 Ibid at 89 – 90.  Compare the statements of the majority of the SCA in Brisley v Drotsky at [24]. 
176 2008 (2) 375 (C). 
177 Ibid at [28]. 
178 It should be noted that Davis J has, in his personal capacity, criticised the Constitutional Court for 
not going far enough in Barkhuizen and allowing too much scope to pacta sunt servanda.  See Dennis 
Davis “Private law after 1994: progressive development or schizoid confusion?” (2008) SAJHR 318.  
In the context of restraint of trade Davis J’s line of reasoning is not unique – see Canon Kwazulu 
Natal (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Office Automation v Booth 2005 (3) SA 205 (N). 
179 2008 (6) SA 229 (D). 
180 Ibid at [33] – [35].  The disagreement between Wallis AJ and Davis J did not end there: Davis J 
struck back with a second judgment in favour of his position on restraint of trade in Mozart Ice Cream 
Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff 2009 (3) SA 78 (C). 
 207
a revision of the burden of proof in restraint cases, implicitly confirming Wallis AJ’s 
position on the issue.181   
 
In a further decision, this time of the South Gauteng High Court, Barkhuizen was 
applied to prevent an unfair result from a standard form contract.  In Breedenkamp v 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd182 the respondent bank had closed the applicant’s bank 
account on the grounds that he was associated with the Mugabe regime in 
Zimbabwe.183  A contractual clause gave the bank the right to close the account for 
any reason.184  Breedenkamp sought an interdict preventing the bank from 
exercising this power.185  Since the contention of the applicant was that the exercise 
of the power to close his account was unfair, the court had to consider the 
Barkhuizen case: 
 “Barkhuizen v Napier … is authority for the proposition that a party to the contract cannot, 
first, impose a term on another party if it would, if applied, operate unfairly and, secondly, 
cannot enforce a term in a manner that is unfair.”186   
 
Jajbhay J noted that banking in South Africa was run by an oligopoly, and that if 
Breedenkamp’s account was closed he would not be able to undertake any form of 
financial transaction.187  The court held that it was thus oppressive under the 
circumstances for the applicant’s bank account to be closed by the bank.188  
 
In a twist to the tale, however, Lamont J refused to confirm this finding on the return 
date.189  Under the direction of a different judge, the South Gauteng High Court held 
that as a result of Breedenkamp’s listing as a “specially designated national” by the 
relevant United States and European Union departments due to his association with 
the Mugabe regime, Standard Bank was entitled to cancel the banker-customer 
                                               
181 See Automotive Tooling Systems (Pty) Ltd v Wilkens 2007 (2) SA 271 (SCA); Reddy v Siemens 
Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA) & Digicore Fleet Management (Pty) Ltd v Steyn 
[2009] 1 All SA 442 (SCA). 
182 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ). 
183 Ibid at 306 – 307. 
184 Ibid at 309. 
185 Ibid at 311. 
186 Ibid at [48]. 
187 Ibid at [60]. 
188 Ibid at [67]. 
189 2009 (6) SA 277 (SCA). 
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relationship with him.190  There was insufficient evidence to support a finding that 
Breedenkamp would not be able to obtain alternative banking facilities.191   
 
The differences in opinion on display in the various High Court decisions purporting 
to exercise the discretion which seems to have been granted to them by Barkhuizen 
underline the need for caution in this regard as highlighted by Brand in the extract 
quoted above.  Clearly Barkhuizen was a decision of major import and it will take 
some time for a jurisprudence to grow around the issues of public policy and fairness 
in contracting.  The Constitution appears to have superseded the common law as a 
source of values for determining whether a particular contractual clause is unfair or 
not.  The doctrinal peg on which these constitutional values have been hung is the 
issue of legality, as determined by public policy.  While the exceptio doli and bona 
fides as independent grounds for intervention in contracts may have reached the end 
of the line, fairness in contracting is just beginning on its path to maturity in South 
Africa.  What is now necessary is a development of the common law in line with s 39 
(2) and s 173 of the Constitution to give effect to these values.  
 
The latest development in the ongoing saga surrounding fairness in contracting is 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA 
Ltd.192  In this case, counsel for the appellant argued that “Barkhuizen stood as 
authority for the proposition that fairness is a core value of the Bill of Rights and that 
it is therefore a broad requirement of [South African] law generally.”193  Harms DP for 
a unanimous court disagreed with this view, holding that Barkhuizen was not 
authority for a general duty of fairness in the enforcement of contracts.194  This value 
would only come into play if a “public policy consideration found in the Constitution or 
elsewhere is implicated.”195   
 
This reflects a negative response to fairness in contracting by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.  The court has cut down the broad wording of the public policy definition in 
                                               
190 Ibid at [66]. 
191 Ibid. 
192 [2010] ZASCA 75.  Harms DP noted in footnote 3 to this judgment that the incorrect spelling of 
Bredenkamp as “Breedenkamp” in the law reports had its origins in the initial Jajbhay J judgment. 
193 Ibid at [27]. 
194 Ibid at [50]. 
195 Ibid. 
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Barkhuizen to something which operates only where a Constitutional value (or some 
other important value) is imperilled.  The disaffection for broad discretionary 
remedies is obvious in Harms DP’s judgment.  Perhaps this confirms that the views 
of Brand JA, although he was not party to the Bredenkamp decision, are the views of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in general.  It should also be noted that leave to appeal 
to the Constitutional Court was denied in this case, so for the moment, Bredenkamp 
must stand as the last word on fairness in contracting. 
 
.Although the Bredenkamp case was negative about the role of fairness in 
contracting, one is left with the feeling that the law is in a state of flux and that the 
last word has not yet been spoken on this topic.  The conservative viewpoint of 
Brand and the Supreme Court of Appeal seems to echo earlier decisions such as 
Brisley and Afrox, which do not go far enough in the direction of equity.  While Brand 
makes valid points as to the importance of certainty in the law, this is outweighed by 
the constitutional imperative to achieve fairness in contracting.  It should also be 
noted that if one can frame one’s claim on the basis of a threat to a constitutional 
right, then this will pass the narrow test set by the Supreme Court of Appeal for the 
application of a doctrine of contractual fairness.  
 
In the context of this thesis as a whole, it thus still seems possible post Bredenkamp 
to argue that a development of the law to accommodate changed circumstances 
could be made under the banner of the constitutional requirement of fairness in 
enforcing contracts.  Before examining this possibility, however, a final avenue down 
which the good faith principle has travelled must be examined.     
 
7.3.4 Legislation 
Long before the landmark decision in Barkhuizen, there was an investigation by the 
South African Law Commission as to whether the question of good faith in contract 
should be regulated by statute.196  This investigation began in 1983 and resulted in a 
Working Paper197 in 1994, a Discussion Paper in 1996198 and a Report in 1998.  
                                               
196  Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts, South African Law 
Commission, Project 47.  For comment on this process and the outcomes of Project 47 see AJ 
Barnard “A different way of saying: on stories, text, a critical legal argument for contractual justice and 
the ethical element of contract in South Africa” (2005) SAJHR 278. 
197 Working Paper 54. 
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Once the views of the respondents to the Working Paper had been considered, it 
was decided to drop the standard of “good faith” in contracts and opt rather for one 
of “unconscionability”.199  A proposed Unfair Contractual Terms Bill was attached to 
the 1996 Discussion Paper, which gave a court the power to “rescind, amend … or 
make such other order” regarding a contractual provision which it felt was 
“unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive”.200  The draft Bill was revised in the 
1998 Report and was attached as a new Bill on the Control of Unreasonableness, 
Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms.  This second Bill is 
far more detailed than its 1996 predecessor.  There are a few notable differences as 
well, as Neels points out.201  Notably, there is express provision in the 1998 Bill for a 
power for courts to terminate or adapt a contract struck by changed 
circumstances.202  This provision appears to be fairly closely based on the equivalent 
article 6:111 of the Principles of European Contract Law.203  If enacted, the 1998 Bill 
would expressly deal with the problem of changed circumstances and obviate much 
of the discussion in this chapter which deals with common law powers to adapt or 
discharge contracts on this ground.  In more than ten years since its proposal this 
draft legislation has made little progress toward enactment, however, and Project 47 
has largely been superseded by developments of the common law, particularly in 
Barkhuizen v Napier.   
 
There is a parallel legislative development in the more specific area of consumer 
protection.  The Consumer Protection Act204 was promulgated in  2009 and will come 
into force in October 2010.205  This Act contains a specific prohibition on any 
“transaction or agreement” or any “term or condition of a transaction or agreement” 
which is “unfair, unreasonable or unjust”.206  A transaction or agreement will be unfair 
if (inter alia): 
(a) it is excessively one-sided against the consumer; 
                                                                                                                                                  
198 Discussion Paper 65. 
199 Discussion Paper 65 at paras 1.49 – 1.50.  Compare the discussion in Hutchison op cit note 57 at 
227 – 229. 
200 Section 1(1) of the Draft Bill. 
201 Jan L Neels “Die aanvullende en beperkende werking van redelikheid en billikheid in die 
kontraktereg” (1999) TSAR 684 at 701 – 703. 
202 Clause 4(3).  See the discussion of this clause in chapter 2 above at section 2.5. 
203 See chapter 6 above for a discussion of the PECL. 
204 Act 68 of 2008. 
205 Schedule 2 Item 2(2). 
206 Section 48(2). 
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(b) its terms are so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable.207 
 
Aside from the actual terms of the agreement involved, a supplier may also not use 
“physical force … , coercion, undue influence, … unfair tactics or any similar 
conduct” in the “negotiation, conclusion, execution or enforcement of an agreement 
to supply any goods or services to a consumer”.208 
 
These prohibitions, contained in sections 40 and 48 of the Act, are aimed at 
“suppliers” and “consumers”, which are defined terms.  According to the list of 
definitions in s 1, a “supplier” means “a person who markets any goods or services”.  
“Market” is also a defined term in the Act and means “to promote or supply any 
goods or services”.  A “consumer” is “a person who has entered into a transaction 
with a supplier in the ordinary course of that supplier’s business”.  Section 5 limits 
the wide definition of consumers in section 1, since it states that the Act is intended 
to apply only to every transaction occurring within the Republic, and not to 
transactions where goods are supplied to certain consumers such as the State or a 
juristic person with a sufficiently high annual turnover or net asset value as 
determined by the relevant minister.209 
 
Given the broad purpose of the Act and the broad phrasing of sections 40 and 48, it 
would appear as though the results which have been achieved in the Barkhuizen 
judgment now have the statutory go-ahead as well, at least in the context of 
consumer relations.  Thus it appears that any contract which can be classed as 
being a consumer contract in terms of the above definition, will be subject to a 
prohibition on any type of unfairness.  This will apply both in the drafting and 
implementation stages of contracting.  This will require careful thought on the part of 
drafters of standard form contracts.  It remains to be seen whether this Act will be 
interpreted in the light of the decision in Barkhuizen, or whether the sphere of 
application of sections 40 and 48 will cut further inroads into the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda. 
 
                                               
207 Section 48(2). 
208 Section 40(1)(c). 
209 Section 5(1)(a) & s 5(2)(a) – (b).  “Transaction” is a defined term in the Act and refers to the supply 
of goods or services for consideration. 
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Again, considered against the overall purpose of this thesis, it may be that the 
Consumer Protection Act does have some relevance to changed circumstances, 
since reliance by a supplier on performance by a consumer may be considered to be 
unfair if an unforeseen change of circumstances has intervened.210  The Act applies 
to contract terms and the performance thereof, so there is scope to argue that it 
would be contrary to its provisions to demand performance under a contract struck 
by changed circumstances.  If there is a hardship clause in a consumer contract then 
the application of such clause will have to be fair to the consumer.   
 
The fact that the Consumer Protection Act is such a recent development, however, 
means that there has been little judicial interpretation of it so far and one must thus 
rely on interpretations of s 40 or s 48 suggested by academics.211  These seem to 
back up the very general points made above.  Since the judgment in Barkhuizen 
does seem to overlap with sections 40 and 48, I will leave consideration of the Act at 
this point.  The chapter now turns to the application of this study of good faith and 
fairness in contracting to the problem of changed circumstances in contract. 
 
7.4 The problem of changed circumstances in contract law  
 
Against this backdrop of good faith and fairness in contracting, both internationally 
and within South Africa, the problem of changed circumstances must now be 
considered.  Again this discussion will begin with the suggestion put forward by Van 
Huyssteen and Van der Merwe under the heading “Good faith in contract: proper 
behaviour amidst changing circumstances.”212  The central thesis of these authors is 
that it may not be in good faith for a contracting party to enforce the literal terms of 
his or her agreement if that agreement has been struck by a significant and 
unforeseen change of circumstances.  This argument assumes therefore that good 
faith is relevant to the enforcement of one’s rights under a contract and thus as a 
necessary concomitant that good faith can serve as an independent ground for 
                                               
210 Since such an instance of bad faith would be at the enforcement stage of contractual relations, it 
could constitute “unfair tactics” in the “enforcement of an agreement” within the meaning of s 40(1)(c) 
of the Consumer Protection Act. 
211 See for example Tjakie Naudé “The consumer’s ‘right to fair, reasonable and just terms’ under the 
new Consumer Protection Act in comparative perspective” (2009) SALJ 505 and Evert van Eeden A 
Guide to the Consumer Protection Act (2009) at 180 – 188. 
212 Van Huyssteen & Van der Merwe op cit note 1.  
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intervention in contracts.  If this were not the case, good faith could not serve as an 
enforceable basis for the type of rule suggested by Van Huyssteen and Van der 
Merwe. 
 
What has been shown above is that according to the Supreme Court of Appeal, good 
faith, at least by that name, does not exist as an independent ground for intervention 
in contracts.213  The recent case law from the Supreme Court of Appeal states that 
good faith underlies the law of contract, but is not free-floating: it must find 
expression through one of its established rules.214  Even the Barkhuizen decision 
avoided the contention that good faith had any role beyond this in contract law.215 
 
This is not to say that altruist216 ideals have no role to play in the South African law of 
contract.  Indeed, since the introduction of the democratic Constitutions, it can safely 
be said that this country has entered an era of egalitarian values and a concern for 
one’s fellow human being.  That is the purpose behind the Bill of Rights in chapter 
two of the Final Constitution.  As has been illustrated above, these rights apply not 
only in a constitutional law setting between the State and its citizens, but also 
horizontally between private parties.217  This means that even contracts are subject 
to the Constitution and the common law of contract must be developed to give effect 
to the rights in the Bill of Rights.218  Just such an endeavour was undertaken by the 
Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier.  Although there is no specific right to 
fairness in contracting, the altruist ideals of chapter two were brought squarely to 
bear on a contract and were held by the majority to stand as a limitation on a self-
serving and one-sided exercise of contractual powers.  As such the values of 
fairness in contracting limited the right to contractual autonomy, a right which is also 
                                               
213 See for authority the discussion of the Brisley and Afrox cases supra. 
214 Brisley v Drotsky supra note 11 at [22]. 
215 Barkhuizen supra note 11 at [79] – [83].  It should be noted that the Constitutional Court left the 
question as to the exact role of good faith open in Barkhuizen.  Compare the argument of Glover op 
cit note 152 who makes the point that the Constitutional Court deliberately chose to ground its 
doctrine of fairness in public policy.  For a contrary view see Barnard-Naudé op cit note 56 at 195 – 
196 who argues that good faith and public policy are both open norms and to privilege public policy at 
the expense of good faith on the basis of lack of precision makes little sense. 
216 Compare the use of this term in Kennedy op cit note 20 at 1717 who sets up “altruism” as the 
antithesis of “individualism” and premises the notion upon the belief that one should not preference 
one’s own interests over the interests of others. 
217 See s 8 of the Constitution. 
218 Section 39(2). 
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implied in the Constitution.219  While the majority in the Barkhuizen case were careful 
not to completely do away with the value of contractual autonomy, it does seem clear 
now that unfair contract terms will be unenforceable.  It thus seems clear that there is 
now an independent ground of fairness in contracting which can limit the exercise of 
contractual powers. 
 
This brings us back to the argument of Van Huyssteen and Van der Merwe.  The 
major fault in their approach is the use of “good faith” terminology.  If one were to 
rephrase their argument and state that it might be unfair and against constitutional 
values to insist on performance of a contract following an unforeseen and 
fundamental change of circumstances, this would seem to accord fully with 
Barkhuizen.  Essentially the difference is thus merely one of semantics.220 
 
This type of approach leaves something to be desired, however.  To allow 
repudiation of one’s contractual obligations on good faith grounds alone, would lead 
to an ad hoc development of the law and would not necessarily do justice in every 
case.221  A better worked out theory to deal with changed circumstances is required.  
Rather than relying on fairness in contracting directly each time, this general 
principle should rather serve as the justificatory basis for a new doctrine, specially 
designed to serve the needs of a contract struck by changed circumstances.  The 
content of such a rule would have to still be worked out, but there are many 
international examples, such as frustration, Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage or the 
model rules of PECL or Unidroit’s PICC.  South African courts could be guided by 
such examples and formulate their own theory to accommodate changed 
circumstances.222  As to the role of fairness or good faith, one is reminded of the 
words of Dale Hutchison cited in Brisley v Drotsky: 
 “Good faith thus has a creative, a controlling and a legitimating or explanatory function.”223   
 
                                               
219 See authority in the text above.  The rights to dignity (s 10) and free trade (s 22) are sometimes 
used to justify this type of argument.  Compare also the argument of Lubbe op cit note 153 at 421.   
220 Cf Barnard-Naudé op cit note 56 at 195 – 196. 
221 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law (1998) at 535 argue that a 
tendency to decide cases of changed circumstances based on good faith should be resisted.  Rather 
there should be emphasis on the contract between the parties and the express allocation of risk.  The 
task of the courts these authors argue is then to fill the gap left in the contract by parties who did not 
foresee the type of event in question. 
222 A possible suggestion in this regard will be put forward in chapter 8. 
223 Brisley supra note 11 at [22]. 
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Much like the role good faith plays in German law, values of fairness in contracting, 
by whatever name, could serve as the underlying rationale, or aanknopingspunt, for 




This brief examination of the law on good faith should make a number of things 
clear.  First good faith, or fairness in contracting, is a cornerstone of most Western 
systems of contract law.  In civil law countries like Germany it plays an important role 
as a free-floating doctrine which can be used either for direct intervention in 
contracts, or as a underlying rationale to justify new developments in the law.  The 
English common law system recognises no independent role for good faith, but it 
underlies several equitable rules and remedies.  Other common law and civil law 
systems tend to be placed on a continuum between the extremes of the German and 
the English positions.  South Africa as a mixed legal system displays elements of 
both the English law role for good faith and the broader civil law role.  Second, within 
South Africa, good faith has had a lengthy history, but was never really an 
independent ground for intervention in contracts.  Good faith did, however, justify the 
incorporation of several equitable remedies and thus the development of new 
residual rules. It can also be said to underlie our law of contract. 
 
Third, the status of good faith in South Africa seems to have changed under the 
Constitution, although it is now no longer referred to as good faith.  According to the 
Barkhuizen decision, the Constitution requires the altruist notion of fairness in 
contracting and may justify equitable intervention in contracts found to be unfair.  
Fourth, good faith has always had a creative function to play in South African law.  
This occurred first in its guise as the exceptio doli, but also occurred under the 
heading of bona fides and continues today under the latest descriptions of the role of 
                                               
224 For authority for the use of an objective concept of good faith (“redelikheid en billikheid”) as basis 
on which to incorporate a new term implied by law, see A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981(3) SA 
406 (A) at 419.  See also: Tjakie Naudé “The function and determinants of the residual rules of 
contract law” (2003) SALJ 820 at 829 – 830 raises a similar argument.  Naudé argues that good faith 
has a creative function to play in South African law and can be used to develop new residual rules in 
contract law. This would provide judges with a basis on which to found a new doctrine and would 
answer critics who feel that fairness in contracting is too loosely defined a term to apply within the 
concrete setting of this specific problem.  
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good faith emanating from the Supreme Court of Appeal.  This creative function was 
expressly recognised in Brisley v Drotsky and played a big role in the case of Safcol 
v York, where the outcome of the case rested on an interpretation of the contract 
based on good faith.225   
 
The logical deduction which should follow from the above points is that provided 
fairness requires that the problem of changed circumstances in contract law be 
addressed, there is ample scope for arguing that this can be done in terms of the 
Constitution.  This would lead the courts to develop our law in terms of s 39(2) to 
give effect to the requirements of fairness and reasonableness implied in the Bill of 
Rights.  Such a development should be in the form of a crystallised rule, rather than 
simply to invoke fairness in contracting per se on an ad hoc basis.  There are many 
international models to follow in this regard. 
 
The overall purpose of this chapter in the greater scheme of things is to show that 
good faith can serve as a doctrinal peg, or aanknopingspunt, in South African law on 
which to base a new doctrine of changed circumstances.  Such a development 
would be entirely in keeping with the history of good faith in this country as well as 
with the Constitutional mandate contained in s 39(2).  Good faith would remain a 
principle underlying our law of contract, rather than a rule which can be directly relied 
upon in its own right. 
 
With this foundation in place it is now possible to attempt to break new ground and 
plot possible solutions to the problem of changed circumstances in South African 
law.  Chapter eight suggests a possible way forward for this country. 
                                               
225 This is in line with the argument of Naudé mentioned above at note 224. 
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Chapter 8: The way forward 
 
8.1 What has been learned from the comparative studies 
 
This thesis has examined the law on changed circumstances in contracting both 
historically and in several jurisdictions.  The clausula rebus sic stantibus was seen to 
make provision for changed circumstances in medieval law, but to have been a 
rather vague and lax doctrine.  It is not surprising that this undeveloped device fell 
out of favour with the rise of commercialism in the nineteenth century.  The notion 
that contracts cannot always be absolute in the face of changed circumstances lives 
on, however.  The United States, Germany and the Netherlands have all been seen 
to make provision for the problem of changed circumstances in their municipal law to 
a greater or lesser extent.  To this list can be added Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, 
Austria – in short, most of the countries of Western Europe.1  Furthermore, hardship 
is recognised by the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the 
Principles of European Contract Law and the Draft Common Frame of Reference.2  
Indeed of the countries examined in this thesis, only France and South Africa lack a 
doctrine to deal with hardship3 and in English law the narrow ambit of the doctrine of 
frustration probably excludes hardship. 
 
8.2 What is different about South Africa? 
This lacuna in South African law has not escaped the attention of our local 
authorities on contract.  Some commentators maintain a conservative stance on the 
question of change of circumstances.  Christie states in his textbook on contract that 
the clausula rebus sic stantibus is a potentially dangerous inroad into the concept of 
pacta sunt servanda and that it is difficult to raise any enthusiasm for it.4  He does, 
however, note that in other jurisdictions the position is different.5  Christie suggests 
that a tacit term or condition may be able to accommodate hardship or, alternatively, 
                                               
1 Ole Lando & Hugh Beale (eds) Principles of European Contract Law – Parts I & II (2000) at 328.  
This is also the conclusion of Denis Tallon “Hardship” in Hartkamp et al (eds) Towards a European 
Civil Code (2004) 499 at 502. 
2 See chapter 6 above. 
3 It should be noted that this is also the approach in Belgium and Luxembourg.  Lando & Beale op cit 
note 1 at 328. 




that a purposive construction of the contract combined with the public policy rule 
should achieve a just result.6  Thus even someone who favours contractual certainty, 
such as Christie, has recognised the problem at hand and suggests ways of solving 
it.  Indeed in a different context (a comparison of South African law and the Unidroit 
PICC) Christie has stated that the lack of a doctrine to deal with changed 
circumstances “leaves a gap in our law”.7  He maintains his conservative stance in 
this discussion by expressing the opinion that South Africa would be unlikely to adopt 
rules similar to the PICC.8 
 
Other writers, such as Lubbe and Murray, suggest that there may be a need to 
develop our law to bring it in line with other jurisdictions.9  These authors suggest 
bona fides – or public policy – as the appropriate tool with which to effect change.10  
Kerr is even more open to change.  His textbook does not use the conventional 
heading of “impossibility of performance”, but rather uses the title “absence during 
the currency of the contract of the circumstances necessary for its operation”.11  The 
ensuing discussion makes it clear that Kerr envisages discharge for a broader range 
of reasons than mere impossibility.  He claims that Williams v Evans12 is an example 
of a case where his rule applies and that this case was correctly decided.13  Kerr 
further argues that the operation of the principle in Krell v Henry14 can be supported 
in South African law.15  In comparison to other writers, Kerr’s views are fairly radical.  
It is at best debatable whether the concept of the supposition in futuro, or the 
analogous doctrine of frustration of purpose, form part of South African law at 
present.16      
 
                                               
6 Ibid. 
7 RH Christie “Our law of contract and the modern lex mercatoria” in Graham Glover (ed) Essays in 
honour of AJ Kerr (2006) at 71. 
8 Ibid at 73. 
9 Gerhard Lubbe & Christina Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract – Cases, Materials, Commentary 
(1988) at 773 – 774. 
10 Ibid. 
11 AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract (2002) at 545. 
12 1978 (1) SA 1170 (C). 
13 Kerr op cit note 11 at 547 – 548. 
14 1903 (2) KB 740 (CA). 
15 Kerr op cit note 11 at 551. 
16 See the argument in chapter 2 above. 
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Von Alvensleben, who wrote a Masters thesis on the topic of “Fundamental change 
of circumstances and the principle of causa finalis”, argued that the doctrine of 
frustration (by which he appears to mean the concept of frustration of purpose) 
became “part and parcel of the South African law regarding supervening 
impossibility”.17  This argument was based largely on the cases discussed in chapter 
two of the present thesis which advocated the incorporation of the concept of 
frustration of purpose into South African law.  The basis for such an incorporation 
would not be good faith, but rather the concept of causa finalis, or the common 
purpose of the parties.18  Von Alvensleben asserts that the doctrine of iusta causa 
should form part of South African law and the principle of reciprocity which it 
embodies can underlie the notion of equivalence in exchange necessary to do justice 
in a situation of changed circumstances.19  Von Alvensleben’s approach is different 
to that advocated here, where good faith has been relied on as the underlying 
rationale for a doctrine of changed circumstances.  His conclusion as regards the 
incorporation of frustration of purpose into the South African common law is at 
variance with the finding in the present thesis in chapter two and the authority which 
Von Alvensleben cites for this conclusion is at best tenuous.20  What is relevant, 
however, is that Von Alvensleben also recognises that there is a lacuna in South 
African law with regard to changed circumstances, which needs to be addressed. 
 
For several reasons a change in our law is required.  The basis for such a change 
may be considerations of fairness,21 or it may be economic considerations based on 
the appropriate allocation of risk under a contract, such as who is the superior 
insurer or risk bearer.22  This thesis advocates fairness as the underlying motivator 
for change.23  While law and economics scholars make a justifiable claim for 
addressing the problem of changed circumstances on economic grounds, there are 
                                               
17 Philipp Carl Von Alvensleben Fundamental change of circumstances and the principle of causa 
finalis (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Stellenbosch 2001). 
18 Ibid at 206. 
19 Ibid at 209 (paraphrased). 
20 Compare the analysis of cases like Kok v Osbourne 1993 (4) SA 788 (SECLD) and African Realty 
Trust Ltd v Holmes 1922 AD 389 in chapter 2 above. 
21 Compare the argument advanced in chapter 7. 
22 Compare the discussion of law and economics in chapter 4. 
23 As set out in chapter 7, the concepts of “fairness” and “fairness in contracting” are used as a 
summary of the approach set out in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) with regard to the 
impact of public policy on the relationship between contracting parties.  As argued earlier, the 
traditional notion of good faith forms a subsidiary element of this approach.   
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worrying discrepancies in their theories, which would make this type of approach 
difficult to implement.  Economic considerations could in any event inform the 
exercise of a discretion as to whether to allow redress for changed circumstances on 
the basis of fairness. 
 
The experience of other jurisdictions shows that it is not just to dogmatically insist on 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda following a significant change of circumstances, 
since this places the burden of the change unfairly on one party alone.  The 
argument to be advanced here is that under appropriate circumstances the burden of 
increased expense following a change in circumstances should be split between the 
parties, by operation of law and on the basis of good faith, rather than allocated by 
default to one party alone.  This is similar to the argument advanced by Fried, who 
states that in a situation of frustration a gap is created in a contract by the 
occurrence of an unexpected event.24  In order to fill this gap there must be a resort 
to a process of sharing resultant losses and gains.25 
 
Thus an expansion of our narrow concept of impossibility must be allowed, to 
accommodate a doctrine of changed circumstances.26  The concern of writers such 
as Christie for the concept of pacta sunt servanda should not fall by the wayside, 
however.  The experience of countries such as Germany shows that even where 
there is a strong good faith discretion allowed to judges to adjust contracts affected 
by an unforeseen change of circumstances, the pendulum has swung back in favour 
of legal certainty as the relevant doctrine of changed circumstances has been 
allowed to mature.27  Issues of the proper allocation of risk must thus be brought to 
the foreground when dealing with cases of hardship.   
 
                                               
24 Charles Fried Contract as Promise (1981) at 69 – 70.  See Sarah Howard Jenkins “Exemption for 
non-performance: UCC, CISG, Unidroit Principles – A comparative assessment” (1998) 72 Tulane 
Law Review 2015 at 2019, where she notes that Fried’s theory based on fairness is an alternative to 
the economic theory of Posner and Rosenfield (see chapter 4 at section 4.3.5 above) which seeks to 
allocate loss based on economic efficiency.  The major difference between these two approaches is 
that in Fried’s the losses are shared between the parties.  See also Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz An 
Introduction to Comparative Law at 535 – 536. 
25 Ibid.  Zweigert & Kötz op cit note 24 at 536 also argue that a judge must fill a gap in this type of 
case.  These authors suggest that such a gap should be filled “in accordance with the standards 
developed by reputable commercial men for contracts of that type.” 
26 The exact manner in which this should be effected will be discussed in the following section. 
27 See chapter 5 above. 
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In addition this chapter will discuss the question of what the appropriate method is to 
allocate the losses caused by a change of circumstances between the parties.  
Before this can occur, however, the question of which types of changes in 
circumstances will be covered by the new rule must be answered.  Furthermore 
there is a need to establish a general threshold test which a change in 
circumstances will have to meet before any type of remedy is considered.  The 
comparative studies have shown that there is a divergence here between countries 
such as England, which allow only for discharge and countries such as Germany and 
the Netherlands which allow for judicial adaptation of the contract in addition to the 
remedy of discharge.  Admittedly the concept of judicial revision of contracts is, in 
South Africa, very far removed from the present status quo, a fact which Christie 
noted in a recent discussion.28  Despite difficulties in introducing this type of remedy, 
even by legislation,29 the question needs to be answered as to whether this is not a 
more appropriate means of dealing with the problem of changed circumstances. 
 
The goal of this chapter is thus to examine ways in which a doctrine of changed 
circumstances could be adopted in South Africa and then also the form which it 
could possibly take.  The ultimate question is whether there can be an application of 
the lessons learned from the foreign jurisdictions and supranational model rules 
discussed in this thesis in mapping the way forward for our own country. 
 
8.3 Basis for change: fairness in contracting 
 
A central part of the argument advanced here is that it is not fair to allocate the 
burden of a change of circumstances on one party alone due to the random 
operation of chance.  As Tallon notes, “[h]ardship is a typical daughter of good 
faith”.30 This means that the principle of fairness must underlie any possible change 
in the law which is to take place.  While such a defence has not yet been tested in 
the context of changed circumstances, it is conceivable that a defendant could plead 
for discharge of an agreement struck by changed circumstances on the ground of 
                                               
28 Christie op cit note 7 at 72. 
29 Ibid at 73. 
30 Tallon op cit note 1 at 503. 
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fairness in contracting.31  If such a defendant were to invoke the Bill of Rights in his 
defence, he might well call upon the value of equality32 to the effect that it would be 
unjust for him alone to bear the burden of an unforeseen change of circumstances.  
Alternatively a party may invoke the right to dignity.33  Although the right to dignity 
has been said to shore up freedom of contract and contractual certainty, it also holds 
that the contracting process should “enhance, rather than diminish” a party’s self-
respect and dignity.34  Further support could be found in the constitutional value of 
fairness itself, which seems to be implied by the majority decision in Barkhuizen.35  
Indeed in an appropriate case a defendant might even argue that it would be 
unconscionable to enforce an agreement against him due to hardship.36 
 
Public policy or constitutional values would thus play the role of aanknopingspunt, or 
doctrinal peg, rather than being the direct basis for a decision to permit discharge for 
changed circumstances. 
 
Such a development could essentially be along the following lines: due to the 
recognition of an expanded role for public policy and fairness in Barkhuizen, the 
courts should now recognise that constitutional values demand that the impact of 
changed circumstances should not fall on one party to a contract alone.  Thus there 
must be a development of the common law rules of South African contract law to 
accommodate the problem of changed circumstances.37  This would be an exercise 
by the courts of their powers under s 39(2) and s 173 of the Constitution.  If an 
                                               
31 The idea that fairness in contracting constitutues a new ground for review of contracts does not 
coincide with the more conservative view of Brand (FDJ Brand “The role of good faith, equity and 
fairness in the South African law of contact: the influence of the common law and the Constitution” 
(2009) SALJ 71 at 89 – 90), discussed in chapter 7.  As stated there, however, this view is too narrow 
as fairness in contracting is now an enforceable right of a party to a contract following the decision in 
Barkhuizen supra note 23.  
32 Section 9. 
33 Section 10. 
34 Gerhard Lubbe “Taking fundamental rights seriously: the Bill of Rights and its implications for the 
development of contract law” (2004) SALJ 395 at 420 – 421. 
35 Although there is no such right in the Bill of Rights, arguably it is implied by the other values listed 
there.  See Barkhuizen v Napier at [29], where the majority held that public policy was informed by 
constitutional values, read with [51] to [52], where the majority held that public policy was informed by 
notions of justice and fairness.  
36 Along the lines of the finding in Barkhuizen v Napier or the judgment of Jajbhay J in Breedenkamp v 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ). 
37 Cf Tjakie Naudé “The function and determinants of the residual rules of contract law” (2003) SALJ 
820 at 827 – 830. 
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objection were to be raised that such a development would be contrary to the 
established principles of our Roman-Dutch common law, one could point to the 
dictum of Lord Tomlin in Pearl Assurance Co v Union Government:38 
 “[Roman-Dutch] law is a virile living system of law, ever seeking, as every such system must, 
to adapt itself consistently with its inherent basic principles to deal effectively with the 
increasing complexities of modern organised society.”  
 
Thus it is a development of the common law which is advocated here, and it is the 
form which this development must take to which this chapter now turns.  
 
8.4 A doctrine to deal with changed circumstances in South African contract law 
 
The conceptualisation of a doctrine to deal with changed circumstances is slightly 
different in every jurisdiction where this defence is recognised.  This emerges from 
the different wording used in the various municipal codes or supranational rules.  
The broad categories into which the various classes of cases of changed 
circumstances fall, however, remain more or less constant from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  For ease of reference, the American terminology will be adopted here.  
Thus following the Second Restatement of Contracts, cases of changed 
circumstances can be divided into the categories of impossibility (including legal 
impossibility), impracticability and frustration of purpose.39 
 
Impossibility is already recognised as a ground for discharge in South Africa and has 
been discussed above in chapter two.  This chapter will thus focus on the question of 
whether the further categories of impracticability and frustration of purpose can be 
accommodated in our law.  Not all countries recognising discharge for changed 
circumstances allow discharge on the basis of frustration of purpose and 
impracticability.  English law in particular recognises the defence of frustration of 
purpose, but seldom allows discharge on this ground, and does not recognise the 
                                               
38 1934 AD 560 at 563.  See also Blower v Van Noorden 1909 TS 890 at 905: “There come times in 
the growth of every living system of law when old practice and ancient formulae must be modified in 
order to keep in touch with the expansion of legal ideas, and to keep pace with the requirements of 
changing conditions.” 
39 Second Restatement of Contracts at §§ 261 – 265. 
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doctrine of impracticability.40  Since both these grounds of discharge are permitted in 
the majority of the jurisdictions studied in this thesis, however, the possibility of an 
expansion to accommodate both will be analysed here. 
 
8.4.1 Frustration of purpose 
Frustration of purpose occurs where the value of the performance under a contract 
to the buyer of goods or services is greatly diminished following a change of 
circumstances.41  The client’s obligation to pay money is still possible, as is the 
supplier’s obligation to supply.  Merely the purpose – or common foundation – of the 
contract (for both parties) has fallen away.  In the common law jurisdictions, this 
doctrine is known by the name of “frustration of purpose” and the same class of 
cases falls under the more general wording of the German and Dutch codes.42   
 
The conclusion of chapter two was that the English doctrine of “frustration” has never 
been validly incorporated into South African law, although there was limited case 
authority in favour of this proposition.43  South African law does recognise the 
concept of the supposition, however, which makes the continued operation of a 
contract contingent upon the existence of a particular state of affairs.44  This 
statement must be treated with caution though - in Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v 
Smith NO the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that even a supposition relating to a 
present fact cannot have any effect on a contract unless it is a term of that contract, 
otherwise it remains an irrelevant motive in contracting, even if commonly held.45  
The supposition as to a future state of affairs was held to be “indistinguishable from a 
condition” or “an ordinary term of the contract”.46 
 
                                               
40 See chapter 4 above at sections 4.2.4.2 – 4.2.4.3.  Aside from the seminal Krell v Henry [1903] 2 
KB 740, Guenter Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure (2004) notes that frustration of purpose has 
scarcely ever been applied since (at 346).  There are several dicta in leading English cases against 
the doctrine of impracticability, such as Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd v CS Wilson & Co Ltd [1917] AC 
495 at 510 and British Movietonews Ltd v London and District Cinemas Ltd [1952] AC 166 at 185. 
41 Cf Treitel op cit note 40 at 309; Christoph Brunner Force Majeure and Hardship under General 
Contract Principles – Exemption for Non-Performance in International Arbitration (2009) at 411. 
42 Cf § 313 (1) of the BGB: “If circumstances which became the basis of a contract have significantly 
changed since the contract was entered into…” and Article 6:258 (1) of the BW: “…the court may 
modify the effects of a contract or may set it aside … on the basis of unforeseen circumstances…”.  
43 See chapter 2 at section 2.2.2.2. 
44 Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v Smith NO 2002 (4) SA 264 (SCA) at [8] – [ 9]. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid at [8]. 
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The supposition in futuro may be an existing avenue for an expansion of South 
African law to accommodate the doctrine of frustration of purpose.  The supposition 
in futuro as encapsulated in Williams v Evans47 would terminate a contract if the 
occurrence or continuation of a state of affairs which had been the commonly held 
basis of a contract between the parties did not eventuate.  In other words if the 
common foundation of the transaction between the parties fell away, rendering as a 
result the value of the performance greatly decreased for the recipient, then the 
contract would be terminated.  Arguably this is merely a different way of stating the 
frustration of purpose defence.   
 
The declaration by the Supreme Court of Appeal that the supposition in futuro does 
not exist is a great blow to the possibility of recognising the doctrine of frustration of 
purpose in South Africa.  The Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding that this device 
does not exist in our law was directly based on the reasoning that the failure of even 
a commonly held motive should have no effect on a contract.48  Since by definition 
frustration of purpose operates in the realm of motives rather than actual 
impossibility, the Van Reenen Steel dictum should preclude the operation of this 
doctrine.  This does not, however, address the unfairness in allowing the loss 
consequent upon an unforeseen change in circumstances to fall upon the client 
alone.   
 
It was argued in chapter two, however, that since the finding in Van Reenen Steel 
prevented only motivating factors that were not elevated to the status of terms of a 
contract from being considered, a supposition in futuro could thus circumvent this 
prohibition if it were framed as a tacit resolutive condition.  Seen in this light, the 
facts surrounding the negotiations of the parties involved might imply that the 
continued existence of a contract was contingent upon the existence of a future state 
of affairs.  This contingency might even extend to an unforeseen change in 
circumstances, since the tacit condition could be imputed to the parties concerned 
                                               
47 1978 (1) SA 1170 (C). 
48 The judgment in Van Reenen Steel supra note 44 refers to the classic dictum in African Realty 
Trust Ltd v Holmes 1922 AD 389 at 403 to this effect. 
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even if they never foresaw it.49  Thus there might be scope within the Van Reenen 
Steel judgment itself for a recognition of the supposition in futuro, provided the test 
for a tacit term was met.  
 
This approach would answer the objections of critics of the supposition in futuro, 
since now the doctrine would not operate merely in the realm of motives, but would 
be concretised as an actual term of the contract.  Such an approach would have to 
answer to Vorster’s criticism of the conventional curious bystander and business 
efficacy tests used to determine the existence of a tacit term in this country, 
however.50  Vorster argues that these tests mask the use of policy decisions by the 
courts relevant to a particular case, which should rather be developed in a more 
coherent (and openly acknowledged fashion) through the other existing methods of 
determining the existence of an implied or tacit term.51  Following Vorster it might be 
preferable to leave the tests for subjective intention aside and rely rather on an 
objective test for an ex lege term to deal with the problem of frustration of purpose.   
 
This begs the question as to whether expansion to accommodate the supposition in 
futuro – or the doctrine of frustration of purpose – is the appropriate way to deal with 
this problem in this country.  Several case examples of frustration of purpose have 
been cited in previous chapters, these include: a contract to view a procession from 
a particular room, which was frustrated by the cancellation of the procession;52 a 
contract to lease a neon advertising sign, which was frustrated when legislation 
prevented the illumination of such signs at night53 and a contract to supply a 
consignment of out-dated drills for use in the mines of East Germany, which was 
frustrated by trade barriers preventing the importation of West German goods, since 
there was no market for the drills elsewhere.54  It is true that the potential loss in this 
class of cases is limited to the contract price, yet is it just to allocate the risk of loss 
                                               
49 Van den Berg v Tenner 1975 (2) SA 268 (A) at 277; Wilkins NO v Voges 1994 (3) SA 130 (A) at 
136 – 137. 
50 JP Vorster “The bases for the implication of contractual terms” (1988) TSAR 161. 
51 Ibid at 179 – 180. 
52 Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740. 
53 20th Century Lites v Goodman 149 P 2d 88 (1944). 
54 “The pneumatic drill case” BGH MDR 1953, 282. 
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due to changed circumstances in this type of case solely on the recipient of goods or 
services?   
 
The proper allocation of contractual risks looms large in a normative discussion of 
whether to permit discharge or revision of a contract struck by frustration of purpose.  
Factors such as the foreseeability of the ultimate change in circumstances, whether 
it was beyond the control of the parties, or whether the disadvantaged party 
assumed the risk of the frustrating event are highly relevant in such a determination.  
Hence it is not entirely satisfactory to argue for the resolution of a dispute based on 
frustration of the purpose of the contract based on a tacit term, since this grounds 
the inquiry only in the subjective consensus of the parties, which does not make 
provision for the above considerations.  Naudé has argued for implied terms 
(including tacit terms) to be viewed as forming a continuum from those terms wholly 
based on the actual but unexpressed intention of the parties to those which are 
determined normatively (by law).55  Since the argument to be advanced here is that 
normative considerations of fairness should underpin a new doctrine of changed 
circumstances and that certain policy considerations should underpin its application, 
it seems more appropriate to place the desired doctrine to deal with frustration of 
purpose at the ex lege end of the spectrum.56  
 
A possible reconciliation of the supposition in futuro with the suggested ex lege 
device to deal with frustration of purpose, could be along the lines suggested by 
Lubbe and Murray: 
“Whether or not a supposition [in futuro] … is actually incorporated into a contract will usually 
depend on whether the test for the existence of a tacit term is satisfied.  This means that 
where the parties are convinced of the existence of the state of affairs, one is concerned with 
an imputed rather than an actual consensus.  Resort to such a fiction leaves one but a step 
away from holding that it is a naturale of contractual obligations that liability depends on the 
existence of the matrix of facts which motivated the contract.  A further development would 
make the obligation depend on the continued existence of that matrix of facts.”57    
 
                                               
55 Tjakie Naudé “The relationship between the different types of terms implied into contracts” (Part I) 
(2003) 24(2) Obiter 283 at 287. 
56 Compare the distinction between ex lege and tacit terms in Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v 
Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) at 531D – 532D. 
57 Lubbe & Murray op cit note 9 at 446. 
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The question remains, however, as to whether this is the appropriate method for 
dealing with the problem of frustration of purpose?  As Lubbe and Murray note, one 
may choose here between a subjective approach relying on a tacit term and 
operating in the realm of a legal fiction, or an ex lege term making the continued 
operation of the contract dependant on the continuation of a given set of facts.  Is it 
necessary to impute a consensus to the parties at the time of conclusion of the 
contract?  Surely it is better to determine ex post facto based on the available facts 
whether discharge should be permitted?  Such a determination could take policy 
considerations into account such as the appropriate weight to be attached to the 
concept of pacta sunt servanda versus the nature and effect of the frustrating event.  
Rather than a legal fiction an express rule of contract law should be formulated. 
 
Several models for such a rule have been examined in this thesis.  The wording of 
these provisions varies from one set of rules to the next, but certain common themes 
tend to reoccur.  As to the threshold test for when a change in circumstances will 
warrant intervention in a contract, slight variations exist.  The US and German 
models rely on the motives in contracting.  The US rule on frustration of purpose 
states that the non-occurrence of the event should have been “a basic assumption 
on which the contract was made”.58  The German model uses a comparable 
formula.59  The Dutch model expressly makes the determination of the continuing 
validity of the contract contingent upon a good faith (“redelijkheid en billijkheid”) 
inquiry.60  The supranational rules found in the PICC rely on a fundamental alteration 
in “the equilibrium of a contract”,61 the PECL on whether the change in 
circumstances has become “excessively onerous” and the DCFR on whether there 
has been an “exceptional” change of circumstances which makes it “manifestly 
unjust” that the debtor continue to be bound to its obligation.62  
 
                                               
58 Second Restatement of Contracts § 265.   
59 BGB § 313(1): “If circumstances which became the basis of the contract have significantly changed 
since the contract was entered into and if the parties would not have entered into the contract or 
would have entered into it with different contents if they had foreseen this change…” 
60 BW art 6:258(1). 
61 PICC art 6.2.2. 
62 PECL art 6:111(2) & DCFR at Book III, art 1:110(2). 
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Since the approach advocated here involves a shift away from imputed consensus, 
the German and US models should be avoided.  Likewise the Dutch model is to be 
discarded, since good faith is already advocated as the underlying rationale for the 
proposed test.  To say that the determination as to whether discharge should be 
permitted also depends on good faith takes the inquiry no further.  Admittedly these 
faults, particularly with regard to the German and Dutch models are minor, but it 
should be borne in mind that these rules have been developed within the broader 
context of the codes and case law of these countries and thus it is more difficult to 
transpose these rules to another country without also replicating the fuller features of 
the original system.  One major distinction between both the German and Dutch 
models and the model rules of the PICC, the PECL or the DCFR, is that there is no 
duty to renegotiate placed upon the parties.  While Busch et al argue with regard to 
the Dutch context that the general good faith provisions could require this, it is an 
important improvement which has been made in the model rules and is a credible 
reason for preferring their approach to changed circumstances.63 
 
The choice of the South African Law Commission in this regard has already been 
discussed in previous chapters.  When the SALC proposed legislation to deal with 
the problem of changed circumstances it was largely based on the equivalent 
provision in the PECL.64  As noted in chapter two, however, no justification was given 
by the commission for this choice.  As argued in chapter six, since this thesis 
advocates that the common law be developed to address this problem, the exact 
formulation of the proposed rule is less important than if legislation was to be 
suggested.  Again, as argued previously, the specificity of the PICC provision lends 
itself to the formulation of a common law rule.  For ease of reference the threshold 
test for the invocation of this provision is reproduced: 
“There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the 
contract either because the cost of a party’s performance has increased or because the value 
of the performance a party receives has diminished, and 
(e) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion of the 
contract; 
                                               
63 Danny Busch, Harriet Schelhaas et al (eds) The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch 
Law (2002) at 289. 
64 See clause 4 of the Bill on the Control of Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or 
Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms (1998) attached to the Report on Project 47. 
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(f) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by the disadvantaged 
party at the time of the conclusion of the contract; 
(g) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and  
(h) the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party.”65  
 
This threshold test sets out that there must have been some upset of the 
equivalence in exchange between the parties and that both situations of 
impracticability (increase in the cost of performance) and frustration of purpose 
(decrease in the value of performance) will be covered.  The guidelines set out at (a) 
– (d) further make explicit the limits which will be placed on the exercise of a 
discretion to award redress. 
 
Since this is to be a common law rule, however, there is no reason why the PICC 
provision should not be read with the other provisions in the PECL or the DCFR.  
Thus in deciding whether the threshold test has been met, a court could also have 
regard to whether or not the change of circumstances is exceptional and causes 
manifest injustice (as per the DCFR) or whether the impact of the change is to make 
performance excessively onerous on the disadvantaged party (as per the PECL).  
 
This basic framework will now be applied to two leading cases by way of example.  
In Krell v Henry (referred to above) the illness of the King was possibly foreseeable, 
particularly since he was over 60 at the time of the proposed Coronation,66 but 
ultimately this consideration was not taken into account by the parties.  This raises 
the question as to whether the question should be a subjective one (“actually 
foreseen”) or an objective one (“reasonably foreseeable”).  This is a question of 
policy.  Since the advocated approach here is generally an objective one (what is fair 
all things considered) rather than dealing in the realms of motive (what was the 
actual/ imputed consensus of the parties) the test should probably be one of 
foreseeability.  This would ensure greater protection for the doctrine of pacta sunt 
servanda and allow greater scope for courts to deny discharge for the failure of a 
mere motive to materialise.  Would it then have been proper to require the lessee to 
pay an exorbitant rental to watch the ordinary London traffic?  Perhaps, but as Treitel 
                                               
65 PICC art 6.2.2. 
66 Treitel op cit note 40 at 316. 
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points out, the lessor could charge an increased rental again when the postponed 
procession did indeed take place, providing him with a windfall gain.67 
 
Perhaps when examining the facts of our own South African locus classicus on 
frustration of purpose, Williams v Evans, one feels less sympathy for the 
disadvantaged party.  In that case the common purpose of the contract was that 
Evans would purchase and operate a dairy owned by Williams’s son.  This required 
capital, however, which could only be raised by a bank overdraft.  Williams agreed to 
furnish security so that Evans could obtain an overdraft, but the bank in question 
nevertheless refused to grant the overdraft.  Thus the purpose with which Evans had 
entered the contract for the purchase of the dairy was frustrated, since he would now 
not be able to finance the operation of it without the loan capital.  It was entirely 
foreseeable that the bank would not furnish an overdraft, the parties had merely 
been short-sighted in not considering this possible outcome of their conduct.  
Perhaps this should be seen as the underlying basis why the discharge of Evans’s 
liability by Broeksma J in this case has been so heavily criticised, since the threat to 
the concept of pacta sunt servanda is too great where the frustrating event is merely 
unforeseen.   
 
Thus in sum: frustration of purpose should be incorporated into South African law, 
since it is a vital aspect of the change of circumstances problem.  This is best 
achieved by means of a common law rule, formulated along the lines of article 6.2.2 
of the PICC, read with the PECL and the DCFR, as set out above.  It is important 
from a point of view of the allocation of risk under a contract that mere motives are 
not permitted to discharge an obligation, thus the criterion should not be a subjective 
one, inquiring merely whether the subjective consensus of the parties was that 
circumstances should remain unchanged.  Rather the criterion should be objective, 
inquiring ex post facto whether the frustrating event has upset the equilibrium of the 
contract, subject to certain important provisos, such as that the event should not 
have been reasonably foreseeable; should be beyond the control of the 
disadvantaged party and that it should not have assumed the risk thereof.  
 
                                               
67 Treitel op cit note 40 at 322. 
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As to the consequences of a finding that frustration of purpose is present, possible 
outcomes are discharge of the contract, or alternatively, renegotiation or judicial 
revision of the contract.  The question as to what is the appropriate remedy will be 
dealt with below once impracticability has been considered. 
 
8.4.2 Impracticability 
Impracticability is the converse of frustration of purpose, in that it affects the supplier 
of goods or services rather than the client.  Instead of a decrease in the value of the 
performance, there is an increase in the costs associated with supplying the 
performance under the contract.68  This may be due to a severe shortage of raw 
materials or of supplies due to war, embargo, crop failure or similar events.69  While 
performance is not strictly speaking impossible, the increased difficulty of 
performance means that in certain jurisdictions (notably the United States as well as 
– for example – Germany and the Netherlands) discharge is considered the just 
outcome.  As noted in previous chapters this is not the position in England, where 
the courts refuse to discharge a contract for impracticability.  Likewise in South Africa 
there are several authoritative dicta which rule out the possibility of discharge on this 
ground. 
 
The inclusion of this doctrine in the more progressive jurisdictions, as well as in most 
of the supranational rules of international trade is indicative of the fact that it forms a 
vital part of change of circumstances doctrine.  While the potential loss in cases of 
frustration of purpose is limited to the contract price, in cases of impracticability the 
potential loss is (in theory) infinite and is limited only by the continuing solvency of 
the debtor.  While perhaps the law may expect a debtor to be prepared to face 
bankruptcy, to place the consequence of insolvency on a debtor due to an 
unforeseen change of circumstances beyond his control seems – as with frustration 
of purpose – to be unjust.  A strong argument could be made that it is 
unconscionable to place economic ruin upon one party because of impracticability 
consequent upon an unforeseen change of circumstances, although considerations 
as to whether the supplier expressly or impliedly assumed the risk of a change of 
                                               
68 Compare Treitel op cit note 40 at 262 – 263.  See also Second Restatement of Contracts at § 261. 
69 Compare Second Restatement of Contracts: Official comment (d) to § 261. 
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circumstances may apply.  In our own South African context it may well be that 
fairness in contracting demands that a debtor be discharged under an appropriate 
situation of impracticability. 
 
Consider the following statement in a leading South African contract textbook: 
 “Die maatstaf by die bepaling of prestasie moontlik of onmoontlik is, is ’n verkeersmaatstaf. 
…Dit is fisies moontlik om ’n spoorstaaf wat in die see geval het op te diep en te lewer, maar 
in die verkeer moet dit as onmoontlik beskou word omdat die koste daaraan verbonde buite 
elke verhouding met die waarde van prestasie staan.”70 
 
Van der Merwe et al translate the concept of a “verkeersmaatstaf” as a “pragmatic 
standard”.71  These authors develop upon the concept as follows: 
 “While an absolute ‘physical’ impossibility will satisfy the test, a performance that might 
conceivably be rendered will nevertheless be impossible if insistence on its performance 
would be unreasonable in the circumstances.”72 
 
In a footnote to this passage, Van der Merwe et al add that factors such as “practical 
and economic expediency and fairness” play a role in such a determination.73  A 
noteworthy factor in this discussion is that De Wet and Van Wyk give no authority for 
their concept of a verkeersmaatstaf, nor is there any support provided for the 
example of a valuable object falling into the sea and therefore being “impossible” to 
recover.  There is a corresponding absence of authority in the discussion of Van der 
Merwe et al, who cite only De Wet and Van Wyk.  Authority for this proposition does 
exist, however, albeit in foreign jurisdictions.  Treitel cites the English case of Moss v 
Smith74 where a very similar proposition was accepted, as well as the German 
textbook writer Larenz,75 who includes a similar example.76 
 
If the standard really is a flexible one, and particularly if considerations of fairness 
play a role, would it really be such a big step to stretch the definition of impossibility 
to include impracticability?  The case studies, particularly in the United States where 
                                               
70 JC De Wet & AH Van Wyk Kontraktereg (1992) at 85 – 86. 
71 Schalk van der Merwe et al Contract – General Principles (2007) at 188. 
72 Ibid.   
73 Ibid at 188n18. 
74 (1859) 9 CB 94 at 103. 
75 Karl Larenz Schuldrecht 14th ed (1987) Vol I at 99. 
76 Treitel op cit note 40 at 264 – 265. 
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this doctrine is most famously recognised, indicate that discharge for impracticability 
is not something to be invoked lightly – only the most severe increases in expense, 
in the order of several hundred per cent meet the threshold test.  The threshold test 
for redress advocated under the discussion of frustration of purpose is phrased so as 
to accommodate both instances of frustration of purpose and impracticability, so it 
could be implemented with minimal tweaking.  Once again, the above listed factors 
such as foreseeability of the change of circumstances causing the rise in prices can 
be used to limit the availability of this defence.  Opponents of impracticability might 
argue that it is merely “subjective” impossibility,77 but it is conceivable that increased 
expense due to a general phenomenon such as war or embargo justify discharge 
nevertheless. 
 
In sum, there is some academic authority that the standard of impossibility in South 
Africa is a flexible one depending on practical standards of social expectation.78  
While increased difficulty in performance has not been recognised in the case law as 
a ground for discharge as yet, this is at variance with international trends.  The 
justification for a possible expansion of the impossibility defence to include drastic 
instances of impracticability are already present, given this flexible standard.    It 
would thus not be a big jump from the present common law position of impossibility 
to a new regime where redress was allowed in situations of impracticability. 
 
Applying this reasoning to the South African cases considered under the heading of 
impracticability in chapter two, reflects that perhaps the dicta in which this defence 
has been denied were pronounced in cases where discharge would probably not 
have been the appropriate remedy.  In MacDuff & Co Ltd (In Liquidation) v 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd79 an argument that the respondent 
was no longer obliged to take over the business of the appellant on the grounds that 
a slump in the coal market had made this “commercially impossible” was rejected.80  
                                               
77 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 71 at 189.  Van der Merwe et al do however note that difficulty in 
performance might lead to such economic or other hardship that the applicable standard demands 
discharge for objective impossibility. 
78 In a different chapter of their book, Van der Merwe et al op cit note 71 translate “verkeersmaatstaf” 
as a “standard of society” (at 542). 
79 1924 AD 573. 
80 Ibid at 606. 
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It is submitted that ordinary market related price shifts are foreseeable in the normal 
course of business, particularly by a party who trades within that market.  Thus the 
Appellate Division was correct to reject this ground of appeal.  In Hersman v 
Shapiro81 a middleman dealer in corn contracted to supply a certain quantity of a 
particular grade of corn to another dealer.  A further contract selling this corn in 
advance on the overseas market had already been entered into by the second 
dealer.  Crop failure due to heavy rains intervened and the first dealer argued that it 
was impossible to supply the required corn.82  It was held that this defence was bad 
in law, since it was not impossible, but merely more difficult to supply the corn.83  
Again this was the correct decision, since the resultant change was foreseeable.  
The dealer was a middleman and the transaction was essentially speculative.  It can 
thus be argued that he had assumed the risk of the resultant change of 
circumstances and should have diversified his sources or at least obtained insurance 
in case of crop failure. 
 
Finally in Unibank Savings and Loans (formerly Community Bank) v ABSA Bank84 
the appellant bank had been placed under curatorship and the curator had cancelled 
the employment contracts of two employees.85  This bank sought to justify this 
cancellation on various grounds, including that it was impossible to continue to use 
the employee’s services.86  The court held that impossibility was not present, the 
decision had merely been based on the business operations of the bank.87  Thus the 
impossibility was related to the expense of hiring the employees, which was minimal 
compared to the total operation costs of a bank.  Deteriorations in the profitability of 
the company had been foreseeable at the time of conclusion of the contract of 
employment and the change of circumstances did not discharge the contract.88  
Again the reasoning of the court cannot be faulted in this case.  Not only was the 
change of circumstances foreseeable in this case, but the consequences of holding 
the bank bound to its contract was limited to the payment of the salaries of two 
                                               
81 1926 TPD 367. 
82 Ibid at 371. 
83 Ibid at 375 – 377. 
84 2000 (4) SA 191 (W). 
85 Ibid at 194. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid at [9.2]. 
88 Ibid at [9.3.1]. 
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employees.  Furthermore it is hardly unconscionable to expect an employer to 
honour its contracts of employment and the argument raised as to impossibility here 
appears slightly frivolous. 
 
It does not seem too radical to argue for a recognition of impracticability in South 
African law, provided this defence is limited to situations where the appropriate test 
for impracticability, as formulated above, are met.  A mere increase in price will have 
to be unforeseeable, which will be hard to prove with a market related price increase.  
The seminal US case of Mineral Park Land Co v Howard89 provides an example of 
the type of situation in which discharge for impracticability would be justified.  It will 
be recalled from chapter four that this is the case which established the defence of 
impracticability in America.  The defendant had agreed to take all the gravel it 
needed for a particular building project from the plaintiff’s land.  After about half the 
agreed quantity had been removed, it was discovered that the remainder was below 
the water table and could only be extracted at 10 to 12 times the price.  In addition, 
building would be delayed while the gravel was dried.  The obligation of the 
defendant was held to have been discharged by impracticability.90 Following an 
unforeseen rise in price of this magnitude, it would arguably be unconscionable to 
nevertheless insist on performance. 
 
As to the threshold level of increase to be met before permitting discharge, it is worth 
reiterating the suggestion of Brunner discussed in chapter six that in a situation of 
impracticability the margin of increase in cost should be 100 to 125 per cent of the 
contract price before discharge is permitted.91  This puts in concrete terms what 
magnitude of increase will constitute unconscionability.  The recent Belgian decision 
in Scaform International BV v Lorraine Tubes SAS92 also refers here, however.  
There an unforeseen rise in the cost of supplying goods under an international 
contract of sale in the order of 70 per cent was held to “fundamentally disturb the 
contractual balance” and renegotiation was enforced on the buyer.93   
                                               
89 156 P 458 (1916). 
90 Ibid at 459. 
91 Brunner op cit note 40 at 432. 
92 19 June 2009 Belgian Court of Cassation [Supreme Court].  Translation available at 





The South African cases in which the existence of a defence of “commercial 
impossibility” has been denied have been ones where discharge for impracticability 
should not in any event have been allowed as the threshold of sufficiently severe 
impracticability was not met.  In a case of sufficiently severe rise in cost, public policy 
can be used to justify a defence of impracticability and this should occur by 
broadening the definition of impossibility.  If one accepts the view of De Wet and Van 
Wyk and Van der Merwe et al that the standard required for discharge is a 
“verkeersmaatstaf”, then this should not be too unfathomable, nor too alien to our 
accepted law.  
 
8.5 Consequences of a finding of frustration of purpose or impracticability 
 
The first remedy envisaged by the PICC, the PECL and the DCFR for a contract 
struck by hardship is in the form of a non-judicial  ability of the disadvantaged party 
to request renegotiation.94  If this proves unsuccessful, a court may discharge the 
contract or adapt it to restore the equilibrium.95  In South Africa the traditional remedy 
for supervening impossibility has always been discharge.  To extend this to changed 
circumstances would be less difficult than to attempt to enforce renegotiation, or 
even less likely, to allow for judicial adaptation of the contract.  Christie has argued 
that the introduction of hardship provisions by the South African courts along the 
lines of those found in the supranational model rules, particularly because of the 
nature of the remedies offered there, would be to usurp the power of the 
legislature.96  He is of the further opinion that the legislature is unlikely to introduce 
such rules, given the hostile climate in this country to discharge for change of 
circumstances.97  This is a conservative stance and is at variance with the argument 
advanced in the previous section of this chapter.  The question which thus needs to 
be asked is whether South African law is really so hostile to enforced renegotiation 
or judicial adaptation? 
 
                                               
94 PICC art 6.2.3; PECL art 6:111(2)-(3); DCFR III 1:110(2); BGB § 313; BW art 6:258. 
95 Ibid. 




The principle of pacta sunt servanda may be under attack in the new constitutional 
dispensation, but it remains one of the cornerstones of contractual doctrine in South 
Africa.  The initial decline of good faith in South Africa was largely due to the 
competing value of contractual autonomy and it will not be easy to persuade courts 
to allow even discharge for changed circumstances, let alone renegotiation.  Chapter 
four demonstrated that in England there is likewise a strong following for the concept 
of pacta sunt servanda and there even under the more permissive doctrine of 
frustration, there is an all-or-nothing approach to remedying changes in 
circumstances.   
 
The question remains, however, as to whether renegotiation is not the preferable 
remedy.  A strong argument can be raised that renegotiated performance is likely to 
be preferable to the parties to no performance at all.    It might thus be desirable to 
attempt to force the parties to renegotiate themselves, before a court actively 
intervenes in the contract.  In this regard, the recent jurisprudence surrounding the 
duty to negotiate in good faith in South Africa is worth mentioning.  In Southernport 
Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd98 the Supreme Court of Appeal enforced a 
duty to negotiate in good faith on the parties before it.99  Here the parties had 
entered into an agreement to negotiate a further agreement contingent upon whether 
the appellant’s application for a casino licence succeeded or failed.100  A clause in 
this bridging agreement stated that should the parties fail to reach agreement in this 
second round of negotiations, an arbitrator could be consulted.101  The Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that the inclusion of the arbitration clause distinguished this 
agreement from a bare “agreement to agree” and hence enforced the duty to 
negotiate in good faith on the respondent.102 
 
The court in Southernport Developments was careful to state, however, that it was 
not making a new agreement for the parties, but simply enforcing their declared 
consensus.103  Hence while this case is authority for enforcing a duty to negotiate on 
                                               
98 2005 (2) SA 202 (SCA). 
99 Ibid at [17]. 
100 Ibid at [2] – [3]. 
101 Ibid. 




the parties before it, it does not stretch beyond implementing their own consensus.  
What if, however, the duty to renegotiate was an ex lege term of the agreement?  
Surely then there would be scope for enforcing a duty to renegotiate and this would 
not be too far removed from the Southernport Developments precedent?  A court 
might even go further and suggest its view of what a fair solution would be and send 
the parties away to return at a future date with their own negotiated settlement.  
Should consensus between the parties prove impossible, the court’s version would 
stand. 
 
In the event of a breakdown of good relations between the parties, some sort of court 
ordered revision may also prove necessary, although the dangers of this are 
illustrated by the American case of Aluminum Co of America v Essex Group, Inc104 
discussed above in chapter four.105  In this vein, the DCFR cautions against ill-
considered judicial adaptation of contracts: 
“Any modification must only be such, however, as will make the obligation reasonable and 
equitable in the new circumstances.  It would not be reasonable and equitable if the effect of 
the court’s order were to introduce a new hardship or injustice.”106   
 
Is judicial adaptation of contracts really so far removed from the present position in 
South Africa?  Consider the concept of restraint of trade.  At one stage the so-called 
“blue pencil” test applied with regard to partial enforcement of restraint agreements 
which were too widely phrased.  If the offending portions could be severed to leave 
an intelligible and coherent residue, partial enforcement could be awarded, if not, the 
contract would not be enforced.107  In National Chemsearch (SA) Pty Ltd v 
Borrowman108 Botha J held that this was an “artificial, ill-defined, and ‘internally 
inconsistent’” approach.109  Rather a judge could, under appropriately limited 
circumstances, formulate a new agreement for the parties which partially enforced 
                                               
104 499 F Supp 53 (1980). 
105 In that case the trial court substituted a complex pricing mechanism negotiated by the parties for 
one of its own creation.  The parties reached settlement before this matter could be determined on 
appeal.   
106 Comment E to DCFR III 1:110. 
107 See the discussion in Roffey v Catterall Edwards & Goudré (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) at 507C-
D. 
108 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T). 
109 Ibid at 1115D. 
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the restraining provision.110  This approach was confirmed by the Appellate Division 
in Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis.111  Thus it is not entirely alien to 
South African contract law for a judge to revise a validly concluded contract.    
Admittedly with partial enforcement of restraint agreements, the judge merely limits 
the application of the agreement, rather than formulating something entirely new, but 
it would not be a big jump from this practice to making slight amendments to 
agreements struck by supervening circumstances. 
 
A final consideration is that the Legislature could introduce a statute which defined 
hardship and made provision for courts to have the power to adjust frustrated 
contracts.  As noted above, Christie felt that such an occurrence was unlikely.  Any 
calamitous change in a country’s circumstances can upset what appeared likely in a 
national legal system.  Furthermore if the arguments of the rest of this chapter are 
accepted, then it is necessary, even in the absence of a national calamity, for the 
problem of changed circumstances to be addressed.  So far only a development of 
the common law under s 39(2) and s 173 of the Constitution has been discussed.  It 
is foreseeable that the same result could be achieved by the Legislature.  A 
comparable power of the courts in this regard is the power to strike down unfair 
conduct or contract terms under s 52 of the Consumer Protection Act.112  As the 
discretionary power to strike down contract terms on the basis of fairness already 
exists, both under the Consumer Protection Act and at common law, following 
Barkhuizen v Napier, it takes only a small conceptual step to extend this discretion to 
the discharge of a contract for hardship based on the unfairness of enforcing it after 
a fundamental change of circumstances.    Eventually a jump could be made from 
discharge to the further remedies of enforced renegotiation or judicial modification. 
To extend the power of the courts in this manner would better equip them to deal 
instances of frustration and would better serve the underlying rationale of fairness in 
contracting.  International practice evidences that this type of remedy is the way 
forward. 
 
                                               
110 Ibid at 1116D – 1117G. 
111 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) at 896E.  See also CTP Ltd v Argus Holdings Ltd 1995 (4) SA 774 (A) at 
787E-F. 
112 Act 68 of 2008.  Of course this Act would not provide much aid to business to business contracts, a 
more general statute would have to be enacted to achieve that result. 
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8.6 Enrichment issues following a termination of a contract due to a supervening 
change of circumstances   
If South African law is to be broadened to allow a change of circumstances to 
discharge a contract, the question which remains is what will become of money or 
property transferred during the existence of that contract.  English law has dealt with 
this issue by the enactment of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act discussed 
above in chapter four.113  This statute requires the return of payments or non-
monetary benefits transferred to the other party prior to the frustrating event.114  This 
rule is subject to the proviso that reliance expenses incurred during the existence of 
the contract may be set off against payments received prior to frustration at a court’s 
discretion.115  South African law maintains that where a contract comes to an end 
due to supervening impossibility a benefit transferred to the other party may be 
claimed by a common law enrichment action.116 
 
In South African law there is as of yet no general action for unjustified enrichment, 
although the Supreme Court of Appeal has strongly indicated that this may be 
recognised in the future.117  Thus there must be a reliance on one of the separate 
condictiones.  The leading case on the enrichment consequences of a contract 
which has failed due to supervening impossibility is Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) 
Ltd v Caterna Ltd.118  There it was held that the appropriate cause of action in this 
type of case is the condictio ob causam finitam, which is a narrower instance of the 
broader condictio sine causa specialis.119  The majority of the court stated that 
sometimes it is “suggested” that the condictio causa data causa non secuta is the 
appropriate action, but noted that there was criticism of the use of this action.120  The 
                                               
113 See chapter 4 section 4.2.6 
114 Sections 1(2) & (3). 
115 Ibid. 
116 Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) Ltd v Caterna Ltd 2003 (5) SA 193 (SCA) at [15]. 
117 McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC 2001 (3) SA 482 (SCA) at [8] – [10]. 
118 Supra note 116. 
119 Ibid at [15]. 
120 Ibid.  The criticism noted is Robin Evans-Jones “The claim to recover what was transferred for a 
lawful pupose outwith contract (condictio causa data causa non secuta)” (1997)  Acta Juridica 139.  
Here the author argues that this action has been incorrectly employed by the House of Lords in the 
context of Scots law to give a remedy where there has been enrichment consequent upon a frustrated 
contract.  Evans-Jones argues that this action has a more limited sphere of application to transfers 
operating outside of a contractual relationship.  See Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Co 1923 SC (HL) 105; 1923 SLT 624. 
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court went on to hold, however, that precise resolution of this point was not 
necessary, since the requirements of proof of both condictiones were the same.121 
 
Visser states that the condictio ob causam finitam is the generally accepted action in 
South African law following supervening impossibility.122  Although Scots law 
employs the condictio causa data causa non secuta in this context, Evans-Jones 
convincingly demonstrates that this is due to a confusion between the civilian and 
common law sources and that this action is not correctly used in this context.123  If a 
general enrichment action were to be recognised this would obviate the need to 
distinguish between the different condictiones and the focus would shift instead to 
the identifying of the general elements of the action.124 
 
In the context of discharge of a contract due to changed circumstances, the same 
position as per supervening impossibility should pertain in South African law.  This is 
because essentially one is still dealing with a contract that existed at one time, but 
has now been terminated due to supervening events.  The same enrichment 
considerations pertain, the only difference being that the grounds of discharge in 
contract law have been broadened.  Thus if parties to a contract which has been 
struck by hardship are unable to renegotiate successfully, there should be a 
disgorgement of benefits using the condictio ob causam finitam.  Should a general 
enrichment action one day come to pass, this would then become the appropriate 
cause of action in this context. 
 
A final point on this topic is due to the status of the defence of loss of enrichment.  
Visser states that in this context a party which is sued for return of a benefit under a 
contract discharged due to supervening impossibility may successfully raise the 
defence that the enrichment no longer exists.125  Thus the risk of loss lies with the 
party who makes performance.126  Visser submits that the defence of loss of 
enrichment should be withdrawn in this context and that a party should be liable to 
                                               
121 Kudu Granite supra note 116 at [16]. 
122 Daniel Visser Unjustified Enrichment (2008) at 481. 
123 Evans-Jones op cit note 120 at 174 – 175. 
124 McCarthy Retail supra note 117 at [10]. 




restore a benefit she has received, or failing this, the value thereof.127  This places 
the risk on the party in possession of the benefit, who is best able to manage that 
risk, by (for instance) insuring the item in question.128 
 
8.6 Hardship Clauses 
 
As noted at the outset in chapter two, parties to an agreement are always free to 
include a hardship clause of their own design in their contract.129  This would achieve 
a consensual regulation of the impact of possible future hardship causing events.  
Since the approach to hardship advocated in this thesis is the introduction of a 
residual common law rule by the courts to regulate the sharing of losses and gains 
consequent upon the occurrence of an unforeseen event, it is logical that the 
inclusion of a hardship clause by the parties should exclude the operation of a rule of 
the type envisaged here.  The justification for this exclusion of the doctrine is that to 
interfere with an agreement already regulated by a hardship clause ex post facto 




A comparison of South African law with the foreign jurisdictions examined in this 
thesis confirms the impression that this country is lagging behind the rest of the 
world in terms of dealing with the problem of changed circumstances.  Our lack of a 
doctrine to accommodate a situation of hardship does indeed leave a gap in our law.  
South African parties trading in the international arena may thus wish to rather 
submit their disputes to arbitration and agree to have their contracts governed by the 
PICC.  Within our municipal jurisdiction, however, our current approach provides no 
solution to the problem.  The insistence of our courts upon the concept of pacta sunt 
servanda flies in the face of international norms and is clearly an outdated approach. 
 
There are signs that the granite concept of contractual sanctity is starting to crack in 
places, however, most notably at the instance of fairness in contracting.  The 
                                               
127 Ibid at 499 – 500. 
128 Ibid at 500 – 501. 
129 See chapter 2 section 2.2.1. 
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Barkhuizen decision is a clear indication, sanctioned by the Constitutional Court 
itself, that courts are now justified in limiting pacta sunt servanda in the interests of 
justice.  What exactly the interests of justice are would vary from context to context, 
but in the present area of changed circumstances justice calls for a splitting of the 
impact of an unforeseen event, so that the hardship caused by the change is not 
born by one party alone.  Justification for the equity of such loss-sharing could be 
found in constitutional values of dignity and equality, as well as the implied value of 
fairness, which inform the concept of public policy.130  Public policy should not be 
applied in an ad hoc manner, however, rather it should form the underlying rationale 
for grafting a new doctrine onto our law.  This doctrine should take the form of a rule 
of contract law (which the parties may exclude or vary by agreement).    This rule 
should set the threshold at which redress will be granted for changed circumstances 
and provide appropriate remedies.  A good guide as to the ideal content of such a 
rule can be found in the PICC articles on hardship, read with those of the PECL and 
the DCFR. 
 
This change could be made through a development of our common law by the 
courts.  Fairness in contracting would underlie the introduction of this new rule and it 
would introduce a definition of hardship to cover frustration of purpose and 
impracticability.  Policy considerations, such as the importance of maintaining the 
sanctity of contracts could be accommodated through the conditions placed on the 
operation of such a rule.  Since such a change is needed to give effect to 
constitutional values, the courts would merely be exercising their powers in terms of 
s 39(2) and s 173 of the Constitution. 
 
Alternatively change could be brought about through legislation.  This would codify 
our law and would provide the necessary impetus for a new approach to be adopted.  
The legislature has a higher democratic pedigree than the courts in order to effect 
what would be a fairly major policy shift in the existing law.  Such a remedy could 
                                               
130 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at [91]. See also:  AJ Barnard-Naudé “‘Oh what a tangled 
web we weave…’ Hegemony, freedom of contract, good faith and transformation – towards a politics 
of friendship in the politics of contract” (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 155 at 196; Lubbe op cit 
note 34 at 421. 
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also then provide for the controversial solution of renegotiation or judicial revision of 
contracts struck by hardship. 
 
The Legislature seems paralysed with indecision, however.  The South African Law 
Commission Bill from over ten years ago was never enacted and developments in 
the area of fairness in contracting had to be undertaken by the Constitutional Court.  
The rules on hardship should thus be formulated as part of the common law of 
contract.  Prudent parties are still able to include force majeure and hardship clauses 
in their contracts to regulate their own balancing of the risk of an unforeseen change 
of circumstances.  In this way more sophisticated parties could manage their own 
risks, and avoid the uncertainty of relying on judicial intervention in their contract.  
Parties of lesser sophistication would have the gaps in their contracts filled by the 
common law. 
 
The way forward is thus to develop our South African law to take account of changed 
circumstances.  This would not be an abandonment of contractual certainty – as the 
comparative studies have demonstrated – rather it would simply achieve a more 
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